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ABSTRACT 
The philosophical approach that I have taken in my thesis, is an attempt 
to evaluate the importance of Kant's and Wittgenstein's thinking for art and 
design practice in education. In order to substantiate my central claim that art 
and design experience needs to be taken seriously in education, I begin by 
discussing through Kant's and Wittgenstein' s work some of the major theoretical 
concerns that appear to underpin aesthetic activity, its experience and thus 
creative involvement. From this analysis and by developing some of these 
arguments further, in relation to practical problems,· I explore and demonstrate 
in the final part of my thesis some of the factors which determine and account 
for art and design learning in education. The arguments that I produce, are an 
attempt to redefine expression and meaning in art and design education in a 
more precise and accurate way. In this respect, the essential distinctions that I 
aim to clarify concern some of the issues that affect and establish art and design 
understanding. In general, my arguments are a defence against considering art 
and design experience as indeterminate, subjective and simplistic. It is with this 
in mind, that I challenge the way art and design experience is often interpreted 
in education. The point that I stress, is that art and design practice is a complex 
and sophisticated learning activity. It is my contention that the complexity of 
understanding which art and design can entail and which I describe in this work, 
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has seldom been explicitly articulated within an art and design educational 
context. The suggestions that I make in my work, outline certain ideas which 
have implications for art and design curriculum issues and teaching practice. 
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Preface 
This investigation is essentially about the notion that the aesthetic is a 
creative experience and its importance for art and design education. Taking 
what appears to be a Kantian position of the aesthetic, it was Louis Arnaud Reid 
who wrote: "A work of art, then, is (at least) something made, or created with 
aesthetically imaginative intention. It is often said to be an "expression" of the 
artist's mind or personality, or his feelings and emotions" (1986, p.14). My two 
main educational aims, therefore, are: (1) to explain this experience and to 
suggest that what constitutes and conditions the aesthetic must partly underpin 
the educational curriculum of art and design at all levels, and (2) to demonstrate 
how learning and understanding takes place in art and design education, and in 
this respect, to determine how aesthetic experience can manifest itself in the 
educational curriculum as an important contribution to self-knowledge and 
understanding. 
The aesthetic, being synonymous with creativity preoccupies most 
people's lives in one form or another, yet few understand how it operates. A 
common assumption here seems to be that, aesthetic learning is often seen as 
very peculiar, unsatisfactory and obscure. One often thinks of art and design 
education as purely a matter of "feeling", an experience obsessed with emotions, 
idle fancy, dreams and passions. But nothing could be further from the truth, 
for as Ernst Cassirer writes: "For artistic inspiration is not intoxication, artistic 
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imagination is not dream or hallucination. Every great work of art IS 
characterised by a deep structural unity" (1945, p.163). It is my intention to 
debate this deep structural "unity" that Cassirer mentions, for art and design 
teachers, lecturers, examiners, assessors, and generalists, lack in my view a 
theoretical and objective understanding of the importance of this aesthetic 
approach, its relevance and learning potential. Consequently, in what follows, I 
will explore the philosophical and practical implications of aesthetic experience 
for education. At the end of this preface I outline specifically the issues that I 
will address. 
The aesthetic plays many roles in human existence, yet to understand 
the objective sense of this phenomenon, our judgement needs to be informed by 
a detailed knowledge of its historical, developing and changing structure. This 
work attempts to explain something of the nature of this aesthetic and how one 
can account for it in a determinate manner. Yet, some might argue that the 
mere name "aesthetic" is a matter of indifference, that it presupposes certain 
conditions on art and design that do not reflect the diverse ways in which the 
creative mind flows between subject and object, material and idea, that art and 
design can refuse to relate, to order, to set boundaries, limits and purposes. All 
this is true, but none of it negates the fact that art and design is primarily an 
aesthetic experience that has a critical and determined structure to it. The 
challenge here, in one sense, is to enquire into Louis Arnaud Reid's comment as 
to what it means to say that a work of art and design as an aesthetic concern, is 
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imaginative, is a matter of feeling and is a personal response of the artist or 
designer. This kind of aesthetic experience is further described by Reid as 
embodying, the whole person (1986, p.19). It is my contention, that such 
aesthetic experience is embedded in social historical practice, personal vision 
and relates to a public conception of understanding that personifies learning in its 
most inspiring form. 
My research, above all, examines the aesthetic as an experience and as 
a practice that has implications for the way art and design is taught in education. 
I take the view, that art and design education must be a creative experience, but 
that this creative experience is accountable and can be significantly relevant in 
the development of our understanding, as to what constitutes learning. It is my 
contention that this creative experience and its learning extends and develops 
new relationships and realities of experience. It is to be noted, that to achieve 
this, the aesthetic must be a highly sensuous and cognitive experience, one that 
seems to draw the subjective and objective together, and as will be explained, 
this is exactly what I aim to demonstrate. For the art and design teacher, it 
would seem important that the teacher knows something about how this 
experience operates, so that he or she can make effective use of this experience 
in the course of teaching. 
In order to substantiate my position on this, I have felt it necessary to 
show firstly what I see is the theoretical structure of this aesthetic concern from 
a Kantian and Wittgensteinian critique. Before I begin to assemble some of the 
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multifaceted arguments and counter-arguments that permeate through both 
Kant's and Wittgenstein' s understanding of the aesthetic, one may well ask why 
Kant and Wittgenstein? To begin with, there has been recently a resurgence in 
Wittgenstein's work in its relevance for education, as Smeyers and Marshall 
argue, Wittgenstein's philosophy: "has challenged and changed the 
understanding of some of our basic concepts including those of "experience", 
"learning" and "teaching" (1995, p.221). These are certainly some of the issues 
that I wish to discuss, but it seems a shame, however, that the same cannot be 
said for Kant, for while his work is often mooted, it is seldom openly and 
persuasively argued in art and design education. Here in this thesis I will argue 
that Kant too, has some insightful thoughts in terms of "experience", "learning" 
and "teaching". While these philosophers have, in one sense, enormously 
different views of the aesthetic, both of these philosophers offer something in 
aesthetic terms that the other does not. I have further felt it necessary, given the 
complexity of Kant's and Wittgenstein's work in relation to learning issues, not 
to combine the arguments of these philosophers but to examine their work and 
itS educational significance separately. This thesis is broken down into three 
sections: in the first section I discuss Kant's aesthetic ideas, in the second section 
I discuss Wittgenstein' s aesthetic ideas and in the section three, my purpose will 
be to show how in practice aesthetic learning manifests itself and develops in art 
and design education in terms of the discussion of Kant and Wittgenstein. Let 
me start by stating the complexity of the problem before us regarding aesthetic 
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experience, as this will provide an overview of some of the issues that appear 
throughout this work. 
In many ways, what both Kant and Wittgenstein tentatively agree on is 
that in the aesthetic, first and third person involvement appears to be going on, 
but the status of this involvement from a Kantian position, is primarily 
first-person "subjectivism", while for Wittgenstein the status centres on a 
"public" conception of understanding. Kant's strength seizes on the sensuous 
and cognitive nature of aesthetic experience (though not as a purely 
physiological experience), its individuality and its "unconditional" and intuitive 
arrangement. Thus, both Kant and Wittgenstein fonnulate aesthetic 
understanding on different grounds. Kant's emphasis on "disinterest" being 
contingent on what gives rise in "free-play", through the "harmony" of 
imagination and understanding to the state of pleasure, might be contrasted with 
Wittgenstein's conception that the aesthetic is dependent on "practice and 
description". In this respect, Wittgenstein' s emphasis on "description" and 
Kant's emphasis on "disinterest" is a further point of contrast and incompatibility 
between these two philosophers. These notions give us a clue for understanding 
the difference between, on the one hand, "disinterest" and on the other 
"practice". Despite these differences, I will attempt to show that "disinterest" 
and "practice" are not that far apart as one might initially think in art and design 
education. 
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It seems, then, that Kant and Wittgenstein identify different things; for 
Kant the aesthetic on prima fiJ.cie evidence is a private world, but for 
Wittgenstein this world is far from "private". The difficulty for Kant here 
seems to be how can the aesthetic be "private" and yet rely on intersubjective 
agreement Does the "private", in fact, negate intersubjectivity? For 
Wittgenstein, his problem is not so much the wholesale denial of "private" 
occurrence, but rather his aesthetic appears ignorant of some of the deep 
epistemological and cognitive arguments that Kant produces in relation to 
aesthetic experience itself. Now, the central tenet of my thesis is concerned with 
"how one learns in reference to art and design practice". That is to say, how is 
art and design experience expressed and how is such expression given 
"meaning" . Both of the philosophers that I have chosen have stated a different 
view on what constitutes learning in the aesthetic, but it seems to me that neither 
Wittgenstein or Kant are entirely correct in their views about the aesthetic. The 
stand that I take is not so much that "subjectivity" is irrelevant but rather that the 
aesthetic can be interpreted as objective. On the face of it, there seems to be 
something misleading about claiming that the aesthetic is objective, but Kant's 
notion of aesthetic "subjectivity" might be interpreted as a means of distancing 
the aesthetic from his "theoretical" and "practical" notions, so as to not confuse 
what differentiates the aesthetic from these concerns. There is a world of 
difference, Kant would argue, between strict "analytic" and "synthetic" 
judgements and those aesthetic judgements which are "purposive" in kind. In 
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the former, Kant is attempting to determine the conditions for a pnon 
propositions, and in the latter, merely the conditions and suitability that one can 
attribute in the general sense to aesthetic experience. 
In some ways then, aesthetic "subjectivity" is a red herring, for Kant 
seems paradoxically to be using it in an objective fashion, albeit one that is 
different to his "theoretical" and "practical" doctrine. Similarly, aesthetic 
"subjectivity" appears to be used by Kant to represent a different kind of 
experience and reality which is not found in the "theoretical" or the "practical". 
One is, of course, obliged to admit that Kant does not go far enough in 
explaining aesthetic experience and it is at this point that Wittgenstein' s 
contribution to the notion of aesthetic objectivity is certainly important, for he 
deals with an aspect of aesthetic understanding that Kant does not touch, notably 
a "public" sense of what constitutes recognition. What I wish to show is that 
art and design education combines both Kant's notion that learning in the 
aesthetic involves "purposiveness", and Wittgenstein's argument that such 
experience also connects through "noticing an aspect", a description that can be 
objective in kind. 
Kant's aesthetic arguments correctly prohibit anything purely 
determinate about aesthetic experience other than it is sensuous, an imaginary 
perception that he believes (correctly in my view) through "disinterest" and 
"purposiveness" is "beautiful". Paradoxically, Kant has a powerful argument 
here, for in itself "disinterest" may well be distinctively "beautiful", but not 
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necessarily in the wider object context and employment of this term. However, 
to further complicate the issue, it is without question that the aesthetic is largely 
self-determining, but for Kant this was an experience that involved "free-play" 
and "purposiveness" as a precondition for aesthetic experience, while for 
Wittgenstein there are no preconditions, for everything is dependent on "usage". 
The fruitful argument that Kant turns to here, is that the imagination transcends 
reason as it connects with the sensuous side of experience. 
In conclusion, my investigation nevertheless construes, by contrasting 
and comparing Wittgenstein' s ideas against Kant I s, that Wittgenstein' s 
contribution to the aesthetic is not only a valid one, but one that confronts in one 
respect the Kantian position on aesthetics head-on. The argument that 
Wittgenstein makes, in contrast to Kant's position, is that understanding is 
ŤŸŪWÙŠŨŨXĚan activity and that this activity being descriptive determines its 
1 objectivity. However, the fact that there are clear differences between Kant and 
Wittgenstein seems unquestionable, but in my opinion since this work is about 
how aesthetic learning can be seen as objective, an objective view of the 
aesthetic must recognise that there is a private side of this experience, but one I 
hasten to add, which can be objectifiable. Let me further state, that, for Kant, 
the cohesiveness of the aesthetic through purposiveness, and the belief that the 
individual brings something unique of itself to the work, are rich, unshakeable 
and enduring arguments. This is something of course, that needs to be proved. 
So, while the theses of these two philosophers may appear to confront one 
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another, it is my understanding that in some respects these ideas can be 
reconciled. The point being, that educationally, the aesthetic connects to the 
private as well as to the public and it is a fact that art and design experience can 
and does draw from these different experiences, that demonstrate in one respect, 
just how imaginative and creative art and design experience can be. Moreover, 
I will argue how aesthetic experience in educational terms, presupposes in an 
important sense, self-realisation and understanding. 
In the final part of this thesis I draw together what I see are the 
educational implications of this work and outline its importance for art and 
design teaching practice. I will attempt to show from a teaching perspective, 
some of the critical factors that can affect the development of art and design 
learning. In this final part of my manuscript, in relation to Kant's and 
\yittgenstein t s ideas, I will explore the role of the teacher and student in art and 
design education. The focus, as stated, is undoubtedly how self-realisation and 
understanding manifests itself in art and design education and how this 
experience is conceived and developed. How one elicits and confers art and 
design expression and its understanding needs vindicating. In connection to this, 
the critical attitude that one might be looking for, from a teaching point of view, 
is whether alterations, adjustments, developments and different experiences are 
being integrated into the learning situation in various ways. This needs to be 
borne in mind, but the issue of learning, will only be settled at the end of our 
enquiry, for clearly one needs to debate first some of the arguments and 
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counter-arguments that affect education in art and design. It is my intention to 
show how the theoretical can throw light on and perhaps enlarge a better 
understanding of some the concerns in art and design education. In learning 
terms, aesthetic interpretations can be unquestionably varied, and this, as may be 
argued, poses problems for the teacher. But as a preliminary to the conclusion 
of my thesis, let me state the possible changes that I feel art and design 
education has to adopt given the theoretical implications of this work. These 
are: (1) that aesthetic subjectivity in itself is dangerous for it misconstrues how 
its experience and its intellectual stance can be seen on a par with other 
educational subjects such as science and technology. In order to change this 
way of thinking about the aesthetic, I aim to demonstrate clearly from a Kantian 
and Wittgensteinian position, that the aesthetic is objective in its experience and 
"usage" and constitutes levels of understanding that can be formidable, (2) that 
there is a need to understand that what constitutes aesthetic experience in itself 
offers a unique, rewarding and accountable experience, (3) that the concept of 
creativity presupposes a complex understanding which is far from arbitrary and 
(4) that learning in art and design education must embrace fundamentally a 
creative approach so as to establish aesthetic validity and expression. 
16 
CbapterOne 
Klmt's Aesthetic 
Introduction 
By investigating the Kantian position on aesthetics as laid out in the 
Critique of Judgement, the special problem that I explore is Kant's assertion 
that the aesthetic per se is profound. It is a special problem not only because of _ 
the difficulty of explaining the aesthetic in terms of its importance, but also 
because the aesthetic is deemed by Kant as constituting a "necessity". In this 
part of my thesis, the areas that I will cover, concern Kant's notion that on the 
one hand the aesthetic is subjective, and that the main characteristics of aesthetic 
subjectivity can be found in his concept of "free-play", "disinterest" and 
"purposiveness". In the first part of this work, in relation to aesthetic 
subjectivity, I draw out some of Kant's major arguments that attempt to clarify 
why he maintains that the aesthetic is subjective in kind. In relation to this I 
have felt it necessary to state further why he thinks the aesthetic on a certain 
level is a priori and universal. Kant has to demonstrate that the aesthetic is 
subjective a priori in order to claim that the aesthetic has a unique character to 
it. In this respect, he argues that the aesthetic is not purely conceptually based, 
but rather, presupposed by an imaginative feeling response. In this section, 
then, my chief aim has been to state a few of the fundamental conditions that 
Kant feels ground all aesthetic experiences. Following on from Kant's 
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conception that the aesthetic is subjective in kind, my approach in "Pleasure, 
Beauty and a Judgement of Taste", interconnects with the f11"st part of this work 
through Kant's notion that the aesthetic is the play of the cognitive faculties 
(imagination and understanding). Both pleasure and beauty can be regarded as 
aesthetic subjective experiences, but Kant holds that only beauty is universal 
(CI, §6). In general, the a priori judgement of aesthetic experiences rests on 
the condition of pleasure as a reflection of "purposiveness" (CI, intro. VII). 
Here, Kant appears to be aware (CI, §12) that one cannot connect one's 
aesthetic feelings a priori to the given object as its cause. This, then, may seem 
to add to our difficulty as to what constitutes a priori grounds for aesthetic 
experience. Kant, as will be seen, differentiates, in one respect, between 
disinterested pleasure (beauty) and pleasure originating from an interest or 
purpose. In the light of these conditions Kant determines through intersubjective 
agreement that the aesthetic is primarily a singular, autonomous and 
"disinterested" (CI, §5, 210) experience. What determines the form of the 
singular, autonomous and "disinterested" experience stems, according to Kant, 
from the "harmony" that is "purposive" and in "free-play" (C!, §9, 217). This 
distinction that the aesthetic is "purposive", indicates that such experience is not 
simply a judgement of perception. It is largely as a result of this that Kant 
holds that beauty personifies all that is best in aesthetic experience. Yet it is 
Kant's intention to distinguish and categorise two different kinds of beauty; 
"pure beauty" and "impure beauty". The former Kant refers to as free beauty 
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and the latter he refers to as dependent beauty. Whether such categorisation is 
possible when it comes to determining aesthetic experience in this way, is 
something which I will consider. 
In my conclusion to this Kantian section of my thesis, I not only 
reiterate in brief terms, what the aesthetic consists of, and how this experience 
estimates and affects certain kinds of judgement, but I will also attempt to 
emphasise the importance of this work. For it seems to me that Kant holds the 
key whereby one can begin to demonstrate the significance of the aesthetic for 
art and design education, because he lays down some of its fundamental 
principles that clearly demonstrate just how creative and important this 
experience can be. Finally, while it may be argued that there are many possible 
confusions and problems with Kant's Critique of Judgement, I have attempted, 
from a theoretical position, to explain, some of the factors that may be useful to 
an art and design teacher's understanding of the aesthetic. 
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1.1 
For Kant, the aesthetic, as an experience, involves elements which defy 
measurement and it is on this basis that he attempts to construe the aesthetic as 
essentially subjective. Firstly, it is important to bear in mind, before one goes 
any further with this, that the reason why Kant thinks the aesthetic defies 
measurement is because the aesthetic experience is very different to his notion of 
"objectivity". There are deep reasons why Kant thinks the aesthetic defies 
measurement, and I will begin to explain this in a moment, but just because the 
aesthetic defies measure, it must be noted, that this does not exclude the 
aesthetic from being objective. For the notion of objectivity is not tied 
exclusively to measurement, but as Wittgenstein points out, to "practice" (a term 
ŸWĚwill be described in chapter two of this manuscript). While Kant's concept 
of subjectivity is explained in aesthetic terms in this piece of work, his notion of 
objectivity itself, is not adequately discussed (although references are made 
throughout this work which explain, in a limited sense, what objectivity in the 
Kantian sense involves). It is, however, necessary to distinguish the subjective 
from the objective, for it is a key issue in discerning Kant's understanding of 
aesthetics. As will be shown, Kant's philosophy of aesthetic subjectivity is 
indeed a complex affair that involves amongst other things, a certain 
understanding of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Yet, for Paul Guyer, 
aesthetic subjectivity (1979, p.85), is conditioned and unified by an imaginative 
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experience, but as I will argue, there is much more involved in this notion of 
aesthetic subjectivity than one might presuppose. For imaginative experience 
seems to be present in almost everything that one does, aesthetic or otherwise. "*' 
A modest conclusion to this would be that Kant, in part, clearly demonstrates 
some of the judgement features (as will be explained) that affect imaginative 
understanding in aesthetic terms. On the one hand, Kant is attempting to put 
constraints on what establishes aesthetic experience in order to claim how one 
apprehends and represents this experience, but he does not, however, specify 
the properties that determine particular aesthetic experiences. Kant himself, 
hints at this point when he mentions in his preface to this work, that his task is 
to categorise only the principles of aesthetic judgement. 
In considering the Critique of Judgement, Kant formulates a totally 
different hypothesis and set of principles from those found in either the Critique 
of Pure Reason or the Critique of Practical Reason. But this is not to say, that 
there are not deliberate connections that Kant attempts to fuse together from 
these two other important Critiques in order to characterise the aesthetic. He 
begins, for example, in the Critique of Judgement by naming the Four Moments 
as: quality, quantity, relation and modality and this, no doubt, is a clear move 
by him, to get us to recognise certain similarities with his Table of Judgement 
and thus its concept of understanding in the Critique of Pure Reason. It is quite 
possible that the point that Kant is making here, is that because the Four 
Moments constitute elements which go to form Kant's understanding of beauty, 
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these Four Moments being aesthetic categories, relate to Kant's overall thesis 
that aesthetic judgement possesses certain conditional elements, not unlike the 
Table of Judgements. The view is, in an analogous sense, that like the Table of 
Judgements, Kant wants to establish "laws" and principles which conform to 
aesthetic experience, which one might regard as constituting a form of 
objectivity . 
While each of these Moments deal with an aspect of the aesthetic itself 
(being in some respects self-contained), they are nevertheless interdependent. 
This interdependency can be likened to Kant's Table of Judgements in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, in that he makes it clear that any kind of judgement has 
certain properties relating to quality, quantity, relation and modality. Kant 
determines the aesthetic as having four essential characteristics which are: (1) 
that the aesthetic can be beautiful, (2) that the aesthetic can be characterised as 
'7 universal, (3) that the aesthetic is purposive and (4) that the aesthetic is 40'- ŸĚ
autonomous and relates to particular and singular feelings of experience. In 
conjunction and springing from the above four categories, the aesthetic as a 
judgement of taste has two other important characteristics which must be borne 
in mind. These are: firstly, that in one sense the aesthetic is contingent, and 
secondly, the aesthetic as a judgement of taste is devoid of "interest" and any 
definite sense of Kant's notion of objectivity. Paradoxically, while in one 
respect the aesthetic is devoid of "interest", in another, it positively embraces 
this concern through its individuality (a point that many Kantian philosophers 
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ŸĦĚ
have failed to notice: Paul Guyer, Donald Crawford, Paul Crowther, Dieter +-
Henrich, Anthony Savile, Eva Schaper and Salim Kemal). 
In examining Kant's aesthetic hypothesis, one needs to take account of 
the Four Moments since they form the means by which he considers that 
aesthetic validity can be judged as a judgement of taste. In tum, what grounds 
these Four Moments is predetermined, to a large degree, by the Critique of 
Judgement's introduction. However, as a preliminary, what has to be borne in 
mind, is that the aesthetic constitutes for Kant three things: (1) it is a personal 
individual decision based on one's experience, (2) its pleasure is derivative of 
imagination and understanding and (3) that because it relates to cognition in 
general, purposiveness, and the subject's feeling response and analytical 
understanding, this experience must also be regarded as having epistemological 
properties. It is for these reasons that Kant regards the aesthetic as subjective a 
priori. Kant's investigation centres on the fact that the aesthetic is a matter of 
experience that presupposes, above all else, creativity. What confronts us, is an 
enquiry into what constitutes the notion that the aesthetic is a creative concern of 
considerable constitution and judgement. 
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1.2 
Plainly, if no definite concept from a Kantian position can adequately 
define, conceive, measure or represent an aesthetic experience what kind of 
experience is the aesthetic, what does it consist of and how does it operate? To 
answer this, one of the first things that Kant wants to get across is that aesthetic 
judgement represents a possible "middle term" (CJ, intro. ID); a cross between 
theoretical (conceptual a prion) involvement and practical (the will, freedom 
and moral) involvement. Accordingly, what the aesthetic consists of and how it 
operates is determined through this "middle term" . Yet, to what extent one can 
say there is this middle ground which the aesthetic occupies, may be difficult to 
substantiate, so much so that perhaps it is misleading to describe the aesthetic as 
a possible "middle term", even though, aesthetic experience may involve 
theoretical and practical considerations. All kinds of problems arise as to how 
one can define and experience the aesthetic as a "middle term", if the aesthetic 
manifests in its own way as a particular and singular experience not bounded by 
any specific rules or relations. But as philosophers have mentioned (Ernst 
Cassirer, Paul Crowther, Paul Guyer, Stuart Hampshire and Eva Schaper), the 
aesthetic as a "middle term" construes interdependently theoretical and practical 
reasoning. Without, however, wanting to dwell on this notion of a "middle 
term", the aesthetic as an experience for Kant combines the cognitive processes 
of imagination and understanding in such away, that the aesthetic principle of 
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"unity" is one of pleasure corresponding to the "harmony" between imagination 
and understanding. As Kant mentions (Cl, §9), the "harmony" is what brings 
about objectivity, for representation, he argues, must harmonise. The 
"harmony" is what makes cognition possible, as it combines imagination and 
understanding in "spontaneity". It may be argued from this, that it is only when 
imagination and understanding coexist that there is spontaneity of aesthetic 
thought In wbich case, Kant seems to be arguing that aesthetic thought} 
combines reason and sense experience in an imaginative way. 
Pleasure being attached to and determined by the coexistence between 
understanding and imagination, is the means by which the aesthetic, according to 
Kant, is felt through one's consciousness. Kant feels that this experience is 
subjective a priori, a condition that Kant uses, to my mind, to claim that the 
ŸVWUŤWÙȘĚis partly objective. One of the conditions of this subjective a priori is 
that it presupposes a necessity. I concur with many philosophers (Louis Arnaud. 
Reid, Anthony Savile, Paul Crowther, and Richard Wollheim) that there are 
problems with this concept of necessity in art and design, but it seems to me 
that Kant is well aware of the difficulty of this term when he comes to. consider 
aesthetic experience. In my opinion, Kant constructs through "subjectivity" a 
different notion of this term necessity (than the one he uses in the Critique of 
Pure Reason) that will mirror in part the aesthetic, and thereby establish along 
with other claims, that the aesthetic has possible universal grounds. Here, Kant 
gets rid of the precise sense in which the a priori is meant to determine the 
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object in "objective" terms, constructing instead, an element of necessity which, 
"prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary" ĜĿÖŸĚ
A.I04). Because Kant recognised that the aesthetic through "purposiveness" was 
a unified experience (to be explained shortly), the "subjective" a priori gives 
him a basis to argue that the aesthetic is not as haphazard as some might like to 
think. The possible reason why Kant thought the aesthetic was not haphazard or 
arbitrary needs explaining. 
What Kant attempts to do through a certain kind of coexistence 
(imagination and understanding), is to demonstrate that while the aesthetic shares 
conceptual and moral principles, its representation and experiences are 
nevertheless unlike the conceptual and the moral in that the aesthetic has no 
"ulterior aim", is "spontaneous", a matter of "feeling" and in "free-play". What 
ÙŸÜŤTÙŠWŤŨXĚoccurs to us, is that if the aesthetic has no "ulterior aim" how can 
one argue that the work of art has, as Richard Wollheim argues (1993, 
pp.132-43), an intentional side to it? Likewise, Guyer makes the point about 
whether it is possible for the imagination in free-play to be independent of the 
constraints of concepts (1979, p.251). While not wishing to disagree with 
Wollheim or Guyer in the above remarks, one will fmd that Kant's interest in 
the aesthetic has a more primary goal, which is to assert firstly the nature of this 
concern. It is important to recognise the claim that Kant makes, when he states 
that: "Aesthetic finality is the conformity to law of judgement in its freedom. 
The delight in the object depends upon the reference which we seek to give to 
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the imagination, subject to the proviso that it is to entertain the mind in a free 
activity" (CI, §29, 270). Thus, Kant is asserting that one of the conditions of 
aesthetic purposiveness is that being in free-play, it is creative autonomous 
experience. The case being, that the capacity to make something one's own, to 
come into contact with one's own frame of mind ÙŸĚa necessary element of 
aesthetic understanding. Furthermore, as Guyer points out: "finality leads to the 
criticism of one form of intentionalist fallacy, namely, the assumption that a 
work's success in fulfilling its maker's intentions for it is itself a ground for 
aesthetic appreciation" (1979, p.215). Put differently, an object which may 
fulfil a certain intention does not in itself presuppose an aesthetic experience. 
One deduces that what Kant is prescribing is that the aesthetic is first and 
foremost a product of one's imaginative freedom, a sensuous encounter. But it 
may be disputable how far one can claim that aesthetic experience is in 
free-play, for as I will argue in chapters two and three, the aesthetic is neither 
indifferent nor oblivious to distinctions between what counts as real and unreal. 
What reasons are there for saying that purposiveness is an essential 
factor in aesthetic experience? An initial answer would be that because the 
aesthetic is coupled to the feeling of pleasure, what gives rise to these feelings of 
pleasure is constituted by purposiveness. Without this feeling of pleasure, which 
Kant sees as purposive and "final", there can be no aesthetic engagement or 
judgement Kant defines "final" in the aesthetic sense, when the feeling of 
pleasure involves a concept. Here the end or finality (purpose) is the means by 
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which a concept determines exclusively the kind of object that one wants to 
produce according to a set of necessary conditions which will produce this 
object. Essentially, the purpose (end) is defined by the concept and is caused by 
it (CJ, flO, 220). However, in aesthetic terms, this concept which in part is 
produced by either the mutual harmony between imagination and understanding 
or by the coexistence of these elements is not an experience which can be 
caused by some predetermined definite end. In this way, Kant does not 
consider aesthetic experience as a priori to any concept (CJ, intro. VII, 191). 
His reason for this seems to be that the aesthetic is "reflective" and based only 
on the consciousness of the subject's subjective feelings and his or her 
pen:eptions of these feelings. These perceptions, conditioned by the harmony 
between imagination and understanding, determine the fonn of the object. Kant 
ŸĚthat aesthetically one can consider the form of the object prior to any 
concept of it (CJ, intro. YIn, 192). He argues that this can operate through the 
subjective harmony of cognition in general as an intuition of the form of the 
object, or alternatively, by the purposive feeling of pleasure itself. The 
difference between these two experiences seems to be that in the first example 
there is a perception of the object involved, but in the latter, the feeling of 
pleasure may be spontaneous and may not necessarily involve a perception of the 
object as it exists. Furthermore, there is the suggestion that the feeling of 
pleasure itself is tied to cognition in the general sense. As Guyer goes on to say: 
"Specifically, what Kant is suggesting is that in the case of aesthetic judgement, 
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the recognition of the fmality of an object does not require a causal judgement 
about the relation between pleasure and an end, but is given by the feeling of 
pleasure itself' (1979, p.217). Kant sees that because the aesthetic is an 
experience in free-play, it cannot have a determinate end in respect of the cause 
of the object and its concept. In the aesthetic, nothing must be allowed to hinder 
the free-play of the cognitive powers. However, one must be careful, as Guyer 
argues, not to insist that causal judgements are not involved in aesthetic 
experience, for as Guyer puts it: "a feeling of pleasure is only a necessary and 
not a sufficient condition of such judgement" (1979, p.217). I should explain, 
before I go any further, that perception broadly involves "extrinsic" and 
"intrinsic" characteristic features, that connect to sensory, emotional, optical, 
tactile, auditory, imaginative and thought aspects of our understanding. While 
Kant sees perception as being possibly linked to our cognitive operations, 
Wittgenstein, as I will discuss later, sees perception in terms of 
sensation-language use. In contrast, Kant argues that our perception is 
determined by the harmony between imagination and understanding. 
Let us discuss further why Kant thinks the aesthetic has a "necessity" 
of its own making. At the beginning of section twelve of the Critique of 
Judgement Kant states: "The judgement of taste rests upon a priori grounds" 
(Cl, §12, 221). The effect of this move is indeed crucial, for the essential 
deduction that Kant makes is not only that the aesthetic is subjective, but that by 
necessity it is subjective. To do this, Kant has to claim that the a priori 
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connection in the aesthetic is a subjective one, because he sees the subjective in 
the aesthetic as a representation of the subject's own feelings. In order to 
understand this, it is necessary to look briefly at the objective sense upon which 
Kant formulates his a priori claim in the Critique of Pure Reason. If one is to 
attach any real importance to subjectivity, one must know what, for Kant, 
constitutes objectivity, in order to see why he might be justified in arguing that 
the aesthetic could not conform to this condition. It is only by making some 
comparisons between subjectivity and objectivity that one can discern possible 
distinctions between these two notions. One has to see that, for Kant, 
objectivity: (1) concerns deductions which are solely conceptual, (2) refers to a 
single principle, (3) means that the character and logical necessity of the concept 
does not change from one moment to the next, but rather has a definite form to 
it, and (4) represents clear systematic connections relating to the Categories 
(CPR, B.92). According to Kant, these conceptions as objects of experience, 
must be truth-functions which one is told must be object rather than subject 
based. However, against this, aesthetic subjectivity is a self-determining 
experience that operates from the premise of felt experience. Here the aesthetic 
is self-grounding as the experience does not look for someone else to act as its 
arbiter about what he or she is feeling. In this respect, the individual responds 
"intuitively" . 
Consequently, in this first critique, Kant's general premise, in relation 
to our debate, seems to be that· when I make a judgement about a particular 
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object I imply by my own judgement a necessity, but such necessity may not be 
a ŮŲÙŬŪŸĚfor the a priori also carries with it universality (CPR, B.4). Now, in 
the deduction of the frrst critique the a priori basis is: "The wgicaJ Form of all 
Judgments consists in the Objective Unity of the Apperception of the Concepts 
which they contain" (CPR, B.140-B.141). Put differently, the object I am 
holding in my hand is a pen, and what makes this object a pen will be the 
concept I hold of it. But to know it "is" a pen (CPR, B.142), requires that I can 
connect a number of particular concepts and relations to this object. What 
conceptual features, in the general sense, make this object a pen as a necessary 
condition of experience (CPR, A.119)? The situation is that the pen is not 
simply a matter of perceptive experience alone, but what also holds as a 
conceptual synthesis of connected properties relating to a general consciousness 
ŸȚĚthis object. It must also have its logical possibility, connected to 
Apperception and synthetic a priori judgements. On this basis, the Kantian 
argument is that I would need to know firstly what the concept of the 
understanding was supposed to be about, if I was going to demonstrate 
empirically how something works. In contrast, when it comes to the aesthetic, 
Kant argues that one does not need to understand the object in this way to 
engage in aesthetic experience and understanding. Kant's point here, is that 
aesthetic experiences being "spontaneous" and imaginative will not operate in 
this fashion, and given his description of "objectivity", one would be inclined to 
agree with him. Indeed, if one takes the above example as a concept of 
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objectivity, then, at first glance, it is no wonder that Kant asserts that aesthetic 
understanding cannot be connived in this manner. For the "objective" appears 
only concerned with defining the constant or its logical possibility judged by a 
systematic determinate approach. Assuming my description is accurate, one 
gets the impression that there is only a specific notion of conceptual synthesis 
that Kant considers appropriate in relation to "objectivity". In chapter two and 
three of my thesis, however, I will explore a different kind of objectivity, one 
which is not as strict, regimented or severe as Kant's interpretation would have 
us believe. 
Furthermore, as if to stress this "objective" point, Kant asserts in the 
Analytic of Concepts (CPR), that concepts fundamentally relate to conditions of 
understanding, the manifold of which is one of "unity". In this, he argues that 
ŸȘŤŮWVĚand their understanding are not factors which can be immediately 
known, as it takes a number of representations to relate to an object and its 
"unity". Such representations that go towards such conceptual understanding are 
not simply sense-impressions. Indeed, if this understanding is to be known, then 
Kant argues that it must correspond to a synthesis (CPR, A.77). However, the 
relevant point that he makes in relation to subjective and objective 
understanding, concerns empirical and transcendental deductions. For he argues 
that in the former: "which shows the manner in which a concept is acquired 
through experience and through reflection upon experience, and which therefore 
concerns, not its legitimacy, but only its de meta mode of origination" (CPR, 
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A.85). Accordingly, the subjective form of empirical and conceptual 
understanding corresponds to a certain sort of universal, but one which is 
different in a number of ways from an objective concept. The main difference 
being, that objectivity for Kant is a regular and determinate experience, as 
opposed to subjectivity which is neither regular nor determinate in the Kantian 
conceptual sense. It is to be noted that Kant is not suggesting that the aesthetic 
is not regular or determinate, it is just not regular and determinate in relation to 
pure concepts. 
There is a vital difference about "objectivity" which the subjective 
understanding does not have, and this centres on: "For this concept makes strict 
demand that something, A should be such that something else, B, follows from 
it necessarily and in accordance with an absolute universal rule" (CPR, B.124). 
"Objectivity" on these grounds rules out anything aesthetic, and whatever further 
problems one might have with this statement, it is self-evident that pure concepts 
of understanding and thus objectivity, do not correspond strictly to empirical 
understanding, in that an empirical experience on its own, does not require that 
an experience be gone through in the above prescribed manner. Aesthetically, 
however, Kant conceives that it might be possible for subjective conditions of 
thought to have objective validity (CPR, A.89, B.122-B.123, A.121-A.123) in 
the a priori sense, in order to establish a particular meaning that relates to 
aesthetic consciousness. From this, Kant establishes a number of things which 
aesthetically seem important. Firstly, Kant points out that sensibility 
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(perception) and understanding need a necessary connection if they are to 
"harmonise", and the only way this can occur is through the imagination (CPR, 
A.124). Secondly, he further insists that the imagination alone makes the 
unitary experience, whether that experience is objective or subjective (CPR, 
A.,133), and thirdly, he writes of this condition: "A pure imagination, which 
conditions all a priori knowledge, is thus one of the fundamental faculties of the 
human soul" (CPR, A. 124). 
Before I go any further with this, it would be a mistake not to recognise 
that the a priori is only one property of Kant's notion of aesthetic universality. 
Any notion of aesthetic universality would have to take in a range of factors 
which affect a judgement of taste. However, the problem for Kant is that he sees 
any a priori ground as conceptual (CPR, B.129-A.96), but since Kant insists that 
ŸŤŲŤĚis no definite conceptual notion which can be strictly applied to aesthetic 
experience, what kind of a priori condition is he then envisaging? I have 
previously indicated one sense of this term, but the way that Kant appears to get 
around this problem is to argue that the aesthetic is supposedly synthetic. As a 
number of Kantian philosophers have noted (A.C. Ewing, H.J. Paton, S. 
Komer, Jonathan Bennett), the synthetic is a matter of a logical inference, such 
that while A is different to B, A and B can be brought together to form a further 
logical concept. It is possible from this basis, to state why the synthetic 
judgement might be relevant to Kant's understanding of the aesthetic as it: (1) 
relates to intuition, (2) is reflective in the sense that no concept is given, (3) 
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involves empirical operations, (4) has a synthesis which relates to imagination 
and (5) carries with it either a priori or a posteriori distinctions. But as Guyer 
(1992, p.28) and Bennett (1990, pp.9-l2) imply, A and B may be connected in 
various ways, not all of which can be accounted for by synthetic a priori 
judgements. 
Kant, however, is drawn to the view that it is upon the immediate 
basis of intuition connected with pleasure that the synthetic condition (CI, §36, 
288) as an aesthetic experience is a priori. He believes, for instance, that this 
experience is: "present in every man, and further that we have rightly subsumed 
the given object under these conditions" (CI, §38, 290). For this to happen, let 
us first investigate how it is possible for pleasure and intuition to "harmonise". 
Kant sums up this process as follows: "The spontaneity in the play of the 
cognitive faculties whose harmonious accord contains the ground of this 
pleasure, makes the concept in question, in its consequences, a suitable 
mediating link connecting the realm of the concept of nature with that of the 
concept of freedom" (CI, intro. IX, 197). In other words, pleasure is the 
"harmony" necessitated through the spontaneity of the practical and the 
theoretical. The feeling of pleasure is final because of the way these cognitive 
elements in free-play harmonise. In free-play, the aesthetic is being itself, 
"spontaneous", autonomous and creative. It seizes on its own voice, its nature, 
which in turn presupposes pleasure. This one might say, is the a priori 
condition of aesthetic experience. It would seem, that the aesthetic is essentially 
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the result of purposiveness deriving from a general cognition of an object 
determined by its perception and pleasure, that is solely of the individual's 
making. If these conditions are met, this leads Kant in aesthetic terms to state 
that: "The object is then called beautiful; and the faculty of judging by means of 
such a pleasure (and so also with universal validity) is called taste" (CJ, intro. 
Vll, 190). 
The necessity and universality of the aesthetic rests on the power to 
comprehend the "feeling of life" (CJ, §1, 204). The a priori must connect to 
this "feeling of life". For Rudolf A. Makkreel this "feeling of life" for Kant: 
"must involve not only the capacity to act, but also the consciousness of being 
acted upon. The latter engenders a capacity to respond, which is crucial to the 
feeling of life in the Critique of Judgement' (1994, p.91). Moreover, it seems 
ŸĚme that this "feeling of life" is one of self-activity and "spontaneity". This is 
why Kant thinks the aesthetic has no ulterior aim, as "free-play" in imagination 
has, as Michael Oakeshott remarks, no ulterior ends (1959, p.40), other than its 
own voice. The situation in "free-play" is delightful because "spontaneity" is 
being created out of this experience and the free-play is "harmonious" with 
itself. When a person responds in this manner as Oakeshott states: " Each voice *' 
is the reflection of a human activity, begun without premonition of where it 
would lead, but acquiring for itself in the course of the engagement a specific 
character and a manner of speaking of its own: and within each mode of 
utterance modulation is discernible" (1959, p.12). For this to happen, free-play, 
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being a combination of understanding and imagination, produces a "mutual 
harmonising" effect which determines the aesthetic representation. Whatever the 
quality of the experience our creative thinking is nothing other than the freedom 
to experience in a particular way. This engagement excites the individual 
character of the person as a singular experience which strives towards a 
consciousness which is indifferent to the "objective" sense of the object. Thus, 
this experience is what Kant describes as subjective finality or "purposiveness". 
Needless to say, the aesthetic a priori is a judgement derived from inner sense 
and its synthesis. It is for reasons of "purposiveness" that the aesthetic cannot 
be considered arbitrary or haphazard, for as Kant argues, the aesthetic through 
purposiveness always has an aim. 
Let us further discuss "purposiveness", for it is an important element 
of the a priori aesthetic condition. According to Ernst Cassirer, the notion of 
purposiveness relates to a: "harmonious unification of the parts of a manifold, 
regardless of the grounds on which this agreement may rest and the sources from 
which it may stem" (1981, p.287). "Purposiveness" in the aesthetic sense does 
not presuppose a definite concept or purpose (end) for Kant, because the 
aesthetic is a cause of feeling that happens when, through spontaneity, a 
harmony is felt through sensation. The individual responds to this aesthetic 
purposiveness as an "internal" sense of his or her awareness. The significance 
of this, is that individuals will construct for themselves, their own experiences. 
One is able to construct for oneself because purposiveness is the expression of 
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"harmony" connected to pleasure by the powers of representation (by the 
imagination and understanding cooperating and interacting). The underlying 
central thought here of aesthetic a priori experience, is that it is a special kind 
of autonomy which is not found in either the Critique of Pure Reason or in the 
Critique of Practical Reason. Such is the nature of the aesthetic, that 
purposiveness is, as Ernst Cassirer mentions: "without purpose" (1981, p.312). 
This is because aesthetic purposiveness being an individual autonomous 
experience is: "the bare contemplation of the object irrespective of its use or of -it 
any end" (CI, §22, 242). 
Crucially, Kant regards the aesthetic as being contingent on this 
"purposiveness"; a purposiveness that is spontaneous, that happens by chance, 
an accident, an irregular or reflective experience. One deduces, that Kant's 
ŸŬŪĚof the aesthetic as "disinterest" is a pleasure which is unfashioned, 
surprising, thoughtful and impulsive; it is as he thought a "phenomenon" (CI, 
intro. Vll, 189). In this way, the aesthetic experience is constructed by 
individuality and: "displays an independent and fundamental lawfulness of its 
own" (Emst Cassirer, 1981, p.306), for it represents an intuitive sense of itself 
which is a priori unconditional and in free-play, that is justified from the point 
of view of the autonomy of the individual. Without wishing to discuss in any 
detail the notion of autonomy (a thesis in itselt), this concern embodies, from 
the point of view of this work, the aesthetic itself as a self-activity, which is 
independent of the desire for moral laws and "theoretical" concepts. Put 
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differently, aesthetic self-activity, because it "calls out" an activity of the mind, 
is concomitantly cognitive activity. Autonomy refers only to the particular and 
singular immersed spontaneity of self-expression which the subject connects in 
free-playas a cognitive and creative understanding of its experience. In this 
case, ŸVWUŤWÙȘĚautonomy is incapable of measured formulation simply because 
the aesthetic is not derived from defmite concepts. 
To repeat, in aesthetic experience new relationships are formed which 
outgrow the confines of a strict logical necessity, and moreover, oppose such 
constraints by virtue of the fact that the aesthetic positively develops a different 
way of looking and experiencing out of its own intuitive responses. This 
experience is meaningful because, as Kant argues, such experiences are part of 
reflective judgement Moreover, Kant implies that such experience through 
ŸȚŨŤȘWÙŬŪĚforms the possibility of concepts themselves (CJ, intro. VII). The 
point being, as Ernst Cassirer writes, such spontaneity: "insofar as it possesses 
true a priori validity it does not present a mere relation to given objects, but it is 
the positing of objects themselves" (1991, p.308). So far as Kant was 
concerned, the aesthetic emerges as a new experience, an experience in 
free-play not as an arbitrary attribute, or something which is tagged on the end 
of concepts, but something final, primary, representative and rewarding. 
Whatever complaints one may have in relation to pleasure, (which is merely the 
outcome and not the ground) it is clear to me, that Kant's argument centres on 
aesthetic creativity being a matter of autonomy, of self-expression and its 
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fulfilment in intuitive and imaginative involvement. These are the conditions 
that connect creativity as an aesthetic concern. Here creativity is synonymous 
with the aesthetic and may be taken as unified cumulative experience. This 
aesthetic cumulative experience is "always in itself sensible" ĜĿÖŸĚA.124), 
because the imagination connecting the perception and the understanding unifies 
the experience. 
Because the aesthetic is grounded in intuition (and thus empirical 
conditions), let me attempt to give a brief account of how intuition in Kantian 
terms, is imbued in this condition. At the beginning of the Transcendental 
Aesthetic in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant immediately opens a debate about 
. intuition. He insists that intuition is the mode by which I receive representations 
of objects in sensibility (CPR, A.20). However, for Kant, whatever I intuit in a 
ŸȚŬŨTĚof experience I must do so in relation to either space or time (CPR, 
A.22). Although space and time, when corresponding to intuition, are 
considered subjective, they are nevertheless a priori representations. This has to 
do with the fact that nothing concerned with appearance (the form of the object) 
can be represented as having determined shape, size, relation and so on, without 
engaging the conditions of space and time. In the current sense, the reason why 
such experience is deemed to be subjective is because the intuitive experience 
which determines shape, size and so on is a relation to inner determinates; a 
sensible rather than a logical condition. 
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Without wanting to discuss space and time specifically (important 
though this issue is), the explanation that Kant gives of space and time as 
intuition in itself for an aesthetic experience: "is valid not in relation to 
sensibility in general but only in relation to a particular standpoint or to a 
particularity of structure in this or that sense" (CPR, A.4S). While intuition in 
relation to objects is regarded by Kant as determined by appearances (CPR, 
A.45) , this intuition if so determined by perception and thus understood to be 
"posited and ordered" in a certain way, is no longer an intuition, (CPR, A.20) 
because now this intuition through appearance has form. If intuition, as 
remarked, is through appearance a perception, then according to Kant such a 
perception belongs to the faculty of imagination (CI, intro. VI, 190). He 
writes: "Imagination is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is 
not in itself present" (CPR, B.ISI). As inner sense, imagination combines 
through a threefold synthesis (that involves reproduction, recognition and 
apprehension) to become what Kant claims is an act of spontaneity (CPR, 
B.130-2). One must therefore see that spontaneity has a special meaning for 
Kant that cannot be found in a dictionary. 
In conclusion to this section, the aesthetic is subjective precisely 
because its experience is determined by first-person sense. Not surprisingly, 
Kant claims that the character of this experience comes about because the 
aesthetic manifests itself through intuition in the free-play of imagination and 
understanding. Whatever the faults proposed by private experience, Kant is 
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absolutely justified in my view to claim that aesthetic experience must involve a 
singular and autonomous experience that connects with the imagination and 
understanding. In the Kantian sense, as Ernst Cassirer mentions, the aesthetic 
has a "goal purely within itself, a new image of reality" (1981, p.307), which 
serves its own needs not out of some twisted or vain insistence on 
comprehending what is being conceived, but because the aesthetic reaches a part 
of life that is necessary to experience; an experience that is boundless and 
dependent only on the possibility derived from the harmony of the sensuous 
feeling in imagination and understanding. Out of this comes the perception that 
every aesthetic judgement must unite these conditions of experience. If one is 
to speak of aesthetic creativity, Kant foresaw, what Wittgenstein was unable to 
realise, that the aesthetic was not just dependent on "usage" but experience; an 
experience that presupposes certain conditions of engagement. Likewise in this 
survey, Kant's view, as explained, is that in one sense, the aesthetic is 
purposiveless, for the aesthetic is not calculated systematically by units measured 
line by line, sensation by sensation, fact by fact, texture by texture. My feelings 
are that, given certain conditions, Kant has a point here. This point does 
indeed do damage to Wittgenstein' s argument of usage, for while the concept of 
usage could be invoked here, Kant's argument centres on the fact that an 
experience of this kind is valid not from the premise of usage, but from the 
premise that the aesthetic is the result of "disinterest" (this will be explained 
later). 
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1.3 
Some might suppose, that it is one thing to claim what constitutes an 
aesthetic experience and quite another to judge whether a particular aesthetic 
experience is correct (this is an issue that is also debated in chapter two of this 
thesis). Difficulties arise when one often cites in aesthetic terms, particular 
experiences that confound convention. Whatever the problem between these two 
questions, the distinction that Kant draws is that what constitutes an aesthetic 
experience must always be present in any particular aesthetic experience. One 
might be tempted to think from this that there is a certain deterministic quality to 
Kant's understanding of the aesthetic, but adopting such a position would be to 
misconstrue Kant's argument entirely. Kant's doctrine is quite clear, that no 
understanding of the aesthetic is fulfilled without one focusing on the particular 
aesthetic intuition itself. The paramount condition that Kant is claiming, is that 
the aesthetic in free-play (which sustains the imagination) is autonomous and 
involves in a purposive manner, imagination and understanding, that must be felt 
as a present experience of the intuition itself. This argument reveals and affmns 
that creativity must not be stifled or tied down to certain antecedent concepts or 
perceptions. The aesthetic is a relevant a priori experience in itself that is 
perfectly capable of unifying an experience out of its own devices, in such a way 
that its results can, according to Kant, be beautiful. This originality, Kant feels, 
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is not matched in the "theoretical" or the "practical". It seems that the first step 
towards aesthetic judgement is that it must not predetermine the experience. 
However, for Kant, judgement was either: "the faculty of thinking as 
contained under the universal" (CI, intro. IV) or either: "the particular is given 
and the universal has to be found for it, then the judgement is simply reflective" 
(CI, intro. IV). The fust proposition applies to the Critique of Pure Reason 
and relates to purely conceptual and cognitive conditions. Whereas, as will be 
explained in a moment, it is this second proposition in particular, that Kant 
proposes corresponds to aesthetic judgement. In this respect, aesthetic 
judgements tum on the fact that (1) they are not predetermined and (2) they are 
particular judgements which are not determinate. Therefore, the aesthetic does 
not fall under definite concepts. If one takes Kant's distinction of judgement in 
the Critique of Pure .Reason as: "If understanding in general is to be viewed as 
the faculty of rules, judgement will be the faculty of subsuming under rules; that 
is, of distinguishing whether something does or does not stand under a given 
rule (casus datae Jegis)" (CPR, A.132), then this concept of judgement as it 
stands, would raise a number of problems, as clearly this kind of judgement 
would run contrary to a Kantian understanding of aesthetic judgement. His 
hypothesis in the Critique of Judgement recognises this problem and claims 
instead, that the aesthetic cannot conform to rules of this kind, since its inherent 
diverse nature is subordinate to the particular. His solution to this problem is to 
argue that: "The Principle of Taste is the Subjective Principle of the General 
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Power of Judgement" (CJ, §35), and it is this condition above all else, that lays 
a partial claim to his notion of aesthetic "necessity". I agree with Makkreel 
here, that what Kant is claiming is that the aesthetic is by nature "content to be 
formed instead of as a form that is fixed" (1994, p.58). Therefore, the second 
condition is that aesthetic judgements rest on particular situations which have no 
precedents in terms of what one may encounter in experience. 
Now, what Kant struggles to do in the Four Moments, is to determine 
the principles that condition a judgement of taste and thus the validity, as he sees 
it, of the aesthetic in general. This is not, however, as straightforward as it 
might sound and as Kant acknowledges, the difficulty is how can judgements of 
taste be made sufficiently determinate to embrace aesthetic experience. What 
mode of experience corresponds to an aesthetic judgement? A vague answer 
would be a subjective one. But the notion of subjectivity alone is not 
representative in itself of any aesthetic experience. The reason for saying that 
subjectivity alone is not an aesthetic condition, is because for Kant, the element 
of intuition and its perception ,being perceived alone as subjective (CPR, A.42), 
are not sufficient grounds to demonstrate an aesthetic experience. Even if one 
could bring this intuition and perception under the condition of understanding, 
this would still not constitute an aesthetic experience. In view of this, Kant 
recommends, at one level, that an aesthetic experience is determined by a 
personal response. That response does not take account of its object (CI, intro. 
VII & § 1, 203) in any objective manner, but is determined instead by creative 
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interactions as a reference to the experiencing subject. Such a response must, 
Kant argues, engage and be a symptom of pleasure as a primary experience of 
the consequence of the "harmony" between imagination and understanding. 
Kant does not confine himself to connecting the aesthetic simply to intuition; 
he also makes the connection that the aesthetic is an imaginative experience. 
Our third condition which is the key to Kant's whole aesthetic argument, is that 
an aesthetic judgement must be imaginative. 
In order to understand this further, what needs to be noted, as an 
element of interdependency, is that the aesthetic for Kant, is a "reflective 
judgement" . In effect, he regards all aesthetic experiences as containing some 
reflective judgement. His analysis seems to be that reflective (sense experience) 
judgements neither predetermine objects, nor make them determinate. As 
ŸŲWŤTĚalready: "only the particular is given and the universal has to be found 
for it, then the judgement is simply reflective" (CJ, intro. IV). In which case, 
the reflective differs from the "determinate" in that the determinate is not only 
conditioned by a clear and necessary concept, but that, in essence, the 
determinate in this situation, is an operation that knows its end and how to 
obtain it (this kind of determination should not be confused with the productive 
imagination kind). The reflective judgement is neither prescriptive nor 
theoretically necessary and its nature is broader and more variable than 
determinate universal judgements. The important thing to remember about this 
condition is that it is through perception that the aesthetic experience connects 
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with cognition (CI, intro. Vil, 190-1). Thus, the perception, as an empirical 
aesthetic condition, holds the manifold of experience together, without, as Kant 
puts it, regard for any concept being present or estimated as part of this 
representation. Kant is claiming that the aesthetic is contingent on feeling being 
a ground for its pleasure and not its concepts. Controversially perhaps, if no 
concept connects to the aesthetic, how can one claim a public sense to this 
experience? For Kant, however, the public sense of such experience is not 
derived from a definite concept as such, but from the imaginative feeling 
response as "disinterest". A point perhaps, that one may consider contentious. 
The fourth condition, is that an aesthetic judgement cannot predetermine its 
purpose, for this would be contrary to the fact that the aesthetic is in free-play. 
Kant argues: "For while in respect of the rational employment of our 
cognitive faculties bounds may be definitely determined, in the empirical field 
no such determinations of bounds is possible" (CI, intro. VI). As will be 
further elaborated, he takes this as a condition which lays claims to contingent 
" 0ty" necessl • Fundamental to Kant's aesthetic position, is that an aesthetic 
judgement, as an act of subjectivity, does not consider an object purely on its 
own account, since, as a reflective judgement, the aesthetic does not subsume 
any strict a priori necessity. The aesthetic, seen in this light, is not part of a 
purely observed experience. It relies instead, on its own reflection estimated on 
grounds relating to "disinterest", a way of experiencing without constraints. 
What is more, while the determinate is considered by Kant as universal in kind, 
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the reflective mode of the aesthetic, being intrinsically multifarious, can only 
have a contingent universal judgement, because it is constituted by its own 
feeling of pleasure being subjective a priori. Such a contingent universal 
judgement, relies fundamentally, according to Kant, on the particular 
correspondence between imagination and understanding. The fifth condition is 
that aesthetic judgements are boundless and multifarious. 
The form of this contingency is taken as being singular and particular. 
This singular and particular judgement is in one sense determinate. I will 
further show that it is the mode of this arrangement that is partly responsible for 
how the a priori occurs. Here, to reinforce the a priori position, Kant goes on 
to explain that: "particular empirical laws must be regarded, in respect of that 
which is left undetermined in them by these universal laws, according to a unity 
such as they would have if the understanding (though it be not ours) has supplied 
them for the benefit of our cognitive faculties, so as to render possible a system 
of experience according to particular laws" (Cl, intro. IV, 180). In other 
words, aesthetic judgements presuppose unity in the representation prior, so one 
is told, to experience, because the synthesis involves the empirical and such 
empirical laws, as H.W. Cassirer argues (1938, p.1l4), must be intelligible to 
humans irrespective of whether they are objective or not. It is this synthesis of ŸĚ
experience through reflection of the formal qualities (space and time), that ' 
presupposes the contingent cognitive accord necessary to conceive the aesthetic. 
ŸĤĤ ĦĒGĤŸĚ.. _I-_''- ._ ...... ,_ .. ĒŸŚĦŚĚ
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The final condition is that an aesthetic judgement must be purposive, uniting the 
experience through agreement and coexistence. 
In the next section of the Critique of Judgement, Kant makes it clear 
that the empirical, as a reflective judgement, relates to how I "ought" to judge 
rather than how I must judge. But I must be careful here, because Dieter 
Henrich asserts that one must not confuse empirical concepts with the aesthetic 
(1992, pp.42-50), as an aesthetic judgement may well be spontaneous, singular 
and irregular in ways which do not conform purely to empirical concepts. 
Indeed, one might well argue that the aesthetic does not fit easily into any 
philosophical category; be it empirical, transcendental, physiological, 
psychological or language. However, being perhaps singular, spontaneous and 
irregular, the aesthetic character makes it difficult for us to formulate, along 
empirical lines alone, a universal agreement. A judgement of taste may well be 
based on empirical intuitive perceptions but such perceptions being aesthetic 
(rather than merely empirical), as Henrich rightly claims (1992, p.47), connect 
to imagination and understanding. Briefly, two further points here need to be 
mentioned. Firstly, it need not follow that just because one has a perception of 
an object that one necessarily understands this object and secondly, the 
harmonious play between imagination and understanding involves cognitive 
operations. None the less, it is the harmony which stems from the free-play of 
the imagination in conjunction with understanding that prevents a further 
determinate judgement This is because the aesthetic judgement presupposes, in 
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spontaneity, a heightened awareness as a condition of a singular pleasure (CJ, 
§8, 215). It may be inaccurate, however, to argue that such heightened 
awareness is singular as the play and feeling response may be changing, be 
accompanied by several feelings about the object not all of which may be 
"harmonising" or alternatively, be conditioned by a "public" rather than a 
"private" acquisition. However, this might be a premature line to take at this 
stage, for in contrast to what has just been said, such arguments need to be seen 
against Kant's premise that the making of aesthetic representation is always 
accompanied by a feeling of pleasure, to the extent that: "All it does is to 
compare the given representation in the subject with the entire faculty of 
representations of which the mind is conscious in the feeling of its state" (CJ, 
§1, 204). It is the intelligible nature of this experience that conditions the kind 
of empirical and transcendental "laws" that Kant describes as conforming to the 
aesthetic. The capacity for considering the aesthetic intelligible must, argues 
Kant, stem from those "laws" derivative of aesthetic experience. Such "laws" (if 
one can indeed call them laws), are, for Kant, derivative of the personal 
harmony between imagination and understanding in free-play. 
It seems that Kant's thinking suggests that any sensible representation 
would require that "I" condition the representation, according to only "my" 
reflective judgement. It may seem contentious to claim that an aesthetic 
experience is purely "my" experience, as such experience (to be discussed in 
chapters two and three) is often acquired and in part attributed to, community 
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values. However, taking Kant's aesthetic viewpoint, the best that can be said of 
this is that I do not take account of what constitutes universality in itself, but 
rather I apprehend and respond dynamically to the phenomena of experience as 
it happens without regard to causes or presupposed considerations. Indeed, he 
regards such experience as a possible aesthetic experience, and refers to it as 
"unconditioned". The question of how "disinterest" and the "unconditioned" 
connects to the aesthetic appears, on a certain level to deny the a priori necessity 
itself. The contradiction seems to be how does one align an unconditioned 
experience with necessity. If there is a necessity which embraces aesthetic 
experience, would such a necessity not affect the "seen", so thus effectively 
ruling out autonomy. Similarly, if necessity happens to affect the "seen", what 
kind of seen experience is one having? But one has shown that the way Kant 
uses necessity is to refer to the "unity" of the experience. By Kant insisting that 
the aesthetic is a matter of "disinterest" he is denying that I can knowingly as a 
predetermined response, involve any background understanding or knowledge to 
this situation in a determinate way. He has to maintain this, for the background 
understanding may express a certain kind of interest, which is what he wants to 
avoid. But, as Wollheim argues, if one cannot connect one's perception with 
one's "cognitive stock" (1993, pp.134-6), what kind of perception is one having. 
Yet, this "cognitive stock" is exactly what Kant insists establishes the aesthetic, 
when he argues that the aesthetic is a cognition in general. On the other hand, 
since the aesthetic must involve personal experience, how can one proceed to 
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argue as Kant does, that such an experience relates to "disinterest" (CI, §5)? It 
may be further argued, that bringing one's interest to bear upon the aesthetic 
may presuppose a more natural state of individuality than "disinterest". If this is 
so, then free-play may be just as much an inclination of interest as "disinterest". 
The term "interest", for Kant, suggests background knowledge and 
understanding, a sense of what the object is itself conceptually, which in tum 
involves satisfaction and fulfilment, though of a different kind than that of the 
aesthetic. Consequently, what Kant is objecting to is that this notion robs the 
aesthetic of its independence, its unconditioned representation, its intuitive and 
reflective sense, and the concept of autonomy, for in Kant's eyes aesthetic 
autonomy is limited to the notion of "disinterest" . 
According to Guyer, Kant's concept of "disinterest" must be seen as 
connecting to Kant's other notion concerning purposiveness (1979, p.169). 
The idea would seem to be that disinterest justifies in part why the aesthetic 
requires free-play and the feeling of pleasure. One interpretation of disinterest 
is stated when Kant mentions that: "All one wants to know is whether the mere 
representation of the object is to my liking, no matter how indifferent I may be 
to the real existence of the object of this representation" (CI, §2, 205). 
Alternatively, Kant considers that interest, more often than not, relates to the 
real existence of objects (CI, §2 & 5). In addition, Kant asserts that: "Every 
interest vitiates the judgement of taste and robs it of its impartiality" (CI, §13, 
223). It may be counter-argued, that Kant's concept of disinterest is somewhat 
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a confusing one, when one attempts to compare it with the concept of interest. 
But this may prove an inadequate explanation of disinterest, as this term appears 
in Kant's work as a whole, to be a reference to the aesthetic experience being a 
genuine "inner" response of itself. Here, Kant's motive for this condition seems 
to be, at one level, that because aesthetic experiences are conditioned by 
disinterest, they are not judgements depending on the proof of objects by means 
of concepts. While one has to admit that there are difficulties if one strictly 
follows the early claims that Kant makes about the aesthetic being independent 
of interest. It is, nevertheless, also clear that one will be misled if one argues 
that Kant's understanding is defined in this way. 
The task that Kant sets himself is obviously to limit the notion of 
autonomy in the aesthetic sense to "disinterest", but there is a real danger that 
ŸŤĚmight be distorting Kant's position if one insists that the correspondence 
between autonomy and "disinterest" trivialises the aesthetic. What I feel that 
Kant pursues, from one reading of this argument, is that in the general sense, the 
aesthetic fundamentally involves "disinterest". This term is not only a 
detachment from what the object might be "theoretically" or "practically", but it 
is a totally different kind of experience that reveals and expresses itself only in 
the aesthetic. The situation is that autonomy being singular and particular must 
involve "disinterest" (free-playand spontaneity), because "disinterest" allows the 
individual to have its own voice. Thus, Kant recognises the importance of 
individuality against suppressing or dictating what one can and cannot feel, 
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suppose or imagine. This spontaneity, this imagery, this imaginative experience 
that one uses aesthetically as an expression of oneself, is as Oakeshott points 
out, an experience which cannot be learnt by imitation (1959, p.5t). One is 
reminded here of Oakeshott' s remark that: "If it imitates the voice of practice its 
utterance is counterfeit. To listen to the voice of poetry is to enjoy, not a 
victory, but a momentary release, a brief enchantment" (1959, p.62). In this 
connection, "disinterest" and interest may not be worlds apart, as they are 
expressions which appear to overlap. "Disinterest" epitomises, for Kant, the 
aesthetic in its most exalted form, a way of experiencing without constraints. 
The argument that I feel Kant is further making, is that disinterest is an 
unrestricted experience that allows us to "turn anything into an object of 
pleasure" (CI, §5, 210). Similarly, it seems that it may also be found that 
disinterest lays claim to aesthetic autonomy itself, which weakens the argument 
that one can purely interpret disinterest in respect of what constitutes interest. 
While Kant claims that there are different modes of pleasure affecting 
the good, the agreeable and the beautiful, the pleasure that matters for him, as a 
judgement of taste, concerns the beautiful (to be discussed shortly). In seeking 
to bring out those conditions which actually presuppose aesthetic experience, 
perhaps it is in the notion of the beautiful, that one gets an understanding of the 
specifics that establish the purity of the aesthetic. It is possible to interpret this 
aesthetic purity as Kant's attempt to show that, like pure concepts of reason, the 
aesthetic too has a purity which one finds in "disinterest". Indeed, what 
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fundamentally differentiates the beautiful from the good and the agreeable is 
that: "the beautiful may be said to be the one and only disinterest and free 
delight; for, with it, no interest, whether of sense or reason extorts approval" 
(CJ, §5, 210). Given that beauty, for Kant, personifies the best the aesthetic can 
offer, it is no wonder that the notion of beauty is the rule that he uses as a 
judgement of taste. The principal point is that the condition of beauty appears to 
be the yardstick against which Kant determines aesthetic experience. 
Indisputably, it cannot go unnoticed that Kant construes the aesthetic as 
an interaction between personal self-experience and object awareness (the 
"form" of the object through the subject's own experience). Aesthetic 
experience can be seen as both unconditioned and dependent It is 
unconditioned because nothing is predetermined and dependent because the 
ÙŸTÙẂÙTẀŠÍĚis obliged to realise oneself through this experience. So, while Kant 
acknowledges the difficulty that the aesthetic poses in appearing to be concerned 
with free-play, cognition and purposiveness, he also recognises that the 
aesthetic, because of this, deals with a certain kind of experience which is 
independent of objectivity, but is not inferior to it. It is not inferior to it, simply 
because, for Kant, it is a different kind of experience which does not attempt to 
be objective. In dealing with this experience, Kant has to account for the 
inherent diVersity in which the aesthetic manifests itself, as he attempts to 
establish certain arguments that constitute and take on board free-play. At one 
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level free-play is an attempt to justify aesthetic diversity, but at another level it 
can stimulate a deeper understanding of object experience. 
But from Kant's point of view: "The obligation to furnish a Deduction, 
i.e. a guarantee of legitimacy of judgements of a particular kind, only arises 
where the judgement lays claim to necessity" (CI, §31, 280). It is crucial to see 
that, from Kant's position, it must be necessary to both evoke the aesthetic 
experience as unconditioned necessity, yet still maintain some sort of conceptual 
stance which is reflective, if the experience is to be seen as aesthetic. For the 
point is, that Kant wants to show that the aesthetic is an experience of 
self-activity, but a self-activity by its very nature which is enlightened through 
its cognitive powers. However, while a judgement of taste can be described as 
multifarious in kind, it is clear that what he has in mind, is that the aesthetic 
ŸẀVWĚrest on a notion of beauty, if one wishes to establish the conditions that 
correspond to subjective universality. Kant also makes the claim, that such 
SUbjective universality connects to the "universal validity of a singular 
judgement" (CI, §31, 281). As Kant puts it: "This flower is beautiful, is 
tantamount to repeating its own proper claim to the delight of everyone" (CI, 
§32, 282). Kant is insistent on this and writes more about this condition when 
he states that: " 'All tulips are beautiful'. But that judgement is not one of 
taste, but is a logical judgement which converts the reference of an object to our 
taste into a predicate belonging to things of a certain kind" (CI, §33, 285). As I 
understand it, what he appears to be claiming amounts to two different things. 
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In the first instance, the aesthetic is founded on a particular and singular actual 
response which results in a certain kind of experience corresponding and 
conditioned by imaginative free-play, which Kant regards in principle as 
universally acceptable. In the second example, there is no direct reference to a 
particular and singular actual experience taking place which results in aesthetic 
experience. The second example cannot, therefore, be regarded as particularly 
aesthetic in the sense that it presupposes a determined concept of what all tulips 
as beautiful objects are to be set against. This implies a situation that attempts to 
deny one's own personal response to objects. It is only if the experience 
represented an individual tulip from the position of aesthetic intuition and 
free-play, that Kant would consider such an experience as beautiful. What is 
echoed in the above remarks is not that I cannot consider a bunch of tulips, this 
building complex, this row of houses, this triptych, this designed object, a flock 
of geese, a collection of short stories or paintings, a museum or gallery 
exhibition as singular; for Kant's comment would be that all these situations can 
constitute particular experiences. Consequently, what Kant is objecting to, is the 
ambiguous sense implied in "all" tulips are beautiful or for that matter "all" 
paintings or objects are beautiful. For example, one does not say, in the 
ordinary sense, that a wilted tulip is beautiful. One might of course argue that a 
wilted tulip is beautiful, but in the Kantian sense, one's argument would then be 
moving in the direction of the particular and singular experience. Taken in this 
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sense, aesthetic experiences cannot be generalised, as they require particular 
perceptions of experience that relate to specific situations and circumstances. 
Without wishing to discuss Kant's notion of beauty at this stage, the 
subjective universality of aesthetic experience rests on individual judgements 
about an object. That is, in Kant's terms: "Taste lays claim simply to 
autonomy" ( CI, §32, 282). But if an aesthetic judgement lays claim to 
independent responses, then once again how can there be any a priori universal 
validity in the aesthetic? Since I agree with Kant that autonomy is a necessary 
characteristic of aesthetic experience, then how can such an experience as 
autonomy represent any agreed understanding in relation to object experience, 
without involving some public conception? Kant's solution to this problem is to 
assert that since the aesthetic is partly a claim connected to autonomy, it is a 
ŸȘẀŅŠŲĚexperience that one has through this autonomy, that decides its 
universality. Furthermore, I have mentioned the six criteria that must be taken 
into consideration for the universality to have merit in Kantian terms. For 
underpinning this universality must be the condition that the aesthetic is 
imaginative and hence the reason why Kant adopts the stance that he does. To 
preserve the aesthetic, universality must fit this concern and not the other way 
round. From this aspect, one can see why Kant could not determine aesthetic 
universality in connection with "objectivity". Kant, however, argues that the 
one experience that establishes universality in the aesthetic is personified by 
"beauty". Let us then turn to discuss this issue. 
58 
1.4 
As indicated, beauty is the one judgement that Kant thinks has universal 
validity. Kant writes: "The beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, is 
cognized as object of a necessary delight" (CJ, §22, 240). Such a necessary 
delight, Kant insists, is logical in that it conforms to subjective a priori 
conditions. As necessity, beauty is regarded by Kant as singular, in the sense 
that the subject must make his or her own aesthetic judgement independent of 
both "interest" and determined conceptual considerations. The concern being, 
that: "no perfection of any kind - no internal finality, as something to which the 
arrangement of the manifold is related - underlies this judgement" (Cl, § 16, 
229). It follows, that, in Kantian terms, the aesthetic cannot be predetermined. 
It also follows that no permanent relation can be found which determines 
aesthetic experience. On the other hand, this new revelation that the aesthetic is 
now universal, is no longer an assertion that the aesthetic is a private feeling. It 
follows, from a Kantian point of view, that what differentiates aesthetic beauty 
from mere pleasure alone ("charms" and "agreeableness" as empirical 
judgements, see §§13-14 of the Critique of Judgement), is that beauty is 
purposive; it is not physiological. In other words, it is not simply a 
sensation-experience, for beauty is not passive as it requires free-play and 
purposiveness to characterise the experience. What is more, as Guyer points 
out: "In defining the "quality" of aesthetic judgement Kant is not making a 
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phenomenological distinction between different kinds of feelings of pleasure, but 
a distinction between the ways in which different instances of pleasure may be 
occasioned" (1979, p.l71). 
Kant further argues, that if the aesthetic is completely free (pure) so that 
the subject makes his or her decision according to imaginative experience, then 
there are possible grounds for asserting that such experience may be universal. 
For a judgement of taste to be universal the individual who is having this 
experience must demand: "a similar delight from every one" (CJ, §6, 211). It 
remains to be seen how exactly Kant determines this state of affairs, for if the 
experience is supposedly singular and particular, how can such an experience, 
being singularly and particularly determined, be at the same time shareable? 
However, Kant holds that beauty is essentially an accord of imagination and 
ŸŪTŤŲVWŠŪTÙŪŦĚin free-play . Yet, there appears to be two sides to beauty; one 
categorised as pure beauty and the other categorised as impure beauty. So, 
while beauty captures the aesthetic mode and its feeling, this feeling may be 
regarded as a pure judgement or an impure judgement. Let us then investigate 
how beauty is seen by Kant as the universal condition presupposing aesthetic 
judgement. It is necessary for us to explore the concept of beauty as it 
represents Kant's attempt to demonstrate that the aesthetic is a priori universal. 
It follows, that if one is not convinced of this claim, then Kant's understanding 
of aesthetic experience must be seriously questionable, albeit only on universal 
lines. It is tempting to say, that the phenomenon of beauty is an aesthetic 
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experience, but to what extent this condition can be considered as the epitome of 
what constitutes aesthetic experience, some might regard as misleading. 
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1.5 
To start our discussion, one must remind ourselves that Kant's notion 
of "feeling" is the "unity" of imagination and understanding in the reflective 
sense, that subsequently gives rise to a judgement of taste as an aesthetic 
experience. This can be described as Kant's first assertion that the aesthetic is 
partly an individual representation corresponding to an imaginative experience, 
but which, as previously stated, correlates in some sense with understanding. 
This is important, for what Kant is suggesting is that aesthetic representation 
connects with the "inner feelings" of the subject. He refers to these "feelings" 
as either pleasure or displeasure and the pleasure or displeasure as he points out, 
is not directly the sensory material itself (the perception). Thus here too, what 
corresponds in free-play is amenable and founded on the dynamical formal 
properties of space and time (magnitude, relation, shape, succession and 
simultaneity), which the individual arranges according to his or her own 
experiences affected by this free-play. 
He refers to pleasure in itself, as something which is "enjoyable" for its 
own sake, in that it appeals to our sensibilities as a private affair of feeling. 
Now, I have already suggested that such pleasure in itself is a matter of 
sensation (perception). He describes this kind of pleasure as deriving from the 
sensation alone. In the bare sense, such sensation as pleasure involves no 
"harmony with concepts" (Cl, intro. YIn, 194), but only the personal sense 
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through imagination of the subject in intuition. In this instance, the mere 
sensation of such an experience is incapable of forming representations of 
objects, because Kant presupposes that such sensations, in terms of feeling, are 
not cognitive in themselves (Cl, §3, 206). It is only when the subject in the act 
of reflection, apprehends this feeling, without regard to definite concepts, that 
one can necessarily refer to this, as an aesthetic experience. Consequently, 
while feelings give rise to one's personal consciousness and individual 
judgement, Kant argues that what forms the basis of the aesthetic is whether the 
subject in the act of feeling this reflection does so as a purposive experience in 
free-play. For beauty to mean anything its disposition must be one of 
"disinterest" . 
It is worthwhile exploring further this notion of sensation, for in Kant's 
mind, sensation can be the condition of the "delight in the agreeable" and the 
"delight in the good" (Cl, §§3 & 4). Indeed, these two different but related 
kinds of delight, are a prefatory remark for a judgement of taste, but are not 
aesthetic experiences in themselves. In fact, to be more precise, Kant contrasts 
the notion of delight in these two terms as dependent upon an interest. He 
alludes to these conditions as being that which pleases as a means to some kind 
of purpose, or as a desire for a certain kind of sensation itself (Cl, §§3 & 4). 
These conditions presuppose a number of things in connection with interest. But 
in order to show that the agreeable or the good, are not aesthetic judgements, he 
refers to the agreeable and the good as elements determined by interest. For 
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Kant, having an "interest" presupposes both a desire and as a reference to the 
real existence of the object (CI, §3, 207). The problem with this is, if I have an 
interest in the aesthetic does this mean that my interest must also be connected in 
some way to real existence. If it does, how can Kant still claim that aesthetic 
understanding is not a cognitive judgement of its object? However, Kant 
sustains the argument that pleasure in itself is not aesthetic, because for pleasure 
to be aesthetic it must correspond to disinterest, and this is the reason why Kant 
maintains that the good and the agreeable do not by themselves constitute 
aesthetic experience. 
This leaves us to consider that the good and the agreeable cannot be a 
matter of "disinterest", as they imply an involvement which presupposes a 
certain kind of deliberate intention. In other words, one's interest and its 
ŸŨŤŠVẀŲŤHĚas opposed to the aesthetic and its pleasure, presuppose a purpose that 
partly conditions and provokes the feeling response. The premise being, that an 
intention or purpose as interest would exert influence on the aesthetic, which is 
something Kant wants to avoid as it conflicts with his idea of free-play. He is, 
therefore, reluctant to reconcile any notion of interest when it comes to matters 
relating to the aesthetic. Now, in the first instance, Kant uses the word delight 
in two different senses: (1) without cognition of the object and (2) that which is 
agreeable with delight has an interest. On first view, this might seem a 
contradiction in terms, but Kant makes it clear his intention when he argues that: 
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"All delight (as is said or thought) is itself sensation (of a pleasure)" (CJ, §3, 
206). 
What is agreeable as delight amounts on the one hand, to what is 
produced in sensation from the reasoning and or cognitive knowledge of an 
object. Such an experience amounts to an interest, but such an interest one 
might still find pleasing in the mere subjective sensations I have towards a 
personal representation of this kind. In this second example, is there the 
possibility that the agreeable could also be a basis for an aesthetic experience? 
The simple answer to this would be no. The reason being, as Kant postulates, is 
that the agreeable presupposes certain preconditioned criteria relating to 
sensation. Under these circumstances, what amounts to an agreeable delight in 
an object, is in effect, an interest, since such interest predetermines the nature of 
the delight as sensation. Likewise, but in a different sense, Kant states that the 
good also has two properties to it: (I) as a means to an attainment which pleases 
because it is cognitive and (2) because such a concept in itself also implies an 
interest. As Kant proposes: "To deem something good, I must always know 
what sort of thing the object is intended to be, i.e. I must have a concept of it" 
(C/, §4, 207). Unlike the agreeable which does not have a determined concept, 
since it springs out of the sensation itself, the good presupposes a desire that 
determines its delight, in accordance with the concept of a given object. But 
since any good, in the Kantian sense, appears to be rationally determined, this, 
like the agreeable, has an interest. Given this account of delight, it is clear that 
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interest is that which can appear related to what can be determined rationally in 
part by a concept, or by a predetermined desire which determines the feeling 
response to an object. 
One might find objectionable, the distinction that Kant makes 
concerning interest. For in claiming that interest in general, is that which 
predetermines an object (by sensation or by concept), is to define narrowly the 
notion interest and mislead us into thinking that interest cannot be a fact in 
aesthetic judgement. In Latin the word interest means "it matters to me", and in 
one acceptable sense Kant makes this point, but because something matters to 
me, it does not necessarily follow that I have to precondition the experience. 
For example, I love my family, but this does not mean that I have to 
precondition the way they should behave. So while Kant accepts the view that it 
must matter to me as to how I feel the pleasure in an object, the pleasure that I 
obtain in this object, in aesthetic terms, happens as a consequence of free-play, 
reflection and spontaneity. The claim that he asserts against interest is that: "All 
interest presupposes a want, or calls one forth; and, being a ground determining 
approval, deprives the judgement on the object of its freedom" (CJ, §5, 210). It 
is in this respect that one can sympathise with Kant that the aesthetic just might 
be a matter of disinterest, but disinterest poses some enormous problems, for if 
the aesthetic can only be glimpsed from the viewpoint of disinterest, such 
experience strains the very notion of the aesthetic itself. But if this is so, what 
does this say about aesthetic judgement, which is supposedly grounded in 
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disinterest and free-play? The problem for Kant is, how can I have an aesthetic 
experience which is not related to: (1) a world of ideas and (2) which does not 
display or provoke a certain familiarity with the object in some sense? 
Similarly, a possible response to the issue of interest depriving the judgement in 
relation to the object and its freedom, is the sense in which Kant seems to be 
taking a purist stance on this issue. The difficulty is, that there are grounds to 
be suspicious of an aesthetic which does not notice these difficulties. Before I 
pass on to develop Kant's notion of beauty further, let me restate the fact that I 
feel the aesthetic does involve "disinterest", which as an experience may be 
enhanced when it connects with interest. 
From the beginning of the Second Moment, Kant insists that any 
individual who is conscious in a disinterested manner of his or her own delight, 
grounds this object as a possible universal mode. Such "disinterest" is regarded 
by Kant as being: "completely free in respect of the liking which he accords to 
the object, he can find as reason for his delight no personal conditions to which 
his own subjective self alone be party" (Cl, §6, 211). It is on this basis that he 
constructs subjective universality. For in Kant's mind the universality, as a 
judgement of taste, is in the claim that the individual perceives an object in such 
a way that his or her own personal prejudices, interest or inclinations do not 
predetermine what constitutes the feeling of pleasure in this object; the aesthetic 
in a sense is pure. Even so, at one level, the sort of difficulty facing disinterest, 
is for example, the kind of pleasure that a child finds enjoyable. For children 
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often appear to enjoy that which they find most interesting and which 
stimulates their cognitive and sensory modes. The concern here, is that my 
interest may itself have been predetermined by an explorative experience which 
at some stage or other involved free-play, a point, however, that Kant appears to 
have overlooked. Since Kant appears also to claim that the aesthetic in fine art 
is not an organic sensation (CI, §44, 306) and has what Kant calls: "a definite 
intention of producing something" (CI, §45, 306), it remains perhaps an open 
question as to the extent to which the aesthetic is ever free of certain interests. 
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1.6 
By far the most important issue which determines the aesthetic for 
Kant, is beauty. Firstly, it may be questioned, that since the aesthetic is largely 
based on a notion of beauty, what kind of aesthetic deduction does Kant make, 
that explains why the aesthetic is beautiful? For Kant, to assert a notion of 
beauty is to apprehend particular qualities that indicate a particular kind of 
pleasure altogether different from that which merely pleases. As I have 
indicated, from a Kantian point of view, beauty differs considerably from that 
which pleases by its universality and form. The form that beauty takes is not 
based on: "neither charm nor emotion, in a word, no sensation as matter of 
aesthetic judgement" (CI, §14, 226). It is in this section that I will explain the 
characteristics of beauty which Kant describes as essentially created out of the 
individual imagination and understanding in free-play. One hastens to add that 
this appears to endorse Kant's view that: "Beauty (whether it be of nature or of 
art) may in general be termed the expression of aesthetic ideas" (CI, §51). 
What is contained in beauty, according to Kant, is characteristic of aesthetic 
experience. Clearly though, the kind of beauty that Kant relates to fine art, is 
presupposed by design and composition (CI, §14, 225). However, beauty, 
while being universal, owes nothing to an external standard. It is a reflection 
only of the autonomous sensuous nature of the human subject and is therefore 
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not purely physiological. Moreover, Kant regards beauty as the most 
heightened, spontaneous and completely free subjective self-experience (CI, §6). 
Perhaps more debatable, is that when Kant examines beauty itself, he 
clearly categorises the aesthetic (in relation to beauty) as pure and impure 
judgements of taste and in doing so, he attempts to explain the aesthetic as an 
experience of these conditions. Such relations obviously determine what I can 
judge as necessary or unnecessary, for pure and impure aesthetic judgements. 
Furthermore, to insist, as Kant does, on a notion of pure beauty being pure, one 
might conceive as objectionable, depending on how one views whether anything 
can really be pure. The salient point here is that Kant by taking a purist 
position, is distancing himself from the notion of interest. However, if interest 
is deemed by Kant as anti-aesthetic, what kind of experience does beauty 
represent? A possible answer to this question is that beauty can be seen as an 
opposite to interest, in that he argues, that interest relates to the real existence 
of objects (CI, §2, 204). In contrast, he maintains that the aesthetic as a 
subjective experience does not concern itself with the real existence of things, as 
it discriminates and estimates only in relation to the representation in free-play. 
This means, as Kant concludes: "everything turns on the meaning which I can 
give to this representation, and not on any factor which makes me dependent on 
the real existence of the object" (CI, §2, 205). The trouble with this argument 
is, that what Kant conceives as the "real" existence of the object bears no 
resemblance to what he feels constitutes aesthetic experience. In this connection 
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there is something quite curious about why Kant feels that the aesthetic response 
is not at all about real existences. Admittedly, Kant feels that "real" existence 
corresponds to objectivity, but does it follow that because the aesthetic engages 
in the activity of imagining, that imagining itself is not "real existence"? My 
deduction is, as I will go on to explain in chapters two and three, that it is a 
fundamental flaw in anyone's argument to suggest that the aesthetic does not 
involve "real existence". Paradoxically, Kant admits this himself, for he sees 
the aesthetic as having its own reality, but is this not a contradiction in terms? 
Kant argues that there are two kinds of beauty: free beauty and 
dependent beauty (Cl, § 16). Free beauty rests on no defined concept of what 
the object is supposed to be, and as early as section two (First Moment), Kant 
suggests that the delight which determines a judgement of taste is indifferent to 
the real existence of the object of representation. It is this notion of disinterest 
that Kant relates to free beauty. Denis Dutton also underlines that the distinction 
that Kant makes in section sixteen of the Critique of Judgement between pure 
and impure (dependent) beauty, which attempts not only to categories the 
aesthetic between notions of pure and impure beauty, but implies that dependent 
beauty is: "a check-list of features against which to measure 'aesthetic' quality" 
(Dutton, 1994, vol.XXXIV, p.229). While I agree with Dutton that a notion of 
a check-list, as Kant describes it, negates against aesthetic diversity and 
creativity, it is also misleading for him to suggest that the aesthetic can be 
divided in this way. However, it seems to me undeniable, as H. W. Cassirer 
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considers (1938, p.271), that the whole notion of free beauty has to be 
interpreted as free from the constraints of rules. In other words, I cannot just 
observe free beauty as implying an archetypal status, as Kant wants to emphasise 
the felt pleasure in an object of experience for its own sake. Nevertheless, the 
categorisation of pure and impure judgement may possibly be seen as a serious 
weakness in Kant's argument and one that needs to be addressed if only because 
a number of philosophers have different views on the subject (consider for 
example the views of H. W. & E. Cassirer, Crawford, Crowther, Dutton, 
Guyer, Savile and Schaper). 
The argument that I want to construct here, concerns only whether the 
grounds of the deduction, that Kant deduces for the distinction of pure and 
impure, can be made at all. This seems to me an important issue, for Kant often 
talks about pure judgements of taste being a necessary condition for aesthetic 
experience. It needs to be noted, and before I proceed any further, it is also 
necessary to recognise that Kant does not consider dependent beauty as entirely 
inferior to pure beauty. He argues that pure and dependent beauty operate in 
different ways: "one according to what he had present to his senses, the other 
according to what was present in his thoughts" (CJ, §16, 231). But, be this as it 
may, the concept that Kant talks about as a pure judgement of taste is not to be 
interpreted as a pure judgement of perfection (CJ, §15), but rather a pure 
judgement of universal delight (CJ, §§2-5-6-8), which presupposes no 
determining concept. Indeed, Kant criticises the concept of perfection on the 
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grounds that perfection implies aesthetically a sense of utility; an estimation of 
its parts in relation to a given purpose or standard. Furthermore, he argues, as 
a rebuff against a concept of perfection, that: "The judgement is called aesthetic 
for the very reason that its determining ground cannot be a concept, but is rather 
the feeling (of the internal sense) of the concept in the play of the mental powers 
as a thing only capable of being felt" (CI, §IS, 228). What he is getting at, in 
contrast to a notion of perfection, is that the pure aesthetic judgement is a 
spontaneous experience that can only judge the concept of beauty as a perception 
of inner sense. Perfection, as Kant puts it, "supplies the rule of its synthesis" 
(CI, §15, 227), pure beauty does not. It is the grasping of this intuitive inner 
sense individually through purposiveness, that is at the heart of a pure aesthetic 
judgement. It remains to be seen just how plausible an explanation this can be. 
A possible dent, however, in Kant's reasoning, seems to be that there is .., 
something not quite right about a pure judgement of taste being pure. For even 
if one accepts that there is such a thing as a pure judgement of taste, one might 
still insist that a pure aesthetic judgement is a matter of degree. The danger for 
us, is deciding where exactly to draw the boundary line as to what constitutes 
purity. But asking a question of this kind, would be to miss Kant's point that 
pureness is a matter of disinterest. In short, one misconstrues the dynamics of 
the aesthetic, because such an experience wholly abandons a determinate 
approach. There remains, however, other problems concerning the way that 
Kant sees pure beauty in terms of parrots, hummingbirds, foliage on wallpaper 
\ 
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and flowers. As if this was not enough, in contrast to pure beauty there is 
dependent beauty which seems just as implausible as the categories of pure with 
its emphasis on men, women, children, horses and buildings (CI, §16). The 
premise of pure beauty being that I judge foliage on wallpaper or humming birds 
without any preconceived ideas as to their purpose. This mayor may not be the 
case, but this might equally apply to dependent beauty. However, Kant 
proceeds to argue that such things as pure beauty are also judged "on their own 
account" (CI, § 16, 229), without, that is, a defined concept. Once again, this 
may be true, but it is questionable how one can judge on his or her own 
account, not least because there must be some "public sense" which one 
associates with this experience, as how else does one "judge"? As I will discuss, 
it is Wittgenstein, rather than Kant, who gives us more of an objective 
understanding as to what constitutes a "public sense". None the less, one might 
think that this is a dubious question, for I can judge an object on its own 
account which may indeed qualify as public. Still, it seems that Kant also makes 
the mistake that dependent beauty has a "concept of its own perfection" (CI, 
§ 16, 230) but this too has many anomalies which are certainly questionable 
given his categorisation of pure and impure. For example, in producing a 
painting that I am working 00, one would naturally draw upon past experiences 
and one would probably reflect on the form and content of the work to the 
degree that what one notices in the work affects the direction of the work, and 
yet through all this experience one still has no idea of its perfection. The 
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essential meaning that I am getting at, is that the work of art or design is more 
often than not, a mixture of "disinterest" and interest that operates through an 
intuitive response (although not always). Hence one arrives at the view that the 
individual, in his or her autonomy, contemplates the object of experience 
perhaps from an intuitive response that is all the time reworking itself as it 
identifies, recognises, rejects and transforms itself through what is being 
confirmed and imagined. In general, however, the adoption of pure and 
impure conditions are certainly confusing, for why does Kant consider a horse as 
being aesthetically the same as a building, or for that matter different to a 
parrot? In these examples, what exactly is Kant designating as pure and impure? 
What is it about these examples that explains clearly their differences in relation 
to pure and impure beauty? 
Entangled in this, as suggested, is that the feeling of sensation as a 
singular judgement presupposes a relation to the object through intuition. In 
Kantian terms, there is no connection with a judgement of taste, which has to 
assume a conceptual understanding of the object concerned, since an aesthetic 
judgement is quite independent of it; for the "unity" of an aesthetic judgement 
as Kant argues, does not conform to strict laws of understanding. This is 
because singular and particular judgements of aesthetic experience are primarily 
imaginative representations which are contingent on the subject's felt experience 
in free-play. Thus, the felt experience is deemed as indeterminate, but 
nevertheless singular and particular because it involves a subjective necessary 
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"unity" which is purposive. Kant is convinced that aesthetic meaning and 
understanding is intuitive. The stand that he takes is: "Imagination is the faculty 
of representing in intuition an object that is not in itself present" (CPR, B.ISI). 
A problem arises here concerning whether one can say necessarily that an 
imaginative experience in free-play does not conform to strict laws of 
understanding, for much may depend on how one's creative sensibility is being 
used. If understanding is dependent on "use" (a point that I will argue in 
chapter two of this manuscript) then nothing is ruled out as to what constitutes 
understanding, other than what establishes and accounts as "usage". Kant's 
aesthetic critique, however, as I have implied, has the advantage of claiming 
firmly that what pre-empts usage (as comprehended by Wittgenstein) is aesthetic 
purposiveness and its independent judgement. For Kant will properly insist that 
"mental" occurrence, as a matter of experience, cannot be superseded by a 
public concept of the aesthetic, so that the aesthetic because it rests on intuition, 
is in one respect a private rather than a "public" operation. Conceding 
Wittgenstein's point (yet to be discussed) that the aesthetic does involve 
important behavioural, description and language conditions, does not rule out 
necessarily that the aesthetic, as Kant thought, is an imaginative experience. 
Beauty is seen by Kant as a personal experience having its own means 
of representation and estimation, one involving both cognitive and sensory 
responses as a feeling of self. Quite clearly, therefore, if I take into account that 
the aesthetic is both singular, original and in free-play, one begins to understand 
76 
further why Kant considers beauty in the aesthetic sense as an "indeterminate 
idea" (CJ, §17, 232). Such indeterminacy in Kant's mind, is a product of the 
sensuous and imaginative experiences and therefore depends on individual 
representation. The distinction that he proposes about indeterminacy, and this 
should be noted, is that he sees any "ideal" of beauty, as that which is 
unthinkable. The account that he gives is that: "An ideal of a beautiful flower, 
of a beautiful suite of furniture, or of a beautiful view, is unthinkable" (CJ, § 17, 
233). This is undoubtedly significant, because he is arguing that such 
experiences are formed by imaginative means, not conceptual means. One has 
to visualise these objects in order to represent them to oneself. Creativity, 
therefore, is not a product of strict logical necessity of the "objective" kind. In 
which case, the imagination can extend one's understanding through free-play, 
but the conceptual understanding that one has, may itself be affecting the 
imaginative experience, but not as Kant points out through some definite end. 
Hypothetically, if the aesthetic has an end then: "we must first have a concept of 
what sort of thing it is to be" (CJ, §15, 227). Consequently, this would negate 
the very idea of aesthetic experience. The power of the imagination is what 
transforms the notion of what is beautiful, a power which concepts alone do not 
have (CJ, §17, 231). Yet, Kant clearly thought that even concepts must involve 
imaginative experience, a point that he discusses in his Aesthetic and Analytic 
sections in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
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I will now proceed to a closer examination of how Kant establishes that 
the imagination transforms the beautiful. As mentioned, he construes in sections 
ten to twelve of the Critique of Judgement his principle of formal purposiveness. 
In this sense, he argues that the perception of an object relating to the 
purposiveness, causally gives us a concept of the finality which relates to one's 
felt engagement. Kant's argument seems to be that an impure judgement 
involves formal purposiveness as a concept in general; as opposed to pure 
beauty whose purposiveness is a matter of purely intuitive sense. In general, 
this formal purposiveness involved in impure beauty relates to causal relations of 
purpose that are meant to establish what the object represents conceptually. In 
one sense, purposiveness presupposes theoretically what I am able, by causal 
aesthetic means, to perceive and thus determine the conceptions of what 
represents a certain object (CIl, §3, 64). In other words, if an aesthetic 
experience is presupposed by what happens conceptually, then Kant describes 
this as dependent beauty, because the purposiveness is contingent upon 
independent reason in relation to what an object is supposed to be (a flower, a 
house, a dress, a painting). This needs to be recognised, for what Kant is 
implying here, is that in order to appreciate dependent beauty it must be possible 
that: "the contingency is itself a ground for making us look upon the origin of 
the thing as if, just because of that contingency, it could be possible through 
reason" (CIl, §3, 64). In contrast, if I have free beauty (as previously 
indicated) no determinate concept can be found. Pure beauty is not connected 
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to any purpose at all (in relation to an object), and it is in this respect that pure 
beauty fundamentally differs from dependent beauty. Now clearly the kind of 
purposiveness that Kant is mentioning here as free beauty, is not necessarily a 
concept of an object, as the point that Kant is making is that the aesthetic in an 
undetermined manner, conceptualises purposively. In pure beauty, knowing 
what the object is (a flower, a house, a dress, a painting) is not part of what 
characterises the free beauty itself, for it would presuppose an interest in the 
object's end. One is completely indifferent to the nature of the object, for free 
beauty is self-activity which is spontaneous as an experience, in free accord 
totally with one's own intuitive feelings. 
An issue that deserves attention is, that while a person may know what 
the object is, it is not the concept of knowing what this object is that determines 
pure beauty. While this is a noteworthy critical view of Kant's, one might still 
wonder how it is possible to say in the Kantian sense, that wallpaper designs are 
objects of pure beauty, when they are designed to serve a purpose? To this 
extent, pure beauty fails to take account of some of the factors that can 
condition aesthetic intention. As Schaper claims, there is a case to suppose that 
pure beauty must be "representing nothing" since its particular effect does not 
conform to object representation (1979, p.86). Schaper's point is, that pleasure 
in the representation is insufficient as a device to produce the necessary object of 
experience. This expresses, that if I do not know what the object is as a concept 
when considering free beauty, how is it possible to deduce experience from it 
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that confonns to the conditions of experience? Representations must stand 
compared and connected, according to Kant (CPR, A.97), but under pure beauty 
this is not possible. If pure beauty cannot (1) be compared, (2) be connected 
and (3) be aroused by the formal purposiveness of objects then what exactly is 
v' there left capable of being considered aesthetic? The brief Kantian answer is 
V' that feelings express my consciousness, but how do I know this consciousness, if 
I cannot compare, connect nor conceptualise? How do I decide that this is the 
v correct feeling or response for myself and for others? In reply, Kant might 
rightly suppose that this misses his point entirely, which is that individuals, in 
immersing themselves in imaginative thought, are reaching a state of 
consciousness and originality, that cannot be grasped in any other method, that 
bring a different kind of reality into play. Similarly, he would argue that pure 
beauty can be conceptualising, can be comparing and can be connected, only it 
does so through its own excitement, in a felt indeterminate (without regard to 
ends) fashion which is spontaneous. It is not judging itself against other 
concepts, ideas or theories, but merely reflecting its own consciousness of being. 
From Dutton's point of view, if Kant presupposes that pure beauty has 
"no perfection of any kind" (Cl, §16) then this undermines judgement. The 
distinction that Dutton makes in response to this, is that: "What of a flower that 
is wilted or whose white petals show grown spots?" (Dutton, 1994, vol. XXXIV, 
p.231). The assumption being that these kinds of qualities may be relevant to 
an aesthetic experience irrespective of whether it is pure or dependent beauty. It 
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is quite possible for qualities of this kind to represent our understanding of 
objects and to presuppose what one fmds interesting. That is to say, that object 
representation can be dependent on qualities or properties of things, so that the 
necessary concepts can be contingent on particular qualities of experience. For 
example, judgements are made that lend themselves initially to how I feel 
intuitively about perceived paint handling, colour mixing, tactile qualities and 
so on. Yet Kant would still insist that these kinds of qualities are under a 
concept of a purpose about possible perfection, and are thus impure judgements 
(CJ, §16, 230). This explanation of an impure judgement would seem to be 
dependent partly on how I conceive the concept as being important to the 
judgement of beauty. 
As previously claimed, Kant sees purposiveness as derivative of the 
person's subjective experience. This is the case even if my delight is taken from 
the object according to its end (concept), but not all objects which depend upon 
purposiveness can be described as delightful (CJ,§33). The goal of this 
subjective aim of purposiveness through synthesis, has two sides to it: on the one 
hand, the aim through understanding is to make sense of the purposiveness 
process itself. . That is to say, because purposiveness is coupled to 
understanding, such experience can be of the subjective a priori kind, since it 
relates to the faculty of concepts in general. Similarly, purposiveness involves 
imagination so that pleasure can be felt. It is an intuition of the cognitive power 
(imagination and understanding). To reiterate, because this experience is 
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coupled to a feeling of pleasure, the aesthetic domain is not a domain In 
reference to the object itself, but as Kant puts it, is a reference to the subject. 
The imagination which engages this experience, does so spontaneously, but in so 
doing it combines with the intuition to form a necessary concept in the general 
sense. Clearly then, aesthetic purposiveness always has, as Kant puts it, an 
"aim", to combine a manifold in such a way that it has a certain unique and 
relevant "unity" about it, that can be awe inspiring in what one experiences and 
creates. So, aesthetic purposiveness pursues intersubjective agreement through: 
(1) a theoretical aim, (2) the combined "unity" of imagination and 
understanding, (3) purposiveness which is devoid of interest and (4) conscious 
experience of these factors as a subjective but reflective feeling; such 
purposiveness is nothing other than the consciousness of the aesthetic itself. 
Alternatively, one might ask, how does the free-play of imagination 
and understanding operate in dependent beauty, if the dependent beauty is 
predetermined partly by a concept? In this respect, Kant himself goes on to 
argue: "Now the delight in the manifold of a thing, in reference to an internal 
end that determines its possibility, is a delight based on a concept" (CI, § 16, 
230). There appears, then, to be at least some confusion as to the extent to 
which the concept of end predetermines the notion of impure beauty. One might 
have to recognise the fact that perhaps there is a certain impasse in the 
argument. If one's imagination and understanding in free-play is always having 
to proceed or be judged according to a concept of end, then the imagination and 
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understanding is not in free-play at all. In other words, if the imagination and 
understanding is serving a purpose, does it not follow that the imagination and 
understanding becomes an instrument of this purpose? For Kant, the answer 
would be no, because the imagination although actively cognitive can never be a 
defined concept, because the imaginative experience itself being intuitive, is an 
object of sense, not pure understanding. Purposively, the aesthetic is without a 
final cause (a concept), that explains its representation, because it has no definite 
end (a purpose) that it strives towards and is only recognised as having a 
"finality of form" (CI, §13, 223), when it is singularly and particularly 
dependent and determined by sensations. 
However, it would be a mistake to presuppose that formal 
purposiveness in object experience automatically determines the conditions by 
which aesthetic judgements are made. It must be remembered that Kant 
repeatedly argues, that what I envisage must be my own awareness of the object 
concerned. Kant's point and one that must be stressed, is that purposiveness 
must correspond to a delight, if the aesthetic is to be accompanied by a 
judgement of taste. In addition, it may be true that any possible notion of 
representation as finality has a concept of its perfection (CI, §16, 230), but it is 
unclear how in practice this works in the aesthetic sense. For artists and 
designers do not know in advance how to perceive representation as a formal 
purposive condition of perfection. This brings us back to an earlier point that 
the aesthetic, as a creative concern, has no definite end that can be envisaged, 
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for to do so would negate aesthetic experience. However, as Ernst Cassirer 
implies, there is: "a special kind of causality for Kant-so as to place it purely 
under the rule of inner creation" (1981, p.312). This obviously suggests that the 
aesthetic is not as unstructured or as unconstrained as one might be tempted to 
think. This is an issue that I explore further in chapter two of this work. 
The fact that Kant peculiarly discriminates between pure and impure 
judgements is secondary to the fact that aesthetic judgements are constituted by 
the representation of what "I" experience as delight through intuition, 
imagination and understanding. Thus, even the cognitive, universal and a priori 
elements must combine with this purpose, to estimate the beauty of an object. 
The aesthetic experience as described, is imaginative, and because it is 
imaginative: "It must therefore rest upon a feeling that allows the object to be 
estimated by the finality of the representation (by which an object is given) for 
the furtherance of the cognitive faculties in their free-play" (CJ, §35, 278). In 
this sense, whatever the experience reveals, it must be aesthetic as its relations 
evolve in a determinate manner, through imagination. None the less, one should 
resist the temptation of thinking of the aesthetic as purely and necessarily a 
cognitive occurrence, for as I will explore in chapter two and three of this 
work much of aesthetic activity can be grasped in public terms. Finally, the 
special case that Kant makes relating to the aesthetic is in principle sound, and if 
objectivity in art and design is to mean anything, it must not overturn these 
fundamental arguments that he appears to be asserting. The real basis of the 
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aesthetic, as Kant considered, is that it involves, in the midst of everything, an 
encounter with a creative experience. 
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Conclusion 
The problems that I have discussed relate to whether the aesthetic is a 
creative experience and whether such a creative experience is worth anything of 
consequence. I have attempted to explain in this work the way that Kant handles 
the unique and characteristic elements that show that the aesthetic is primarily a 
creative concern of considerable value. He regards, the aesthetic as being 
particularly important to human beings in their " life", as it intensifies both the 
cognitive and sensuous side of human existence, the completion of a mind, 
which the "theoretical" and the "practical" does not touch upon. In this respect 
the aesthetic extends one's knowledge and understanding of things in a way that 
the "theoretical" and the "practical" cannot comprehend or dismiss, as it 
represents, through feelings, a different kind of life experience. 
The Critique of Judgement attempts to explain above all else, how the 
imagination and the understanding as self-activity, feature as elements in 
aesthetic experience. In this respect, Kant investigates how one judges and 
estimates the aesthetic in relation to how he sees the aesthetic revealing itself 
through autonomy as a felt particular experience which is creative and 
independent of determinate objective concepts. When one enquires what Kant 
means by the aesthetic being independent of determinate concepts, the 
connection that he establishes is that the aesthetic in free-play is imaginative. 
Here the logic of Kant's argument arises from the fact that the aesthetic as a 
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feeling of pleasure, is an individual experience without ulterior aim, but one that 
is valid a priori universally "for all men" (CJ, intro. VI, 187). 
In exploring the multiple nature of the aesthetic, Kant argues that this 
experience can only be accounted for and determined according to its pleasure. 
What gives rise to this satisfaction, according to Kant, is the harmony between 
imagination and understanding in free-play. Consequently, he arrives at the 
view that because the aesthetic is spontaneous and connects to a conscious 
feeling of pleasure, a feeling of this kind must in some sense be indeterminate. 
This argument appears to be strengthened by the fact that, for Kant, and I 
concur partly with him on this point, the aesthetic is singular, particular and 
autonomous. Certainly it is the case that autonomy is of paramount importance 
in creativity because it allows the individual to experience the object as a matter 
of disinterest, spontaneously and without any preconceived or presupposed 
considerations about how such an object should be experienced. In this respect, 
individuals are obliged to state their own feelings, to express themselves and to 
feel this experience unfolding. One is drawn to the conclusion that what governs 
the aesthetic and its a priori conditions are: (1) free-play, (2) autonomy, (3) 
particularisation, and (4) aesthetic purposiveness. In short, the aesthetic is, as 
Kant thought, an unconditioned experience that is a reflective rather than a 
purely conceptual determinate judgement. This, however, should not lead us 
into thinking, as I have intimated, that aesthetic experience is discordant. 
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One soon realises that the new cutting edge that Kant bestows upon the 
aesthetic surpasses both theoretical and moral concepts, in that the aesthetic is 
the only creative experience that one has; it is the only experience where the 
individual as an autonomous being is at the centre of things. In other words, the 
aesthetic does not push aside the individual, but positively embraces them. Kant 
is confirming the importance of intuitive experience, for in his mind nowhere 
is the individual more respected, than in aesthetic experience. Through 
free-play the individual is obliged only to feel their sensuous selves, to grasp 
their own feelings and thus give life to such self-activity; the individual is not 
subordinated, but elevated as it dwells in its own experience. It is essential to 
realise, as Emst Cassirer states, that in this fashion the aesthetic designates and 
enlarges the concept of validity (1981, pp.318-9). Consequently, in the 
aesthetic, the individual is neither swallowed nor tied-down to existing concepts, 
because through free-play the artist or designer creates new concepts of 
experience. Here, Kant develops the argument that despite creativity being an 
irregular experience, it still has a unified structure which although subjective, 
represents one's imaginative impulses in their originality. In supporting Kant's 
argument that the aesthetic can be a unified experience (though not, I hasten to 
add, necessarily a subjective one), one may be puzzled as to why Kant feels that 
the aesthetic is an irregular experience. The important thing is that Kant is not 
implying that the aesthetic nature is a rare, unreliable and haphazard 
experience, but rather, that because the aesthetic is unconditional this governs 
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the irregular nature of the aesthetic. That is to say, that the only thing that is 
irregular about the aesthetic is that each experience is unique. The point being, 
that the specific aesthetic experience itself is not disorderly, as the experience is 
a unified one which can make perfect sense even though it may not have a 
purpose or defined concept. Here, the involved "harmony" and agreement 
between imagination and understanding brings about the necessary spontaneity 
and synthesis of experience. The imagination and the understanding may be 
disproportionate to each other, but what matters is not their ratio, but their 
"harmony". Kant argues that the creative sense strives for a: "mutual relation 
of the powers of representation so far as they refer a given representation to 
cognition in general" (CJ, §9, 217). Such a harmony only occurs, argues Kant, 
when the imagination and understanding are in free-play. 
One is left feeling that perhaps one has to concede the point that in 
Kantian terms the aesthetic experience is unconditional, is autonomous, is a 
disinterested experience, is personal, is particular and is in imaginative 
free-play. But, if one did agree with this impression would one also have to 
agree that the aesthetic is non-conceptual, has no criteria, is indeterminate and 
thus has no objectivity? Does it follow, in other words, that because something 
aesthetically is autonomous and in free-play, it cannot be conceptual and 
determinate? In one sense, Kant is arguing that the aesthetic is objective, for his 
notion of autonomy, free-play, disinterest and purposiveness represent objective 
understanding. These are the rules which one is obliged to accept when it comes 
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to aesthetic matters. But Kant only deals with one side of this notion of 
objectivity from the viewpoint of experience. In chapter two of my thesis I will 
discuss another side to this argument, one which draws on a different kind of 
aesthetic understanding that is conditioned by Wittgenstein' s notion of 
behaviour, language-games and usage. This leads me later in this work to 
comment on the fact that these different views can be reconciled and can be 
accommodated under an objective notion. 
The difficulty that one has to face, if one presupposes that Kant's 
understanding is correct, is how exactly from an art and design perspective, does 
one know that a mutual harmony between imagination and understanding exists? 
Kant's response to this, would probably be that one's conscious awareness and 
the conditions which bring about pleasure, would tell us when such harmony 
existed. Yet, how does one confirm, amass and make clear a conception based 
solely on a conscious feeling of pleasure which can only be interpreted as a felt 
experience? The fact that I am conscious of a feeling does not tell us what this 
feeling is about, or indeed how it came about. One observes, that in Kantian 
terms there is no public criteria that will enable us to understand the aesthetic 
through art and design experience. Yet, Kant's thesis is immersed in something 
quite different than this, for his doctrine requires us to put aside our tendency to 
want to judge things in purely deterministic and conceptual terms. This thinking 
argues that the aesthetic is receptive only to creativity. Here, then, what 
justifies creativity is not a thoroughly systematic approach, but when the subject 
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through imagination responds to his or her own sense of being in spontaneity. 
In this experience, the aesthetic has no need to follow a procedure or define and 
fix a course of understanding since everything is dependent on what is seen and 
experienced. It makes no sense, therefore, to confine the aesthetic to something 
which it is not. Aesthetically, the individual's only obligation is to feel itself 
and to come to terms with this experience from an intuitive and imaginative 
position. The individual concerned, embraces the totality of his or her powers 
of experience in an autonomous free-play rather than a mechanistic manner. In 
other words, the aesthetic relies on the subject's natural inclinations of 
imagination and understanding to explore and to absorb self-experience. 
Accordingly, the aesthetic reaches a level of creative output that surpasses 
anything else, as it connects its whole self-experience in a unified manner. 
Indeed, it enriches the lives of those who can perceive this experience, because 
it expands one's sensuous being. In essence, aesthetic reality, because it is 
concerned with creativity, challenges the orthodoxy of what constitutes 
experience and understanding. 
What strongly accompanies the Kantian argument is the concern that 
what aesthetic experience connects and exposes is a world where feelings and 
pleasure are given a logical outlet, a defined role and an understanding of one's 
self in intuition. Kant is committed to the view that this world is incapable of 
determinate concepts in that feelings and pleasure need to escape precise 
conceptual meaning in order not to subsume any account that would directly 
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affect the natural states of these expressions. My opposition to this view is not 
to deny these states of affairs, (as I happen to support this view entirely), but 
rather to suggest that there is also an intentional and conceptual side that affects 
aesthetic experience and meaning in a way that Kant appears not to have 
realised. By moving this thesis in a more practical direction in my next chapter, 
it becomes necessary to explain in this part of my manuscript, in contrast to the 
Kantian thesis, how a ·public· understanding of art and design aesthetic 
practice is manifested. One shall see that the "public" does not negate Kant's 
position, but instead complements it. 
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Chapter Two 
WittgensteiD's Col1cept of NoticiD.g 811 Aspect: A Public Col1ceptiol1 
Introduction 
The main arguments in this chapter relate to noticing an aspect as a 
public conception of understanding. Aesthetically, Wittgenstein believes that 
a public conception of understanding can be shown to connect to the notion 
of objectivity itself. I begin by discussing why Wittgenstein objects to the idea 
that the aesthetic is a "private mental experience" and why he argues that it is 
only through one's actions and "practice", that meaning and objectivity can 
embrace the aesthetic. It is on these lines that "noticing an aspect" takes 
shape. Yet, in noticing an aspect what Wittgenstein is concerned with is the 
particular visual experience, and its perception as a public rather than as a 
"private experience". Wittgenstein's argument is that a painting only makes 
sense when it can be described in a specific kind of way through its "usage" 
and conceptual understanding. The claim being, that it is only by what I do in 
terms of observed actions, behaviour and sensation-language, that determines 
objectivity. Aesthetically, what Wittgenstein pursues, is that the aesthetic gets 
expressed only when I know how to use and make sense of particular lines, 
colours, shapes, tones, materials and so on. What he is asserting, is that it is 
by behavioural, visual, sensation-language and conceptual means alone, that 
any criteria or notion of aesthetic understanding manifests itself. There are 
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therefore, many aspects of Wittgenstein I s work, but pertinent to his argument 
and to this discussion about aesthetic understanding, are his claims concerning 
"seeing" and "interpreting". 
One of the principal arguments that Wittgenstein sustains in relation 
to noticing an aspect is that observing does not produce what is observed, as 
visual experience is a conceptual matter (PI, p.187, §IX). However, part of 
his understanding of aesthetic perception relates to "organisation", a Gestalt 
approach. Wittgenstein, in relation to "organisation", talks about the 
"dawning of an aspect" (PI, pp.193-6, §Xll), an issue that I will shortly 
discuss. Now, it is particular important to realise that noticing an aspect 
primarily involves "seeing" and "interpreting". Here, he argues, that seeing is 
a "state", a felt experience, or optical effect, and interpreting that which is 
taken from the seen, verifies what is seen, a criterion of understanding of this 
experience. On this basis, Wittgenstein describes some of the ways in which 
seeing affects the interpreting and mentions that everything is dependent on the 
seen. While Wittgenstein I s concern is to describe the perception of what is 
"seen", he is adamant that how one applies this expression of the "seen" 
describes its meaning. In other words, and this is a fundamental point, a 
public conception of understanding relates to a description of what is "seen". I 
will discuss the issue that what is "seen" aesthetically can be "real", but 
problems arise here relating to the picture-space as one I s responses are never 
clear cut, given the various light, tone, colour, lines, texture, shape and 
character differences alone in anyone painting. 
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Perception, Wittgenstein argues, has unintentional and intentional 
aspects that affect the "organisation" of noticing an aspect, but one may not 
be aware, how these sensory modes are being organised. In seeking to 
explain the conditions of perception, he argues that in perception, one can 
make connections between elements which cannot actually be seen in a 
painting. In other words, that one will readily foi'm a picture of an image or 
event when in fact much of our identity of this picture or image may be 
obscured from view (consider William Turner's seascape paintings or 
Rembrandt Hermensz Van Rijn's interior/figure paintings). The kind of 
connections that Wittgenstein has in mind here relate to an arrow piercing an 
apple, in that one sees the two ends of the arrow, but assume through 
experience that the two ends are connected in the apple even though one 
cannot see this effect. This leaves open the question as to other kinds of 
perception connections that can be made in this fashion. Another significant 
feature of this perception that Wittgenstein draws out, is that visual experience 
is essentially an activity of a particular kind, involving perhaps sound, touch, 
sight and body movement all at the same time. One's attention is drawn to 
the fact that if I use my paintbrush in a particular way, creating marks of a 
certain kind that represent spatial elements through dry brushwork and the use 
of solid and transparent colour techniques, then the figure in this painting 
through the rhythms that I have created in my mark-making, says something 
about the character of this expression and its description. If a certain 
expression is therefore captured as so described, Wittgenstein maintains that I 
may be right to assert how this happened and thus determine its objective 
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validity. The claim is, that by describing something I am illustrating a concept 
of the object. Thus, according to Wittgenstein the criterion of understanding 
is being deduced in relation to what can be "seen" in the perceptual situation. 
Consciousness alone is not enough, he insists, because one needs to make 
conceptual connections that describe what I am designing or making. The 
creative process is in one sense not implied by my feelings, but how I use 
tone, colour, line, scale, atmosphere, expression and materials. 
At the very core of Wittgenstein I s understanding of the aesthetic, is 
that it converges on a public concept of understanding. As will be explored, 
he sees the aesthetic as a matter of considering, differentiating and comparing 
that presupposes "public" accountability. He proceeds to show how method, 
example and order are involved and connected to aesthetic experience and 
that what ultimately matters is the visual expression, since this explains usage. 
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2. 1 
Having ŤŸĚthe Kantian aesthetic argument, in one regard, as 
an imaginative "private" experience, it is time now to tum to Wittgenstein's 
aesthetic argument which centres on a concept of "usage". In other words, for 
Wittgenstein, how the aesthetic is being employed and how it is being used 
determines what kind of aesthetic representation one is dealing with and its 
objectivity. This further determines, for Wittgenstein, the way in which one 
can take stock of the aesthetic as a public conception. For the concept of use, 
in Wittgensteinian terms, constitutes meaning. The premise being, that usage 
presupposes a social practice (how individuals communicate and behave) that 
demonstrates and describes the meaning of what one is doing. In which case, 
usage is a criterion and a development of identity which is meant to show how 
the aesthetic activity is being expressed. As Oswald Hanfling remarks, usage 
is connected with the description that one gives of an object (1989, p.42). 
From an educational point of view, these Wittgensteinian arguments further 
substantiate our pursuit, at one level, in establishing relevance and credibility 
to aesthetic experience. Underlining Wittgenstein' s argument is, that our 
sensation-language must be grounded by some physical object. 
For Wittgenstein: "The mental picture is the picture which is 
described when someone describes his images" (PI, §367). He can only 
describe what he imagines, argues Wittgenstein (PI, §344), when what he says 
rests on his behaviour (usage). It is in relation to behaviour-description that 
I now want to strengthen the case that art and design is objective and 
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accountable. In pursuing this issue, Wittgenstein' s point is that through our 
actions the imaginative experience is described. Indeed, he states that: "How 
does one teach anyone to read to himself? How does one know if he can do 
so? How does he himself know that he is doing what is required of him?" (PI, 
§375). Moreover, he insists that: "One ought to ask, not what images are or 
what happens when one imagines anything, but how the word 'Imagination' is 
used" (PI, §370). Consequently, Wittgenstein's method is an attempt to 
observe behaviour and its actions and to conceptualise this experience 
through social practice. He argues quite clearly that: "The concept of the 
'inner picture' is misleading, for this concept uses the 'outer picture' as a 
model" (PI, p.196, §XI). His analysis is, not to deny the "inner picture", but 
that the "inner picture" only makes sense when one describes the perception of 
this thought and its action. By examining the aesthetic in this way, he aims to 
show that a fundamental feature of this experience, is a public conception of 
understanding. Here, it is only by exhibiting one's behaviour that it is 
possible to determine the kind of imagining or making that is taking place. 
For he insists, that "doing" sums in one's head (PI, §369), could invariably 
mean anything. It should be remembered, before I go any further with this, 
that one should not lose sight of Kant's argument that the aesthetic is 
"purposive", an experience through which the aesthetic sense is developed and 
directed. In other words, as I have explained, the aesthetic through 
spontaneity and "free-play" is an imaginative experience capable of exhibiting 
its own perception. My feelings are that Kant has a point when he claims that 
art and design experience defies measurement. It is evident from this that one 
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must treat with caution Wittgenstein' s notion of usage, for while the concept 
of usage can be invoked here, Kant's doctrine centres on the fact that an 
experience of this kind is valid from the premise that art and design is the 
result of imaginative "free-play" and "disinterest". However, despite these 
differences, I am using Wittgenstein' s arguments along with Kant's, to 
demonstrate the importance of the aesthetic for education, and not as a battle 
for supremacy between two different theories. 
In private language, one of Wittgenstein' s arguments is that there is 
no independent criteria and the relationship between a mental image and what 
it is an image of, may of course be correctly connected, but the fact is, that 
there is no independent way of comparing his or her image. The issue facing 
private language is knowing not only how to identify, but also how to 
reidentify. The Wittgensteinian argument, claims that knowing how to 
identify and reidentify requires a public conception. What is being suggested 
is that one's method of comparing, differentiating and so forth corresponds in 
some sense to a public recognition of what constitutes construction, 
comparing, differentiating and so on. Yet the notion of reidentifying an 
aesthetic object, from a Wittgensteinian point of view, implies a criteria of 
identify. This is certainly a contentious issue given Kant's notion of aesthetic 
free-play. Accordingly, one of the problems seems to be the extent to which 
the form of the object (its shape, colour and pattern) detennines what I feel for 
the object. On the other hand, one must be careful here, for the public 
conception that Wittgenstein has in mind has to be rooted in art and design 
itself if it is to mean anything. Put differently, a scientific method, according 
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to Stephen Hawking: "must make definite predictions about the result of future 
observations" (p.9). Since this is hardly an aesthetic experience, one must be 
cautious about how one goes about comparing and differentiating in aesthetic 
terms. Similarly, it might seem as though Kant's notion of the aesthetic is far 
from a Wittgensteinian conception of art, but as I have suggested, there is a lot 
of overlap and criss-crossing going on here between cognitive occurrence, 
conceptual understanding and behaviour, that neither Kant nor Wittgenstein is 
prepared aesthetically to fully admit. To my mind, neither philosopher goes 
far enough in explaining aesthetic experience and its understanding. It would 
be naive not to admit that the act of coming to know, is an act that involves 
both impressions, feelings and ideas reciprocally. What is more, as Stuart 
Hampshire argues, a living human being cannot be seen: "primarily as a tool 
for effective action, as a mechanism. It is also a complex living organism that 
has its own preconceptual tendencies and goals" (1989, p.156), but this is an 
issue that I will examine further in chapter three. However, art and design 
experience does involve a personal response which is intuitive and 
imaginative, but as Wittgenstein thought, the judgement-features of such 
experience is realised only when one is able to ascribe meaning to these 
character experiences. The visual impression must have certain features which 
can be described in perception, action or language. How one associates a 
certain kind of meaning with its visual effect is the subject of this chapter. 
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2.2 
In Wittgenstein I s discussion of the philosophy of psychology he 
mentions "noticing an aspect" (PI, p.193, §XI), in relation to "seeing" and 
"interpreting" . As Wittgenstein explains, one has to look at why it is that one 
can imagine and "see" some things and not others. To understand this in 
Wittgensteinian terms, is to determine what the image or picture appears to be 
dependent on. In this context, it is not the image or "seeing" that matters, 
which Wittgenstein describes as lifeless (4 §§236-8), but rather its role, what 
explains it, how am I comparing this image to something else, what it is doing 
and what it is for. This is what for Wittgenstein, determines the expression 
and "forms of life" in the aesthetic. 
To begin with, what Wittgenstein fmds interesting in noticing an 
aspect is how: "I contemplate a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to 
another. I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently" (PI, p.193, 
§XI). In this respect, noticing an aspect of an object, is akin to having a 
particular image of it and seeing it "as this" object, because of the sensory 
change. The difficulty here, of course, is the degree to which the sensory 
change as "organisation" (to be explained) is dependent on concepts. 
However, "seeing" the object as a particular kind of object is to have a 
concept of it, but a concept that involves an understanding of perception. The 
sensory perception that Wittgenstein has in mind appears to be of the observed 
rather than of the imaginary or feeling aspect that Kant emphasises. In the 
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final part of my thesis, I attempt to draw some conclusions about these 
different approaches in relation to art and design understanding and education. 
Now, as Malcolm Budd points out: "But the image of a single point at 
which the sensory meets the intellect is not entirely accurate. For there are 
significantly different kinds of aspect, in which the sensory is joined with the 
intellect in different ways and in different proportions" (1993, p.79). In which 
case, the visual description is not to be solely understood in the sense that one 
cannot necessarily segregate the intellect and the sensory nature of this 
experience. They interconnect in ways which cannot easily be prised apart. In 
Kant, the aesthetic is a dynamic experience which in part is spontaneous. It 
has no need for a single point to be considered in this way, since the 
experience is a unified one. Our search to get close to such an experience is 
hampered partly by the fact that there are different ways one can perceive 
noticing an aspect, and also by the fact that one wants to "unify" this 
experience as a whole. If Wittgenstein' s notion of aesthetic objectivity is to be 
acceptable, then clearly it must embrace this concern. As Kant thought, there 
is a general cognition in aesthetic experience through "purposiveness" that 
serves to make sense of one's experience. Of course, Wittgenstein is adamant 
that there is no strict manner in which aesthetic objectivity operates, because 
everything is dependent on what is "seen". The "seen" is the basis, according 
to Wittgenstein, of what constitutes objectivity, its recognition. 
Let us then cite some of Wittgenstein I s examples (PI, §XI) that 
emphasise some of the possible objective differences that can affect noticing an 
aspect or the "seen": (1)"1 can draw this object but I cannot describe it in 
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words", (2) "I can see a likeness between this object here and that object 
opposite", (3) "these two objects look the same to me", (4) "the duck and 
rabbit syndrome" (5) "my understanding of this person's face changes as his or 
her face changes and at the same time when no change appears in the face", 
(6) "I can imagine this object two-dimensionally but not three-dimensionally" , 
(7) "but I can imagine the object two-dimensionally and three-dimensionally", 
(8) "this object could be a plane", (9) "I can visualise only a part of this 
object", (10) "if you can imagine this you should also be able to imagine this 
other object", (11) "I can compare this object with this object, but not this 
with that object", (12) "I do not see any blue in this painting", (13) "to 
understand this experience, you have to be able to do this first", (14) "I am 
unable to visualise how this works", (15) "the way that you are imagining the 
ŸŞÚŤȘWĚis wrong, what you need to do is ... " and finally (16) "I can imagine that 
what needs to be added to this object is ... " Quite clearly, one could continue 
with this process, but this list should be sufficient to show what noticing an 
aspect can encompass, and the many important ways it is possible to 
experience an object. If objectivity is to mean anything then Wittgenstein 
might be correct to state that one must first ask what is being seen. If 
noticing an aspect involves perception, then Wittgenstein asks us to consider 
how I am able to understand this experience. For example: "what makes my 
image of him into an image of him" (PI, p.177, §Ill). It is not so much that 
I have an expression of this face, but what is it about this expression that 
justifies the appropriateness of this visual experience. The case being, what 
tells me that this face is sad, happy or angry? For the artist and the designer 
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are searching, through experimentation, for a particular expression, and it is 
this feeling for this particular expression that will constrain how their 
creativity will develop. 
The issue seems to be in the kinds of connections that I am making in 
"rule" terms. That is, in order for me to see this face like "this", I must 
experience the characteristics of "this" as they are meant to be "seen". 
However, it may be difficult to maintain the characteristics of what is seen, in 
aesthetic terms, since the strength or significance of "this" must involve an 
imaginative experience and an understanding perhaps of the artist's or 
designer's work, that extends beyond description. None the less, Wittgenstein 
argues, one can only notice an object if one understands the kinds of 
relationships that this object may have, if one is familiar with its experience. 
To become familiar, one has to describe something, he argues, by the way 
that one is using it, by what the individual goes on to do (PI, §180). This 
entails, how is the "seen" being used, because it is how the object is being 
used that determines the expression and its familiarity. How one chooses to 
describe an art or designed object whether by referring to the making of it or 
otherwise, is not the issue here, but merely the fact that one's description 
determines how one acquired an understanding of the object. One central 
notion that Wittgenstein is making here, concerns the thought that the use 
accounts for the argument that one is determining. What is at stake, is the 
competency of the description either as a performance, a visual experience or 
by discussion. Connected to this is that one's description is dependent on 
noticing an aspect. Yet, it may have to be admitted that the connections that 
104 
an artist or designer make involve imaginative consequences that make it 
difficult for the seen to be a simple straightforward matter. Wittgenstein 
partly realises this himself when he mentions: "There is gold paint, but 
Rembrandt didn't use it to paint a golden helmet" (RC, p.27, §79). Now this 
is a very interesting remark, which is not really explained by Wittgenstein, 
other than the fact that he is referring to the issue that one must look at the use 
of things. Our response to such a gold helmet, painted by Rembrandt 
Hennensz Van Rijn, gives one the feeling that yes "this" is a gold helmet. It is 
not a representation of a gold helmet, it is the real thing, which the painter 
gets us to experience in a particular way. Likewise, it would be wrong to 
construe that Rembrandt was merely in the business of copying a gold helmet 
for the sake of it. In other words, this gold helmet would have been painted in 
a particular kind of way, positioned spatially and scaled compositionally in 
relation to other objects and the atmosphere of the painting and its mood. 
What is more, it would be symbolising perhaps other connotations to do with 
the description of the painting as a whole, that would in turn be expressing 
several things about this helmet. One might consider how the gold helmet has 
a certain weight to it, but how is this achieved? Similarly, one might consider 
what is the object's social status, or alternatively, does the gold helmet look as 
though it is battle worn (how did Rembrandt achieve this effect), which might 
suggest something further about the painting and the helmet. To engage such 
an object is not just a matter of visual perception as it also involves an 
imaginative experience to appreciate the sensuousness of this artefact. 
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One must tread carefully about the concept of use, for in this instance 
the gold helmet is an imaginative experience, not necessarily a concept of what 
one observes, for the play of light and shadow in Rembrandt's paintings, 
though difficult to pin down, are certainly not arbitrarily constructed, nor 
arbitrarily conceptualised in an imaginative sense. Cubism, Fauvism, Abstract 
Expressionism, the work of Joseph Beuys, Georg Baselitz and so on, are 
testimony to the fact that usage in art and design terms is anything but 
obvious. Still, Wittgenstein would insist that one should make use of the 
"identity" (PI, §565) , but what is the "identity" when it comes to aesthetic 
issues? The assertion is, that this aspect of colour, line, mark-making, 
texture, volume and space presupposes "identity", that comes about through its 
intention, thought and purpose. The aspect of "identity", in this instance, is 
not the colour or material itself, but, once again, what seems to matter is that 
the colour or material application presupposes a certain expression on the 
painting or designed object. A painting, he would argue is designed to give a 
specific kind of visual impression. If one changes this visual impression, then 
the painting changes, and the painting only makes sense when its perception 
can be described in a specific kind of way. In this case, the expression must be 
one of thought as opposed to merely a "cry of recognition" (PI, p.198, §XI). 
I feel that the point that Wittgenstein is getting at (amongst other things) here, 
is that a work of art is conceived and constructed with thought (PI, p.197, 
§XI) which makes it possible for the work to be realised. To be able to 
construct or respond to an aesthetic experience requires that one understands 
how one is able to perceive connections, images and differences in the work. 
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However, if one thinks back to "making use of the identity" (PI, §565) , the 
identity that one comes to understand about a work of art or design may well 
come about because of the purposive nature of aesthetic experience. While 
identity is certainly problematic, the mistake that I feel that Wittgenstein 
makes here, is that his notion of identity seems to give us only one slice of the 
experience, it does not account fully for the way in which our 
cognitive-feeling understanding might otherwise develop. 
Wittgenstein realises that: "Displace a piece and it is no longer what it 
was" (PP I, §339). In his view, the particular visual perception changes both 
the object and its surroundings. That is to say, that my awareness is no 
longer the same if for any reason I add, take away or change direction in what 
I am doing to this object. As he puts it: "' A quite particular expression' - it is 
part of this that if one makes the slightest alteration in the face, the expression 
changes at once" (PP I, §340). The difficulty here, as indicated earlier, is 
whether such alterations in themselves have meaning? Wittgenstein' s solution 
to this problem is that one does not work with "definite" meanings, (whether 
these meanings are there or not, is not the issue) as the point is that: "I am 
developing what there is of it" (PP I, §363). Thus, something has caught my 
attention; I am not clear about it, but it interests me, I recognise that this 
aspect has possibilities and I keep working with these ideas until what 
Wittgenstein calls the "dawning of an aspect" (PI, p. 194, §XI). Before I 
discuss "the dawning of an aspect", Wittgenstein surmises again, how is it that 
I know that these possibilities are taken in conjunction with the work itself? 
He deals with this when he explains that: "So we interpret it, and see it as we 
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interpret it" (PI, p.193, §XI). The argument that Wittgenstein develops here, 
is that as I interpret the object, I have a particular visual experience that forms 
what I notice about the object. In response to this, I can see the same object, 
at one time like this and at another time like that. If I harbour a different view 
of this object each time I look at it, then surely this experience corresponds to 
a different picture or image, which in turn changes my understanding of the 
object. In a moment, I will discuss how Wittgenstein sees this in terms of 
"organisation" . 
From Wittgenstein' s point of view: "' Observing' does not produce 
what is observed" (PI, p.IS7, §IX). In other words, he does not feel that a 
visual experience is purely a perceptual matter as: "Our problem is not a 
causal but a conceptual one" (PI, p.203, §XI). His argument is that a visual 
experience that involves noticing an aspect must also presuppose that a certain 
kind of thinking connects to the "seeing", to determine the visual sense. 
Clearly, being aroused by stimuli is dependent on how one is "seeing" the 
experience and the attention that one pays to it. Now because a visual 
experience for Wittgenstein corresponds to a perceptual and conceptual 
experience, the visual experience is essentially a description of an image. 
This description must provide: "a representation of a distribution in a space 
(that of time, for instance)" (PI, p.IS7, §IX), to claim that something has 
observable qualities. On this basis, Wittgenstein insists that noticing an aspect 
is an active rather than a passive (non-reflective) experience; an experience, 
that must involve an "interpretation". To understand further what noticing 
an aspect stipulates, one needs to explore the crucial elements of "seeing" and 
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"interpreting", for, without doubt, these are the factors that determine 
Wittgenstein's understanding of the aesthetic. 
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2.3 
One of the most important statements that Wittgenstein makes about 
"seeing" and "interpreting" is found in Zettle, §208, and in Remarks on the 
Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I, section 1. Here, to begin with, 
Wittgenstein remarks that seeing is not an action but a "state" (2; §208); 
whereas interpreting is a procedure, an action, a hypothesis. In seeing as a 
state: "'Seeing this' doesn't mean: reacting in this way, - for I can see without 
reacting" (PP I, §83). Seeing seems to imply that the experience is an 
"Inner" occurrence. Aesthetically, this phenomenon, from Wittgenstein' s 
point of view, involves a sensation-optical experience which art cannot do 
without, as the sensation-optical experience leads to "particular actions" (2; 
§208). It is to be noted, that Wittgenstein is not claiming necessarily that 
there is a causal connection between the optical effect of an object and its 
interpretation. That implies that there is some "common property", as 
Godfrey Vesey puts it (1992, pp.6-12), in what I see and in what I reason. 
The difficulty here is, to quote Vesey: "0 looks like an X to S without S,s 
taking 0 to be an X" (1992, p.10). Although Wittgenstein never elaborates 
on this notion of "felt", he nevertheless feels that this experience affects the 
seeing. It is important to notice this feeling, because in the aesthetic sense one 
arrives at seeing partly through this state. What I see, simply as seeing, is a 
behavioural response involving what I am observing, but it is not as 
Wittgenstein argues, an expression of an experience, as this would constitute 
interpretation (PP I, §20). For example, a car races towards me as I am 
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walking down the street and my immediate reaction is to jump to one side. 
My reason for jumping to one side was because I interpreted the car as a threat 
(see also, ŸĚ§218). It is not simply that an object is red in colour that 
matters, but rather how I react to this colour red and what it expresses. The 
premise being, that the fact that I may be conscious of an object, as 
Wittgenstein thought, does not presuppose necessarily anything poignant about 
this object. Thus, I may be conscious of the wall in front of me, but an object 
needs interpretation, if it is to mean anything. 
Yet, a different kind of seeing and interpreting is required, for 
instance, if in seeing Pablo Picasso's Guemica I notice that there is a human 
face and a horse in this painting. Here in order to see the human face and the 
horse in this painting I have to interpret according to what I see, but the 
difficulty is how did I come to recognise a human face and a horse in such a 
painting? If I rely purely on the optical effect would I see a horse or a human 
face? For not only does the Cubist "style" of this painting affect my 
interpretation, there is the added difficulty about how one compares and thus 
understands a painting of this kind. To make matters more complex, in order 
to understand a painting like this, is it necessary that I should see a human face 
or a horse? The manner in which Picasso has painted the human face or the 
horse in this work represents more of a likeness rather than a direct copy of a ! 
human or animal expression. That makes the comparing and understanding 
less than obvious. But, as noted earlier, one's imaginative experience of this 
painting is a real one, not an illusion, the human face and the horse appear as 
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living objects in our consciousness. In which case, our imaginative ability is 
not constrained simply by the formal qualities in the work. 
To reiterate, the picture-space of these objects IS less than 
straightforward, involving as it does a combination of forms and indeed ideas. 
So, while it is true to say that I am seeing this aspect "as" a particular 
expression of a horse, this implies noticing an aspect and hence an 
interpretation of this painting by Picasso. The painting surface in this painting 
alone combines a complex mixture of light, tone, colour, shape, texture and 
expression that makes our specific responses to such stimuli far from clear 
cut. As Kant thought, the aesthetic mind, through purposiveness, tends to 
unify these experiences. This is because when one looks at a painting, it is not 
just the picture-space that is affecting our understanding of the work, there is 
also the time factor and one's personal history that affects our understanding. 
However, the interpretation gives the seeing, the expression of experience, 
although perhaps the optical picture appears to be changing (as in the rabbit 
and the duck experience). Does it not follow, then, that my interpretation, 
because of this optical picture, must also change? So, while the whole point 
of interpreting is to state how one is seeing an object, how can one rely on this 
experience, if the problem is, as Wittgenstein remarked: "Do I really see 
something different each time, or do I merely interpret what I see in a 
different way? I am inclined to think the former. But why?" (PI, p.212, §XI, 
see also Z; §208 and PP I, §1). It is debatable how far one can go along with 
this Wittgensteinian claim here, as there are limits and constraints relevant to 
what one is recognising. It is by no means clear that in seeing a walking-stick 
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appearing to bend in a pool of water, that I am experiencing such an object as 
formulated in this way. 
What Wittgenstein appears to be getting at, is that one's 
interpretation in noticing an aspect is based on what one is seeing, as the 
sensory perception of what one is seeing affects one's interpretation. This is 
the reason why Wittgenstein comments on: "seeing the figure F sometimes as 
an F, sometimes as the mirror-image of an F" (PP I, §l). Put differently, my 
interpretation is taken from what I see, even though what I see now may be 
different to what I see in five minutes and may vary from one object to 
another object. Yet, as I have suggested, this is not always the case. The 
consequence of my interpretation if properly used, verifies my visual sense and 
gives the situation a particular kind of expression that belongs to the seeing 
"as". But, as Wittgenstein mentions (PP I, §21), not all interpretations are 
voluntary; some are involuntary. The assumption being, that a piece of art or 
design work may leave a strong visual impression which affects one's 
experience of this object. There is also the possibility that my visual 
experience of an object as a perception succeeds only because there was an 
intentional side that identified what I needed to see. In other words, as John 
Searle mentions, there are conditions of satisfaction that direct the visual 
experience (1993, ch.2). 
As Wittgenstein explains, I may not see the object as a rabbit, if I am 
not aware of the existence of this creature (PP l, §74). Even so, it is quite 
clear that my perception is not dependent necessarily on my knowing the 
existence of certain objects, since it is possible to describe an object without 
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necessarily knowing what kind of object it is. Similarly, as Wittgenstein states, 
seeing means seeing "as" which is not something that can be known before 
that particular state of seeing (PI, p.212, §XI). It also seems to me, that what 
I see may be dependent on the sort of questions that I have been asked to 
answer, for the question itself may involve a visual experience that affects 
what I see; for example, if I am asked the question can I see the texture in 
this painting, the lines in this painting, the colours in this painting and so on. 
My seeing is employed differently each time to distinguish not just the 
question, but its visual sense. In these sorts of situations my perception 
becomes part of my conceptual understanding. Indeed, in relation to arrows, 
triangles, double crosses, hexagons, duck and rabbit and other picture puzzles, 
Wittgenstein makes it clear that perception makes the difference in the way 
that one interprets. 
Let us now address some of the issues that correspond to the 
"dawning of an aspect". The difficulty, as Wittgenstein argues, is how can I 
see a rabbit or a duck and know that I can "take" this image as an image of a 
duck or a rabbit (PI, p.195, §XJ). A possible reason why one might see a 
rabbit rather than a duck or vice versa, has to do with one's possible mode of 
comparing (PI, p.195, §XI); a difference between one conception and another. 
Yet, it is also clear that I cannot see the duck and the rabbit at the same time, 
but this argument leads us a bit astray from Wittgenstein' s main argument. 
The main argument being the change of aspect, which in the case of the duck 
or rabbit is a change in perception. As previously suggested, how one sees a 
duck or a rabbit is dependent on one's visual experience, but how is it possible 
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to justify that both the duck and the rabbit are seen experiences? In other 
words, can one claim that the optical effect and its perception is not just a 
"mental occurrence" or something that I happen to have imagined. In view of 
this, Wittgenstein's reply to this problem appears to involve the fact that: "I 
suddenly see the solution of a puzzle-picture. Before, there were branches 
there, now there is a human shape. My visual impression has changed and 
now I recognise that it has not only shape and colour but also a quite particular 
"organization" (PI, p.196, §X!). The example shows, right or wrongly, that 
the "organisation" determines, from a Wittgenstein angle, how one is 
intetpreting the object, but he also remarks in relation to visual experience: "I 
shall mostly have no recollection of the way my glance shifted in looking at it" 
(PI, p.l99, §XI). The argument is, how is the "organisation" arranged and 
made responsible for the visual experience, if I have no recollection of how I 
visually formed an image of this human shape by this notion? An aspect of 
this change from branches to human shape seems for Wittgenstein to involve: 
"half visual experience, half thought" (PI, p.197, §XI). How Wittgenstein 
arrives at this proportion "half" visual and "half" thought is not clear. 
However, he further sees this experience, the visual and the thought, as 
interconnected, to the degree that the language-game may help to describe and 
form the picture with the perception. In this respect, the thought is part of the 
experience of seeing and part of the linguistic intercourse that may have more 
of an explorative and imaginative content than simply a grammatical one. 
Wittgenstein's notion of "organisation" is derived partly from Gestalt 
theory (often referred to as optical illusions concerning figure and ground or 
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positive and negative spaces). While more needs to be said about 
"organisation", in the context of visual experience, Wittgenstein also argues 
that whatever I see this object or event "as", this object or event only has 
"life" (meaning) if I have an interest in it. One of the contingent factors that 
gives life to visual experience is time and space (PI, p.187, §IX), in that time 
and space allow one to explore and develop an interest that can be talked 
about, extended, modified and used (PI, p.209, §XI). This brings us to the 
point, where Wittgenstein writes: "How is it, though, that when pointing to a 
particular figure I tell myself that I should like to call this such-and-such 
('X')? I may even say the ostensive definition 'X' means this out loud to 
myself. But I must surely also understand it myself! So I must know, 
according to what technique, I think of using the sign 'X' "(PP I, §264). One 
visualises, in this instance, according to how one constructs "X". But the fact 
that I have constructed "X" does not make it a portrait of "X". For to repeat, 
the expression to be a portrait of "X" requires that I know something about the 
various factors which go to make the portrait of "X". Here, to master a 
technique means that I know how to handle certain materials and how to create 
a certain expression through these materials that describe what "X" represents. 
In itself, mastering a technique may be very skilful, but it does not necessarily 
presuppose a depth of feeling or ideas. In reply, though, one I s technique can 
be very experimental to the extent that the technique itself can evoke a strong 
feeling (see the work of Jasper Johns or Vincent Van Gogh). Furthermore, it 
seems that there may be no connection between the development or mastering 
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of a technique in a painting and the ideas or feelings behind it. Thus, one may 
be very good technically in making an object, but weak in generating ideas. 
Returning to the issue of n organisation n, Wittgenstein claims that the 
change in aspect, is not something produced by the recognition of the object, 
for example, a duck or a rabbit, but by the "organisation" of the sensory 
experience. The reason being, that "organisation" produces a new 
experience, but a new experience which as a change in aspect is also 
unchanged. What is being presented here is that the picture elements remain 
the same, but because of the "aspect of organisation", I now experience the 
picture differently. Hence, what is being claimed is that the lines, colours or 
texture in the duck or rabbit syndrome (other examples of this kind can be 
found in M.e. Escher, Bridget Riley, Paul Klee, Greek, Gothic, Islamic, 
Chinese, Renaissance and Impressionist painters or craftsmen) remain the 
same, even though my experience of these perceptions is now changed 
because of the "organisation" stimuli. The dawning of an 'aspect then is the 
"organisation" of a person I s visual impression. This only comes about not 
because I can give a description of it (though this is important for other 
reasons), but because: "the concept of "seeing" makes a tangled impression" 
(PI, p.200, §XI). Such "organisation" as a change in aspect, can be drawn 
and described to show my concept of this object has not changed. So, 
therefore, it is not an "inner process", "for this concept uses the "outer 
picture" as a model" (PI, p.196, §XI). In other words, to experience or draw 
any figure in my painting requires the perception of certain visual 
characteristics (line, texture, tone, colour) that determine my understanding of 
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this activity. However, this does not explain necessarily how the visual effect 
was constructed. The visual effect is not constructed by the line, texture, tone 
or colour, alone, but rather by what these qualities represent in the object 
itself. 
It seems, according to Wittgenstein, that one cannot explain how the 
visual effect was constructed, because during "seeing", one is not made aware 
of how the sensory modes are being "organised"; how one's glance shifts. 
What Wittgenstein means by this is, that I cannot say what the picture of the 
rabbit or duck must have been like to produce this effect. In the same way 
that I can suddenly picture blue in this painting, where before I could only see 
red, or "Before, there were branches there; now there is a human shape" (PI, 
p.196, §XI). The interpretation that Wittgenstein is asserting is that while the 
expression of the experience may change from a pyramid to a square by the 
optical effect of the diagonals crossed in these pictures (PP I, §31), or from a 
duck to a rabbit, my interpretation remains the same (PP I, §33). It 
remains the same because the same components are in it (colour, texture, 
shape, space), and can be shown to be located in the same place. To reiterate, 
Wittgenstein argues that the "how" of experience depends on what I am able to 
make of it, what this experience tells me and thus the visual sense that it gives 
me. The suggestion is, that only by conceiving in a particular kind of mode 
(for example, I am now seeing a rabbit), is it possible to experience the 
content of an experience (PI, §111). It is one thing to claim that I need to 
conceive in a particular fashion, but what one finds in "the dawning of an 
aspect" (I now see it as a rabbit), is that I will see this experience in the same 
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way. Without wishing to debate this point any further, Kant could justifiably 
challenge Wittgenstein' s attack on cognitive experience, on the grounds that 
the aesthetic is not purely a reality determined by physical and observable 
predictions. 
The idiom that Wittgenstein also considers in seeing and interpreting, 
is that there are unintentional and intentional features of visual experience that 
have to do with repeated and chance images coming before one's mind. The 
kind of intentional feature (wanting to make connections) that Wittgenstein 
draws our attention towards is as follows: "I see that an animal in a picture is 
transformed by an arrow. It has struck it in the throat and sticks out the back 
of the neck. Let the picture be a silhouette. - Do you see the arrow - or do you 
merely know that these two bits are supposed to represent part of an arrow" 
(PI, p.203, §XJ). Many examples of art and design work are dependent on 
making visual connections between missing, hidden, obscured or only hinted 
at objects. The painting by Giovanni Bazzi, St. Sebastian,is an obvious 
Renaissance example of the kind of visual connection that Wittgenstein is 
commenting on. Yet there are more complex forms that demonstrate further 
the extent and application of this approach. Suppose for instance, that one can 
make connections in an object or event, where no actual visual and optical 
forms exist in the work itself to support these connections (as in the above 
arrow example). Does it necessarily follow that because optical and visual 
evidence is missing from the work, that I cannot presuppose another form of 
logic between these objects and events which will allow me to make the kind 
of connection that is needed? After all, not all art and design experience and 
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judgements are based solely on visual effects. For example, in painting to 
music or exploring touch painting, the kind of connections that one would be 
making would not be based essentially on optical effects, but rather, may be, 
on tactile and auditory experiences. Similarly, if one is capable of making 
relevant connections of the kind, as Wittgenstein is claiming, then what is to 
stop me from making other kinds of connections that draw upon this 
experience or other sensory phenomena? How is it possible, for instance, to 
imagine that an arrow can enter the body at one point and come out at another 
specified point, when the point of entry is different to the exit point? As E. M. 
Gombrich writes: "It is the unpractical man, the dreamer, whose response may 
be less rigid and less sure than that of his more efficient fellow, who taught us 
the possibility of seeing a rock as a bull· and perhaps a bull as a rock" (1977, 
p.264). Here, one has the sense of what Kant talks about in free-play; the 
ability to make connections that previously seemed impossible (Gothic, 
Abstraction, Impression, Cubism, Deconstruction and Post Modernism are 
examples of this effect). Of course, it could be argued whether it follows 
from this that all connections of this kind carry equal validity? Simply put, 
Wittgenstein I s reply to this would be that if I see the object according to a 
particular interpretation, then this can be accounted for and verified because it 
reflects a certain visual experience. Tied to this argument is the notion that 
the value of the work is determined by my interest in it, an interest that 
involves and springs partly from the interpretation itself. 
So far, it has to be stated that Wittgenstein' s central argument has 
been that the activity of visualising itself is responsible for the interpretation. 
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He makes a further case for this when he mentions that: "Make a movement 
with your finger (such as you make in piano playing, say); repeat it, but with a 
lighter touch. Do you remember which of the two feelings you had yesterday 
in connexion with the first movement?" (PP I, §387). Wittgenstein replies, yes 
I would remember especially if I have repeated it several times over. Is it 
simply that I repeated this feat several times over, that characterises what I can 
remember? The proviso being, that the reason I can remember it now, might 
be that I realise that "this" feeling of touch "now" has certain possibilities 
that are worth exploring further and that this feeling of touch is connected 
importantly with the music itself? One localises, implies Wittgenstein, the 
possible coordination of hand movement, eye, sound and touch. By 
coordinating this action (voluntarily or involuntarily), certain kinds of 
movements with the fingers are registered, as one presses the fingers on the 
piano in a certain kind of way so that a certain kind of sensation accompanies 
the touch and produces a particular sound and time sequence. This 
experience, however, of eye, sound and touch, though particular, is particular 
perhaps only in connection to how these elements interact and come across in a 
unified manner. 
It is tempting to think that if one can grasp an aspect of an object then 
what one grasps is a "necessary" aspect of this object. However, in 
Wittgenstein's words, there is no definite "how" of what is necessary, because 
how one should experience is not the issue. For what Wittgenstein is 
suggesting, is that it is the expression that matters. One might be inclined to 
think that the lines that I draw, the marks that I make, the joints that I cut, the 
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spaces that I create are in fact descriptions of my visual awareness, but is this 
really the case? One has to accept the fact that a visual experience can be 
interpreted in a number of ways. Yet, it must be remembered, that it would 
be ludicrous not to accept Wittgenstein t s argument that despite these 
differences I may still be perfectly correct to say "how" (PP l, §428) I noticed 
this aspect, as in the movements that I make with my fingers on the piano, or 
the marks that I make with my paintbrush on the canvas. What this 
presupposes is, that if I do "this", "this" is what happens to the painting, the 
sculpture or the textile print. Of course, noticing one aspect of a painting or 
an object is hardly a sufficient explanation, as Wittgenstein concedes, for most 
paintings or objects. But it has to be conceded, that to recognise an aspect is 
to recognise something in particular about this observation. What one wants 
to do, is provide an account of an experience such that: "If a ghost appeared to 
me during the night, it could glow with a weak whitish light; but if it looked 
grey, then the light would have to appear as though it came from somewhere 
else" (RC, p.47, §231). One sees that it is the connection between the 
image and what it is an image of, that may give the experience something of 
its credibility. 
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2.4 
Wittgenstein's concern with grammar may seem to cause us problems 
aesthetically. However, the tendency here may be to misconstrue the role of 
grammar, and it is to be noted that one can only teach someone how to use 
words, but not how to describe the use for them (Re, p.32, §122). Without 
submerging or dismissing experience, Wittgenstein is asserting here that this 
phenomenon is something which only the individual can do for themselves. 
The use of grammar, as Wittgenstein surmises, may not be central to the 
activity, but is involved in the activity through thought. It should be stressed 
that in claiming that art and design experience demonstrates conceptual 
understanding, I am not claiming necessarily that such conceptual 
m:tderstanding should be along purely linguistic lines. For it is perfectly 
possible that my conceptual understanding is in what I do in practical terms, as 
opposed to what I am able to put into words. As Andrew Harrison puts it: 
"His action of using the right thing in the right way at the right time is what 
constitutes his thoughts in what he does" (1978, p.45, see also Wittgenstein's 
Zettle, § 1 (0). It would be circumspect not to realise the effect that material 
conditions can have and how these materials, as Harrison goes on to say'- play 
an important part in our conceptual understanding. Knowing how materials 
behave and how they can be handled can be as difficult an exercise as writing 
a philosophical paper. What matters is what is being attended to and as 
Harrison writes: "How he makes is inevitably how he visually attends" 
(p.170). There is a close relationship between perception and practical activity 
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in the arts, and what both Harrison and Wittgenstein seem to agree on is that 
aesthetically it is the activity of action itself that often supplies the interest. 
One of the further difficulties about a painting or an object is that it 
has a visual spatial sense to it that is not simply an element of grammar, but 
also of perception and imaginative experience. Yet, Wittgenstein' s point is 
that one cannot know automatically what a painting is about, because while 
something mayor may not be consciously before the mind, this does not make 
it so. The reason being, that for a thing to be such-and-such, a series of 
experiences and conceptual referencing is needed to describe, in the 
Wittgensteinian sense, what I am picturing. The difficulty is: "' Does A have 
the aspect A continuously before his eyes - when, that is, no change of aspect 
has taken place?'" (PP 1, §506). If one is unable to visualise this experience 
continuously can one know what established this particular experience? For 
going in or out of a visual experience for whatever reason, must in some 
sense change the course of this experience. But why should this be the case, if 
the work itself can be identified and reidentified in the same way? An 
experience is rarely continuous in any precise sense. Wittgenstein does nbt 
deny this, but I agree with Budd (pp.l04-7), that what Wittgenstein is 
concerned with here is not just the vivacity of the picturing, but also, the 
voluntary and involuntary sense in which visualising impresses itself or not, on 
understanding. Against this, whether something is intentional or otherwise, is 
not ultimately the crucial factor for Wittgenstein, as what finally matters is the 
visual meaning that one gives to this understanding. That the visual 
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experience is not continuous is hardly the deciding factor, as what appears to 
matter is the identification of this experience and what this expresses. 
As I have mentioned, Wittgenstein' s interest and indeed fundamental 
premise, is not a commitment to experience as such, but rather the meaning of 
our understanding. For the moment, consider the question that what needs 
expressing is the character of the communication (PP 1, §514). Simply put, 
one uses signs; the sign looks like "this". In other words, the sign (an arrow, 
a letter, a face, an object, a pattern and so on) points in this direction (left, 
right, portrait, landscape, top, bottom, diagonally, convex, concave and so 
forth) to indicate some spatial position. The immediate question that comes to 
mind, is how do I know that the sign is pointing to the left or right direction? 
Wittgenstein's slender argument here seems to be that I can say that this colour 
has blue in it. One knows that this colour has blue in it, because I can 
compare my reaction with yours; by comparing my reaction with yours there 
is the possibility of agreement about this sign. The criteria of understanding 
are what are being deduced. This point leads us back perhaps to Kant's 
argument that the aesthetic cannot be hemmed in by criteria. On the other 
hand, the way that Wittgenstein describes this concern is not to force criteria 
onto aesthetic experience, but to suggest instead that the concept of usage is 
the only means by which the usefulness of criteria can be applied (if they can 
be applied at all). It makes no sense to suggest that criteria need apply to the 
actual experience itself, since there is no way of knowing what the criteria are 
before the aesthetic experience, and access to such an experience, is certainly 
not via any criteria. 
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The meaning of an object, one could say, is what art and design is all 
about, but the problem is, what kind of meaning can be attached to an 
aesthetic object? Wittgenstein writes: "Let us suppose that our picture of 
thinking was a human being, leaning his head on his hand while he talks to 
himself; Our question is not 'Is that a correct picture?' but 'How is this picture 
employed as a picture of thinking?'" (PP I, §549). The difficulty appears to 
be, as Wittgenstein asserts, how do I know what is representative of 
"thinking"? There are two possible issues here, one is what constitutes the 
phenomenon of thinking, and secondly, how in a visual sense is it possible to 
represent this experience? A possible answer to this problem seems to be that 
: "' One can't describe the aroma of coffee' . But couldn't one imagine being 
able to do so? And what does one have to imagine for this? If someone says: 
'One can't describe the aroma', one may ask him: 'What means of description 
do you want to use? What elements?'" (PP l, §553). The distinction that 
Wittgenstein asserts is that if one can imagine it then in some sense one must 
be able to describe it, since imagining connects to seeing and interpreting. 
This involves the idea that in thinking, searching, considering, trying and 
exploring the artist or designer distinguishes the possible differences that relate 
to a particular experience. From the standpoint of the Rodin 'Ibinker, the 
picture here evoked by the artist is contingent on the fact that one understands 
the classical behaviour of a thinker. In this respect, one need only to imagine 
whether an actor on a stage could entice their audience through his or her 
acting behaviour to imagine the aroma of coffee. Quite clearly, what these 
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examples show are that behaviour and imagination often appear to be closely 
connected. 
No matter what the description, it is the activity of method, example 
and or order itself that partly decides one way or another, what can possibly 
be ignored or not in the process of aesthetic making. For example, in planing 
a piece of timber that one has never used before (whether one is a novice or an 
expert) one cannot help noticing through touch, observation and thought how 
the jack-plane cuts and shaves this timber differently to other timbers. 
Noticing how timber cuts, indicates to the craftsperson something about the 
properties of this material, and how to achieve certain effects with this 
material given these properties. Likewise, one could say, that each bench 
plane needs to be held differently, has perhaps a different cutting edge and 
only produces a scraping action or a cutting action depending on the pitch of 
the cutting angle, the material itself and its sharpness. Within this, one 
teaches a person to plane, to paint and to see by teaching them the kind of use 
that verifies particular experiences of this kind. For instance: " if you hold the 
plane like that you are not going to get a clean finish", and one can verify this 
experience by example. 
Wittgenstein acknowledges in one sense, that my thoughts are my 
own, but in what sense can I say that these thoughts are my own, if I wish 
others to be acquainted with them, to share and to understand my experience? 
What this means is, if I want to judge and describe experience, the experience 
needs to be seen against a public conception of experience. This experience, 
however, is manifested and constituted by my actions. For example, what 
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would be the effect if I decide that the pigment cobalt blue was better than the 
pigment ultramarine for this painting, or why did I choose sandstone instead of 
limestone for this stone relief, or decide that the adjacent tones in this painting 
needed more work doing to them. Equally, why did I feel that I needed to 
look at how Rembrandt Hermensz Van Rijn used oil-paint, or why did I judge 
that Joseph Beuys was a much better artist than any of his contemporaries. 
Similarly, why did I judge that these visual drawings and paintings in my 
sketchbook display a different kind of creativity that I cannot match in my 
finished paintings, or why did I choose ash instead of oak for this cabinet or 
why did I decide to use this composition and so on. Here the suggestion is 
that if one wanted to know how a particular artist achieved a certain kind of 
effect, I would have to know something about the visual properties of this 
effect; I would have to be able to imagine such visual properties and interpret 
them accordingly. Wittgenstein often seems to imply, that what I am able to 
conceptualise in an experience helps one to characterise and decide what I am 
able to do in this situation. 
This provides Wittgenstein with the argument that objects can be an 
important point of contact and represent a certain place in the scheme of 
things, as they must do to be of any value. Consider for example, the action 
that a painter may produce for touching-up certain spatial areas of his or her 
work. Such touching-up is often a different kind of experience and action 
done only at a certain stage of the work. This touching-up presupposes not 
only an intention to over-paint a certain area, but why this area and not others? 
Does touching-up impose limitations? That is, what is it about this particular 
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area of the painting that needs further work doing to it such that it only needs 
touching-up? By working on such a space, one might realise that this space is 
positioned in a certain kind of way with certain kind of qualities. The colours, 
tones, spatial areas and mark-making contained in these features of the work 
are worked differently to other areas of this painting. Still, one might work on 
such an area and not be sure where one was going with the colour, tone or 
spatial sense. Indeed, what a person does to such a specific area of his or her 
painting is limited by what is happening around it and by the kind of visual 
changes that one keeps making to this surface area. But such visual changes 
that one makes may have nothing to do with the actual paint surface itself and 
more to do with one's own imagination. That is, my response may not be a 
response to the lines and the colours in the painting, but to images and 
thoughts that I have in my mind. When Wittgenstein asserts: "But a painter 
can paint an eye so that it stares; so its staring must be described by the 
distribution of colour on the surface. But the one who paints it need not be 
able to describe this distribution" (PP 1, §1077). Apart from the 
over-simplistic way that Wittgenstein thinks a painter goes about creating a 
certain stare of this kind, his explanation in essence may be correct, in that 
words may fail an artist or designer not because they are inarticulate people, 
but simply because such words may seem inappropriate or do not do justice to 
an experience that depends substantially on the activity of imagination, 
conceptual understanding and visual perception. 
This brings me to the point that perhaps in a weak sense there are 
rules in art and design that presuppose a complex set of relations which as 
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particulars, operate by a certain kind of activity that is not predetermined. As 
Wittgenstein mentions: "The statement: "I see a red circle" and the statement 
"I see (am not blind)" are not logically of the same sort" (RC, p.13, §84). 
This recognises that our descriptions have certain consequences. To repeat, 
for Wittgenstein, the conditions of satisfaction are taken from the concept of 
use (the action itself), since the concept is expressive of the meaning with 
which the use can be applied, but the problem with this is that it denies purely 
"intrinsic" occurrence. Does this then negate imaginative thought; not 
necessarily, for what Wittgenstein seems to be arguing is that imaginative 
thought is meaningful if it has application. What is important here is not how 
the experience itself connects with the concept since each individual will 
experience differently. What Wittgenstein emphasises. instead, is how the 
practice (the painting itself) forms part of the condition presupposing the 
satisfaction in the concept and its rule. The result being, that the use of 
planing a piece of timber or the colour blending or mixing of a certain tone 
has its rule, but its rule is determined by its particular perception, grammar 
and its "forms of life" (the expression itself). It is not a rule, however, that 
one can apply universally. Once one has learnt to plane a piece of timber, one 
can employ and extend this technique appropriately, but does one do the same 
with colour? Wittgenstein argued that the rule of how one learns to tone, 
plane, sow, mould, print, use perspective, photographs and so forth, allows 
one to investigate further what techniques accord with this rule. From a 
different point of view, how can rules be applied to aesthetic objects, if the 
concept and application of toning in relation to objects are variable and 
130 
varied. One is tempted to say, that the concept of toning and its application is 
dependent on different uses of regular and irregular paint work, mark-making 
and light effects in which toning can be employed. 
On the other hand, does a furniture maker not follow rules in dovetail 
making? Does a ceramicist not follow rules in slab building? Did Peter Paul 
Rubens and John Constable not follow rules when highlighting and 
intensifying certain areas of their painting? Jackson Pollock's action paintings 
are painted in a certain manner conforming to the notion of Abstract 
Expressionism; does this not constitute a rule? What defines a collage, a 
frottage or photomontage? How does one practice or define the Dutch De Stijl 
Movement, Impressionism, German Expressionist, DADA Movement or 
Deconstruction? What tonal scales and colour mixing did Vincent Van Gogh 
like to use? What rules did Andrea Palladio use for the plans and elevations 
of his buildings and finally what rules did a Medieval craftperson adhere to 
when carving out a tympanum? It may well be then, that rules throw light "on 
the concept of meaning something" (PI, §130), if the rule can be shown to be 
important to the work itself. But it is certainly questionable about what sort of 
rules do in fact play a major role in aesthetic experience and judgements. 
What needs confronting, is whether one can determine aesthetic experience 
and judgement by rules? One might reasonably say, in agreement with Kant, 
that no such rules are possible, since such experience would undermine 
imaginative free-play. Rules themselves do not engender imaginative thought 
and understanding. 
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Finally, to show how difficult it is to define precisely certain aspects 
of perception, Wittgenstein remarks whether it is possible to talk about "pure 
colour" . For example, does this red have white in it, or is there a hint of 
black in it too; is there yellow in this red or is there blue in it also; is it a dull 
red, or is it a bright red; does it have a matt finish or is it metallic; is it an 
embossed red; does the red here appear to enhance the shape of the form, but 
here it merely appears to camouflage the form; is this red tonally different 
when placed next to a green or a black? Likewise, what impression does one 
have of this red when used in a triangle shape, a square shape, a series of 
striped lines or a set of red dots? Indeed, how is it possible to make the same 
colour red seem as if the object that one is looking at is a velvet red gown 
rather than a cotton red gown? If red was the only colour that one could 
recognise how would one describe it? Somewhat differently, however, is the 
fact that red has a relationship with other colours, that determines the position 
of red (Re, p.25, §§60-3)? Here the red is the red it is, because I am 
comparing it to something or because the red, through sense-perception, has an 
intensity that other colours do not have. As Wittgenstein implies, one may use 
the same shade of green to paint an object transparent and opaque. For the 
shade of green that one is using may not be the important element in the 
transparency or opaqueness of an object, as the technique of painting may be 
dependent on how one applies the colour in a particular fashion to this object 
(Re, p.26, §76). What one has to agree on to a limited extent is, that there 
are various relationships that make it possible to notice an aspect. To justify 
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usage, it is more than likely that these aesthetic relationships will have to be 
worked on, altered and shaped to manifest this experience. 
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Conclusion 
For Wittgenstein the aesthetic exhibits public fonns of accountability 
and understanding when its expressions describe the significance of its use. His 
notion of objectivity, therefore, centres not on "intrinsic" experience, but on 
whether such experience can be considered as part of one's ordinary usage. The 
way he describes this ordinary usage in aesthetic tenns is firstly to demonstrate 
that aesthetic experience goes about its task in ways that can be observed and 
described. Thus, because such experience can be observed and described, what 
is observed and described becomes the means by which it is possible to argue 
aesthetic expression in objective tenns. In other words, one looks for the 
example, the order, the method, the interpretation and the seeing to ascertain 
what describes the aesthetic experience. The case that he is arguing is that the 
sensation-perception is attached to some object which is publicly recognisable. 
To do this, one conceptualises the experience, invoking comparison, 
differentiation and consideration. In this respect, he argues that the aesthetic is 
an active rather than a passive experience, that bestow fonns of life, through its 
interest. The position is, that it is how one handles texture, line, colour, space, 
scale, materials and so on that constitutes an element of aesthetic understanding, 
forms of life and its interest. The aesthetic means of representation, for 
Wittgenstein, are how one establishes connections with the object, since the 
method of comparison that one uses, presupposes a public sense of what 
constitutes tonal values, atmosphere, character, colour, pattern, space and so 
forth, as concepts of experience. 
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One sees that an individual's ability to recognise and to detennine 
aesthetic experience was, for Wittgenstein, dependent on how one connects 
meaning to a piece of work, which as an activity is judged by how this meaning 
is being applied. For Wittgenstein, it is one thing to give an account of a 
painting and quite another to say how it is being employed. Here one could give 
an account about anything, but to understand the meaning of a piece of work 
requires that I know something particular about how this work is being 
expressed, its identity, purpose and character. To describe the content of an 
aesthetic experience, however, is to recognise in Wittgensteinian terms, that 
there are various ways that one can link and represent such experiences. 
Furthermore, the aesthetic sense only happens when the experience 
demonstrates the possibility of it being shared, and unless there is this possibility 
there can be no objectivity. The reason being, that the possibility of the work 
bdng shared constitutes and shapes our public understanding. A further point 
here, however, is that it may be the argument that one produces rather than any 
agreement about what is being shared, that has more relevance for art and design 
education. 
One has seen that the aesthetic is an imaginative experience, that 
interconnects the properties of thought, behaviour and conceptualisation, but 
for Wittgenstein the issue is not whether such experience is interconnected in 
itself, but rather, as previously explained, how does the aesthetic experience get 
expressed and fulfilled, how does one recognise the experience. He determines 
that the aesthetic gets its meaning when one can compare, observe, 
differentiate, contrast and question. It is only when one can apply and confer 
different uses in the expression of these terms, that meaning for Wittgenstein 
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manifests itself. The thought is that through this approach the learning can 
become more accountable and possibly more creative in the sense that it opens 
up opportunities to explore and test ideas. These points wiJl be explored further 
in my final chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
The InDuence 01 Kimt's And Kittgenstein's WOlX On Teaching 
Practice In Ad And Design Education 
Introduction 
A crucial issue for education has always been to embrace "quality". 
In the debate about quality, standards and performance are often mentioned 
(see Christopher Winch's work in the Journal of Philosophy of Education, 
ŒŬŊĦŸĚMarch 1996). In educational terms, what seems to connect to 
"quality", some would argue, relates to aims, objectives, the curriculum, 
learning outcomes, a common core, vocational skills and so on. All these 
things have relevance, but it is quite possible to extend the idea of "quality", at 
least in art and design, to the creative content itself, its perceptions and 
experiences. Kant refers to the aesthetic as a "moment of quality" (CJ, §1, 
203) which in itself denotes in the Critique of Judgement what in aesthetic 
terms the individual is feeling, his or her imaginative thoughts relating to one's 
heightened awareness of oneself in this world. This moment of quality which 
Kant discusses is "productive" rather than just reproductive or mimetic. To 
some extent, unless the teacher has a working knowledge of how creativity in 
this area is acquired and applied, his or her understanding of art and design 
practice must be questionable. It may be argued that since art and design 
experience in education is essentially concerned with creativity, the teacher 
needs to be aware of the fact that this experience transcends conventional ideas 
of reason and thought, "seeing" and "interpreting". Likewise, it seems that a 
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teacher will not understand how to execute art and design activities unless he 
or her knows something about the various kinds of conditions that can affect 
art and design expression, and how one can make such experience accountable 
and worthwhile. I will endeavour in this work to construct how the "quality" 
of one's teaching practice may be improved through an understanding of what 
determines in some fundamental ways the learning experience in art and 
design education. 
In this final chapter I discuss the aesthetic implications of Kant's and 
Wittgenstein's work for education. What I want to consider and bring out are 
some of the educational lessons that one can learn from Kant and 
Wittgenstein. To deal with this issue, what needs clarifying is just how 
pertinent certain concepts of understanding, taken from these philosophers, 
may be, and how these concepts can have implications for art and design 
teaching-practice. What I propose to do first is to present the way 
Wittgenstein's concepts of understanding corresponding to 
sensation-language arguments can affect art and design education and to draw 
some conclusions from this. Secondly, I shall in contrast, present Kant's 
arguments and attempt to assess how some of his notions cannot easily be 
pushed aside by Wittgensteinian thinking. I intend to establish, despite 
differences in Kant's and Wittgenstein' s arguments, just how accountable and 
educationally sound aesthetic learning appears and how one can employ this 
understanding in a teaching situation, drawing from the work of both of these 
philosophers. On this basis, my aim is to explore and construct, in practical 
terms, ways in which certain concepts of understanding affect learning in art 
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and design education. To vindicate this position, I will have to work out in 
detail in connection with this text, just how understanding in art and design 
can be pinned down. In part, what obscures our understanding of art and 
design, must be the inherent diversity of this experience. This in itself poses 
many problems for the teacher, not least because such diversity must be 
maintained. 
What Kant and Wittgenstein explore, which appears to be missing in 
art and design teaching practice at all levels of education, is how aesthetic 
experience is peculiar, complex and sophisticated. A popular myth is that art 
and design is seen as inferior to such subjects as science or language 
education, but such a myth stems perhaps from the belief that art is a "leisure 
activity", a "playful experience". Such assumptions can be seen to be rather 
negative to the development of art and design education as it is not uncommon 
in schools to put those who appear less academic, into art and design classes. 
Thus, giving the view, apart from other things, that art and design is a soft 
option. Similarly, because of the peculiar nature of art and design experience, 
it is common practice, in my view, for educational documents to dismiss 
rather than tackle some of the hard facts concerning what establishes effective 
art and design learning. I feel that I have, in the previous chapters, 
demonstrated some of the complex problems and issues that do affect art and 
design practice from a theoretical position. But it is my opinion that education 
in general appears either ignorant or unwilling to investigate in an informed 
way, the difficulty that learning presupposes in art and design given its 
diversity of experience. Any proper educational understanding of art and 
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design must take in the fact that aesthetic experience is conceivable in all kinds 
of ways. Yet, many art and design educational documents, either deceive or 
mislead what constitutes art and design meaning and its practice. In this 
respect, one is led to deduce that education has not analysed imaginative and 
creative experiences in relation to the depth of perception that this subject area 
can reveal. The facts are, that many reports and documents concerned with 
art and design experience have simplified art and design understanding to the 
point that this simplification dilutes the content and complexity of what 
determines art and design education. To my mind, this simplification 
misconstrues and trivialises learning in art and design. 
I am sure that many in art and design would agree with me that 
aesthetic experience is a complex matter that requires, because of this 
complexity, considerable understanding. What makes art and design learning 
formidable is partly because such learning has considerable depth to it. There 
are indeed, then, special problems in relation to art and design, but the 
difficulties that I wish to avoid are the superficialities that seem to plague a 
proper discussion of what is far from a simple subject experience. By 
skimming the surface of aesthetic education such views can give a distorted 
account of art and design learning. The professionalism of art and design 
teaching must avoid this kind of approach, because it can reduce the quality 
and delivery of art and design education. It does seem that the problem that 
art and design education faces, is that it has this rich seam of diversity, but 
that this diversity can cause enormous problems in the teaching of art and 
design. The contention is, that the teacher will be better placed to assist the 
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development of learning in art and design if he or she understands some of the 
intricate issues faced by this experience. This is not to deny that art and 
design has not benefited from the educational treatment of procedures and 
methods, but it has largely ignored other central concerns that to some extent 
combat and defy mainstream arguments about how to record and understand 
learning in this field. Even if one accepts the need for methods and 
procedures how secure such arguments are must be questionable in art and 
design education, not least because there is a real danger that such claims can 
overshadow and threaten to curb the creative dynamics of human involvement 
in teaching and learning. I will attempt to give a more insightful explanation 
and description of some of the arguments that art and design understanding 
must consider so as to enrich and nourish a wider debate about learning in this 
curriculum area. My argument is, that there is nothing straightforward about 
art and design experience and it is an implausible diagnosis to conceive that it 
could ever be so defined. 
In this chapter, I will discuss in various ways how Kant and 
Wittgenstein seem to cultivate the expressive life of art and design relating to 
experiences and understanding. To some extent, I have covered some of the 
arguments concerning the visual sense of such experience, but I have yet to 
state how such arguments can affect art and design learning in education. One 
might reasonably argue, that art and design understanding is characterised by 
certain conditions constituted by visual impressions and their effects. To 
investigate these issues in educational terms one needs to describe how 
learning in art and design is manifested, but given that such experience is 
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multifarious in kind, there appears to be numerous pedagogical problems. I 
attempt, therefore, to give a thorough understanding of some of the issues 
which affect the competence, appreciation and application of art and design 
education. For in order not to fudge or gloss over some of the conditions 
which affect art and design understanding in education, a more substantive 
analytical view of what determines understanding in this subject area is 
required. 
The kind of standard platitudinous remark that one finds being used 
m education is that: "Teachers will have to deal with a wide range of 
knowledge and understanding and be able to encourage pupils to show a wide 
variety of skills and abilities" (1988. National ĿẀŲŲÙȘẀŨẀÜŸĚ Task Group on 
Assessment and Testing Reporf). On prima mcie, there seems to be nothing 
mistaken about this remark, but it is not at all obvious how one is to digest 
this, how one is to decide what this means, how one is to make these 
distinctions, and how one is to give an answer, as to what determines and 
demonstrates knowledge and understanding, skill and ability. Similarly, 
while Peter Abbs thinks that art teachers should be made aware of Kantian 
thinking (1989, p.32), he, in numerous places in his work, fails in a sufficient 
sense to advise teachers more precisely of the kind of convincing arguments 
that will help us better understand art and design experience. The crux of the 
matter is, that it is simply not good enough to claim that teachers should 
become more aware of Kantian thinking without describing and explaining 
why the substance of Kant's ideas seem important. My argument is, that to 
say that a teacher needs to demonstrate knowledge and understanding, skill and 
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ability, requires substantiation. The kind of issues and problems that art and 
design raises are not easy to place. It may seem, contradictory, then, to 
examine in this chapter, how one can claim that art and design learning can be 
profound. But one should not be fooled by this argument, for it misconstrues 
the fact that art and design practice can be enormously enriching and true to 
life. The fact that art and design experience cannot be easily placed has more 
to do with the fact that such experience transcends boundaries. Art and design 
educational experience extends one's understanding, but not I hasten to add, 
by conventional means. With a bit of foresight, it follows perhaps that much 
can be learnt from art and design that is important for education. 
As suggested, my concern here is to answer the question, what is art 
and design understanding? This needs to be done in a way that lends itself to 
practical methods and experiences that any art and design teacher can learn to 
recognise and employ in a studio or classroom teaching situation. The 
problems that one is concerned with are: (1) the need to recognise and decide 
what establishes effective art and design understanding in learning situations 
and (2) how to stimulate such understanding in teaching and learning so that 
students can appropriately use such methods and experiences for themselves. 
Consequently, a central tenet of this chapter is to show that art and design 
education is empowering, acquirable and communicable. 
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3. 1 
Of importance to education and to this work, is how a teacher can 
help a student to understand and learn about art and design experience. It is 
striking that when one hears a teacher saying "he understands this project" one 
would want to ask, how the teacher knows that the student understands this 
project. The relationship between how students know about object X, and 
how teachers know that their students know about object X should, of course, 
to some extent, correspond. One may protest, however, that one cannot just 
claim that there has to be an understanding of what constitutes X between the 
student and the teacher, but that there also has to be an agreement between the 
student and the teacher about X. The problem being, that a student may have 
a particular understanding of X which does not correspond to how the teacher 
particularly understands X. Furthermore, from a teaching point of view, a 
feature of this constraint is that there is a difference between knowing that the 
student knows that X equals Y, and how one comes to know and understand 
that X equals Y. In other words, how does one confirm that X equals Y, in a 
way that this expression confers aesthetic understanding? This invites one to 
consider what kind of "evidence" would a student need to demonstrate that 
they understand the word Bauhaus, or how to use a jack-plane? Moreover, I 
suspect, that one might surmise in art and design, when it comes to the 
employment of certain colours, the spatial qualities in the work, or one's ideas 
to do with "contradiction", "abstract expressionism", "multiple-imagery", "a 
sense of place" or "personal identity", that our understanding of such 
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phenomena are perceptibly difficult to grasp. While there are different ways 
by which one could "test" someone's knowledge and understanding on certain 
issues, my concern here is, to get a better focus of what determines art and 
design experience, centering specifically on understanding itself, rather than 
on the notion of "testing". What a student understands about his or her work 
and the teacher's subsequent appraisal of this experience, will inevitably only 
constitute a small part of the student's total understanding of such experience. 
Several things seem to follow from this. It is first necessary to note, that the 
main difference perhaps between "testing" and understanding in general, is 
that if one wants to test whether someone knows X properly, then one would 
expect the student to react to X in a certain kind of way. Hence, there are 
only a limited range of conditions under which X could be described properly 
by the learner. Now, not wishing to denounce the value of testing, the 
problem that such testing might pose for art and design education would be 
considerable, since so much of art and design understanding does not stipulate 
how X can be preconceived, let alone what X properly means. This is a fact 
of great interest in art and design teaching as it indicates the difficulty, in one 
sense, in justifying the relevance and meaning of art and design learning. The 
danger for us is that education always looks for a working concept, but art and 
design seen as a creative experience in some ways defies such categorisation, 
if that is, one sees a working concept in rule terms. 
One aspect of what has been stated so far, is that without knowing 
what constitutes the kind of differences and similarities that presuppose 
learning and understanding in art and design education, how does the teacher 
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know whether a student needs help with his or her work and how will the 
teacher know whether the student's work is producing the kind of results that 
one might expect? To answer this, it may seem that one has to ask what can 
one expect from aesthetic experience and its understanding. Some 
philosophers like David Pears (1988, p.422), argue that there must be criteria 
involved in learning. But it is not obvious how one could answer this 
question, because, art and design learning does not educate students to 
differentiate and respond to things in precise and restrictive rule-following 
ways. There are, then, some highly difficult problems which art and design 
experience poses for education. One aspect which confronts art and design 
understanding is that it may be interpreted as being inconsistent with 
mainstream educational thinking, but as the foregoing discussion would imply, 
from an art and design position, how would one establish a criterion for 
"harmony" in aesthetic terms, when such experience is often of a particular 
kind? The way that Piet Mondrian would consider harmony and the way that 
Anthony Caro would consider harmony are fundamentally different. Other 
differences can be found in the way that artists and designers use space, 
mark-making, colour, form, expression and meaning. Of course, Wittgenstein 
might simply argue that the notion of aesthetic harmony rests on how it is 
being used (PI, §43). Accordingly, to know how a student is using a sense of 
harmony, infers that one has to know in part how the student is comparing and 
differentiating. But, would knowing the mere employment of a particular 
harmony itself be sufficiently revealing aesthetically? 
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A sharp distinction remains about aesthetic understanding, in that 
there is no one common thought, practice or idea that one can tum to that 
will explain the multifarious way that art and design is experienced. Indeed, 
in individual and team teaching, it is not unusual to find that teachers 
themselves will offer different advice to students that at times may seem from 
the students point of view, contradictory. One reason why a student might see 
such advice as contradictory, has something to do with the way education in 
general views learning. However, a moments reflection reveals that art and 
design is concerned with aesthetic judgements and that the teacher's 
competence relies, in part, on this awareness. It is often the case, that because 
the teacher's and the student's judgement involves his or her perception of an 
object, problems arise here as objects have different relations to different 
things. As David Armstrong mentions: "Objects have an indefinite number of 
characteristics, and perception is a selective affair" (1961, p.25). Moreover, 
such judgements emerge in art and design when the character of this 
experience is imaginatively constructed. There is considerable scope then in 
art and design education for disagreement and ambiguity. But one can further 
say, that it is not always recognised in education that the complexity of 
imaginative involvement is not something which the teacher can either deny 
nor be dismissive of. Imaginative engagement constructs the sense of an 
object in art and design terms. Here as Kant claimed, an imaginative 
experience can develop spontaneously (CI, intro. 197), but it can also be 
reflective. One might think that it is the aesthetic complexity and its notion of 
"free-play", that makes such experience so distinctive and difficult to 
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comprehend. While these are not simple matters that can easily be resolved in 
the teaching of art and design, it is clear that both Kant and Wittgenstein offer 
ways which can better equip teachers to understand some of the problems to do 
with object perception and experience. In order to grasp the sense of the many 
different approaches in which objects can manifest, it will be necessary for the 
teacher to develop strategies that help to stimulate students appreciation and 
identification of objects and their experiences. As I aim to demonstrate, to 
comprehend educationally art and design practice, calls for considerable 
understanding on the part of the teacher since such appreciation can be 
textured and coloured in many subtle variations. A teacher needs to be 
aware of these factors since they form an important part of the relation of art 
and design understanding. The temptation that one must resist, in relation to 
this concern, is that art and design work must not be over-simplified. The 
reason for this is that art and design experience involves a deep level of 
understanding of ourselves and our environment, which can be made virtually 
meaningless if one is unaware of this involvement and how it operates. 
It has to be admitted, that there are philosophical and educational 
difficulties with Kant's and Wittgenstein's notion of understanding (with 
Kant's emphasis on the logical functions of judgement and Wittgenstein' s 
emphasis on language), but these are not issues that need concern us here, 
because this problem would involve primarily theoretical concerns that would 
side-track our main purpose concerning aesthetic practical understanding in 
education. However, in one loose sense, Kant classifies understanding as a 
conscious judgement of experience, while for Wittgenstein understanding is 
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presupposed by the conditions of use. As indicated for both philosophers, 
understanding involves reason, perceptions and concepts that connect to a 
range of conditions which can either presuppose the possibility of experience 
or reflect through experience the conditions which contain its understanding. 
In either case, understanding as a "unity" of thought (and this implies that it 
may also be a drawing or a made object), asserts a particular identity of an 
object, but this identity may be connected in various ways. The identity of an 
object may be applied differently as each student has his or her own 
imagination. But one must resist the thought, from an art and design point of 
view, that identity is conformity to a rule. As Kant realised, in any art and 
design practice there are unconditioned and indeterminate elements in the 
experience of an object. One ground for refusing to accept the rule argument, 
is that aesthetically, one's understanding in art and design education is not 
determined purely by sense-perception or reason experience, but rather by an 
insistence on creativity. I will explore further why this seems to be the case. 
The implications for the teacher, are that if the identity of an object in art and 
design terms can be made in various ways, he or she must be skilled in 
teaching this learning. It would be ludicrous for education not to recognise 
this concern. 
149 
3.2 
Before I discuss the relevance of Kant's aesthetic for art and design 
education, I will debate firstly Wittgenstein' s concept of understanding and its 
relevance for art and design teaching practice. In order to dispel the claim that 
art and design work is accidental or arbitrary, one has to investigate as 
Wittgenstein attempts to persuade us, how art and design practice is being 
applied through the use and description of particular expressions. While I feel 
that to some extent these points have been covered in chapter two, 
educationally, the problem for the teacher is to demonstrate just how these 
experiences manifest themselves in art and design learning and teaching 
practice. It may be problematic, however, as I will later indicate, as to how 
an, understanding of use, can specify fundamentally what counts as learning 
in art and design education. Standing perhaps in the way of use, is that art and 
design teaching relies on the authenticity of feeling, an insistence on knowing 
one I s own mind and the complexity and cultivation of creativity. In this 
respect, as will be explored, self-understanding as an expression of feeling is 
vital to art and design practice. 
Taking Wittgenstein' s argument of use, it is not at all obvious, that I 
could come to understand aesthetically Marc Chagall' s painting The Green 
DonJa:y by how I described this work, for it could be argued rather, that it is 
how I imagined this painting that gives the work its understanding. The 
important argument being, that the image-making process may not think nor 
reason in the same way as language construction, for what is involved in 
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aesthetic experience is more than mere intellect. If this is the case, then this 
comment must get us to at least question the Wittgensteinian argument 
concerning description and language. The point is, that if one sees art and 
design experience simply in terms of sensation-language situations, one may 
be displacing how cognitive and feeling experiences are also part of this 
picture. One must ask how visual perception concerning the physical 
qualities of the work, gives us access to the visual experience, for what is 
"seen" may not be identified in the ordinary sense, with the physical 
perceptual properties of the work. How revealing is Marc Chagall' s painting 
The Green Donla!y, by analysing simply the optical perception or physical 
sense of this work? An interlocking argument here, from an educational 
position, is that aesthetically one's understanding does not just relate to the 
ȚŬŸĚof the object and its construction, but also its content. Without doubt, 
the difficult task for the teacher is being able to suggest ways that enable the 
student to correct and enlarge his or her understanding of this experience in an 
insightful manner. This, poses many problems for the art and design teacher 
concerning how to design situations that will encourage students to learn how 
to account for their different experiences in different ways. Attached to this 
problem is that the teacher must develop strategies that enable students to 
"see" and "interpret". For this to happen, the teacher needs to be aware of the 
factors which lead a student to develop his or her arguments in a particular 
way. Let us then examine more closely in learning terms, the possibilities of 
what might confirm our art and design educational understanding. 
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The idea that understanding is constructed in various ways may leave 
us thinking that understanding is subjective, but as Wittgenstein writes: " 
'Thinking', a widely ramified concept. A concept that comprises many 
manifestations of life. The phenomena of thinking are widely scattered" ĜŸĚ
§ 110). This· suggests, amongst other things, that our concept of understanding 
has more of a plastic or flexible notion than any strict meaning might imply 
of this term. Failure not to realise that "thinking is a ramified concept" will 
prejudice any understanding of art and design education. Yet, while Kant 
appears to suggest that aesthetic understanding is an "inner process", 
Wittgenstein argues that understanding is an outward expression. In support of 
Wittgenstein, Hantling remarks that when one describes something, one is 
supporting some claim about the meaning of the object (1989, p.47). The 
ȘŬŸŤȘWÙŬŪĚthat Hantling appears to be implying here, is that meaning is not 
just an experience persistent in language. One has to construct thought, but to 
understand whether this thought construction amounts to a concept of 
understanding, one must in Wittgensteinian terms, describe its character and 
examine its use. As Hanfling puts it: "The meaning will consist in the work 
that the word is doing in a given context, and not in a corresponding entity" 
(p.49). Thus, in an analogous sense, the art and design teacher needs to 
consider how things are being employed in the work by their students. For 
Wittgenstein thinks, as Hantling mentions (p.42), that if one wants to identify 
understanding one must connect it with the operations of its particular use. In 
general, one does not, for instance, mix the colour red with blue to get the 
colour green. What this entails for Wittgenstein, is that use has certain 
152 
characteristics that describe understanding, as one uses blue and yellow to 
make the colour green. This is obviously a straightforward case, but it 
remains to be seen just how far one can properly determine or rationalise art 
and design understanding in this way. In provisionally accepting 
Wittgenstein f s argument concerning the need for description, from an art and 
design teaching point of view, one does not judge the work in relation to the 
language itself, but whether the language is appropriate to the object's 
circumstances. In which case, one aspect of Wittgenstein' s understanding of 
language corresponds to what one is making, which in turn, defines the 
meaning of the language, in that the language has to correspond to how our 
actions and behaviour are being employed in an and design. For one's 
actions to make sense, Wittgenstein argues that student understanding has to be 
conditioned by the situation that entails the expression of the object itself. 
To repeat, Wittgenstein insists that understanding is not a "mental II 
process, for the criteria of understanding are represented by how the student, 
in sensation and language terms, is able to mould clay, use a saw and cut 
joints, stitch a garment, use tone, use colour and scale, the manipulation of 
architectural space and so on. The argument being that: "One has to look at 
its use and learn from that" (PI, §340). A number of things can be implied 
from this, one of which seems to be that understanding is an activity, the act 
of doing something that others can observe and copy. Here, as claimed, 
Wittgenstein is concerned with "ordinary usage", for his aim is to demonstrate 
that a fundamental feature of aesthetic experience is a public concept of 
understanding, not whether such experience relates to an esoteric 
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understanding of the physical world. As many philosophers have asserted 
(David Pears, Colin McGinn, P.M.S. Hacker, Oswald Hantling, G.E.M. 
Anscombe and Godfrey Vesey) Wittgenstein' s later work is concerned with 
how one manages to construct a building, make a piece of furniture, produce a 
textile print and so on. So, while a philosopher, as Hanfling indicates 
(P.48-9), could spend a whole lifetime exploring metaphysically the 
phenomena of space and time, this does not prevent us from using space and 
time correctly as an ordinary description of the objective sense in which art 
and design is practised. Yet, it may seem contentious to claim that art and 
design conforms to ordinary usage when so much of its experience is 
imaginatively and originally constructed. If art and design education is a 
particular and singular experience having an imaginative content, then, this 
could easily commit us to the view that art and design practice clashes with the 
concept of ordinary usage. 
On face value, the distinction that Wittgenstein appears at one level to 
be making is that if the response is taken immediately from the actual object, 
then what the student is reporting on has to do with the perceptions of that 
immediate object, as an observed event. But this seems questionable, since 
what kind of discrimination is the student making, if any, how does the student 
draw from past experiences, and how does the student determine that the 
character of what is being experienced actually identifies the perception. If 
one is to attach any credibility to art and design experience, the student has to 
unravel and establish his or her interpretation of the object, but how is this 
achieved? Of course, one might suggest, as Wittgenstein does, by giving a 
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description, but as I have intimated, there are more factors involved than mere 
description that heighten one's awareness of art and design experience. 
Similarly, it is not clear, from a teaching perspective, that the familiarity that 
the student has of a given object is derived purely by his or her actions, since 
the student's actions are not always revealing in themselves. One must 
consider in any art and design work that such experience presupposes 
preconceptual, non-verbal, spontaneous and reflective feelings of expression. 
However, one should not fail to notice, that the Wittgensteinian concern seems 
to be how does the teacher teach the student to be able to know what 
constitutes meaning other than by a public sense? For the teacher does not 
have clear access to the privileged pictures, feelings, notions or images which 
the student may be experiencing. 
Let us begin, for example, by exploring the kind of aesthetic response 
and analysis that a designer might make. Here, one wants to ask, what 
latitude can one give to Wittgenstein' s argument concerning how one 
distinguishes understanding? In the spatial complexity of Gerrit Rietveld's Red 
and Blue Chair of 1918, such an object can be described by how Reitveld used 
colour and three-dimensional form to enhance a certain particular spatial 
context to this object. The use of vertical and flat planes and the horizontality 
of some of these planes are counterbalanced by the vertical ribbing whose task 
appears to be to keep suspended the central body which serves the container. 
These features, at the same time give emphasis to the spatial dynamics of the 
object. Here, the spatial relationships have a certain harmony, which among 
other things, take account of De Stijl thinking. This movement held that 
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equilibrium depends on the distribution of the opposing forces (horizontal and 
vertical) which balance each other out (De Stijl was influenced by Gestalt 
psychology). The structural geometric form of this armchair with its simple 
. but complicated proportions, the scale of the sections themselves, together 
with the total lack of decoration in this armchair, add to the precision and 
order of the spatial effect of this object. Now, it could be argued, that the 
spatial sense of this armchair by Rietveld, is dependent on the viewer being 
acquainted with De Stijl theory. However, whether one is aware of De Stijl 
theory or not, the way that I have described this object may lead one to think 
that a great deal of imaginative thought has gone into this object. One might 
further argue, that since such an object appears to have a definite arrangement 
through its proportions, harmony of fonn, spatial qualities and its sense of 
order underlining these relations, that this creative expression undennines the 
view that art and design is a chance or irregular experience. The mere fact 
that there appears to be an "arrangement" that is perceptual, describes in one 
sense, as Wittgenstein thought, the conditions under which meaning manifests. 
But is this description of Rietveld's 1918 chair correct? For this description 
seems to take for granted that I know what horizontal, vertical, harmony and 
so forth mean and that I know how (without misinterpretation) to perceive 
and represent these qualities as perceptual experiences. In the Wittgensteinian 
sense, the teacher could claim that one knows that the student understands 
what vertical means by the way he is employing these sections in the work. It 
surely remains a problem about how the student knows that he or she is 
employing such sections vertically and not horizontally, how does he or she 
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come to understand that certain planes in this work are vertical and not 
horizontal? One should expect, in agreeing with Wittgenstein, a degree of 
conformity in what constitutes a vertical or a horizontal plane in "common 
language" (PI, §261). Wittgenstein's argument here is: "Once you know what 
the word stands for, you understand it, you know its whole use" (PI, §264). 
While Wittgenstein is careful to single out the "what" here in the above 
quotation. In art and design learning is it also the case that what is vertical or 
horizontal needs to be manipulated creatively? This yields the suggestion that 
art and design understanding involves preconceptual and conceptual thoughts 
that make it implausible to state what the what is in purely language terms? 
The reason being, that in viewing the object the expressive nature of this work 
serves not just the intellect, but engages also the student's sensations, emotions 
and thoughts as an imaginative experience to the extent that these sensations, 
emotions and thoughts are what determines perhaps his or her understanding 
of the object. It seems that there is a sense in which one can describe these 
characteristics by how one conceptually accounts for them. So much so, 
that our conceptual understanding seems to feed-off, and in part operate or 
extend at times, these very sensations, emotions and thoughts that one claims 
to possess. 
What appears educationally to give us a possible solution to the 
problem before us, is Wittgenstein I s notion of noticing an aspect. In this 
respect, understanding needs "tie-ups" ĜŸĚ§170), that demonstrate that I can 
talk about the object in a way that makes sense, that I can draw the object, 
differentiate and compare this object with other objects ĜŸ§ÍĬÎĞĦĚ It also 
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means, according to Wittgenstein, that understanding always presupposes an 
order (.2; §297). Apart from Wittgenstein's understanding of Gestalt theory 
(which I have already explained), order also relates to Wittgenstein's notion of 
methods and rules. It would be unusual to find a product designer, a furniture 
maker, an architect, an artist and a potter not constructing their work with 
some loose kind of order involved in the construction of the work. However, 
to assert that there are rules may be controversial since any art and design 
teacher would be suspicious of any claim that suggests that a student's work is 
constructed by orders. This is not to deny that the work itself has a certain 
perceptual order (refer to the Reitveld's Red and Blue Chair), but for 
Wittgenstein, orders exist to be obeyed. Obviously, the art and design teacher 
in a classroom will give various kinds of orders to his or her students, some 
ŸŬŲŤĚdefinite than others. One might say that there is a difference between an 
order which expects us to fetch an item from the next table in the classroom, 
and one that says that the way that you have ordered this sequence of events 
needs changing. However, as Vesey points out in relation to Wittgenstein: 
"His order has been obeyed if the person to whom he gave it did something 
correctly described by the words of the order" (1994, p.97). On the face of it, 
this seems simple enough, for if I ask a group of students to examine and 
describe in sculptural form the concept of a chair, one would expect them to 
make an object that shows that they have obeyed the order. If they have 
obeyed the order, then in one sense, the work must be successful since the 
order describes what is expected. Unfortunately this is too simplistic, for it 
takes for granted if this assignment is to be successful, that the students 
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already know how to describe, in sculptural form, the concept of a chair. 
What is expected in art and design terms does not conform strictly to what is 
being described by the project or assignment information. It seems fair to say, 
that one must be familiar with the order if one is to cany it out correctly, but 
it could be construed that I do not understand the order unless I am able to 
execute the command. Of course, one may well put the burden of 
responsibility on the teacher to make sure that their students are familiar with 
what the requirements are in the project. It remains a problem however, that 
even if a teacher is convinced that a student does understand the requirements 
of a brief, this student may still have no idea about how to experience such 
requirements imaginatively. It is a recurring feature of art and design work, 
that students will not grasp what is required, unless they at some stage know 
UŬŸĚto implement their creative powers. One's awareness of this experience 
in imaginative terms is presupposed by a feeling sense, which is neither 
constrained nor determined necessarily, if at all, by language. 
Wittgenstein explains that embroiled in noticing an aspect, is that 
there may be several ways in which one can identify an object (PI, §XJ). In 
each case, one should not assume that while one aspect will be different to 
another aspect of the same object, that one aspect is necessarily inferior to the 
next. For the art and design teacher two issues seem to be related here. For 
instance, if I was asked how would I identify Le Corbusier's Villa Saroye at 
Poissy, it may be having visited this building, that I was particularly taken by 
the roof garden, or I may have a strong spatial sense of the building as a 
whole, the sense of its whiteness, the scale and proportion of the building, the 
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furniture and fittings in the house, the design period itself, the way the 
windows envelop the whole structure and let so much light into the building, 
the spiral staircase, the sliding walls and ramps in the building, Le Corbusier's 
writings on architecture, the position of the building when viewed from the 
north, or how this building relates to Mies van der Rohe, Walter Gropius, 
Mart Starn or I.I.P. Oud's buildings at the time WlIa SaJOJe was built. The 
contention being, that if students are asked to make an object or a painting 
based, for example, on their experiences in a museum, one might expect many 
different aspects to be comprehended. In which case, would it be possible to 
argue, taking our Wlla SalOJe example, that anyone aspect of this building is 
superior to any of the other mentioned elements? The problem that one would 
have in answering this question is that there is a pictorial sense in any art and 
TŤŸŦŪĚobject. Thus, if this pictorial sense presupposes a "unity" which is 
dependent on various aspects of the work, the elements or expressions that go 
to make-up this whole picture are presupposed by this arrangement. Similarly, 
how one works out and develops this "unity" and its arrangement may not 
always be perceived through the formal properties of the work. 
In looking at young children's (between the ages of 3 and 5 years) art 
and design work it is doubtful to what extent the formal properties in the work 
itself are revealing unless one already knows what these formal properties 
represent. Wollheim argues, that children's art becomes much more 
perceptible when one knows the intention (1993, p.I40). The visual 
experience, therefore, is no longer accessible by what one perceives simply in 
the object alone. The point that needs stressing here, is that the kind of 
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judgement that one needs to explain the object, can make a difference to our 
visual perception. For example, if one is told something about a particular 
artist's or designer's life and their concerns, then this experience can make a 
difference about how one understands his or her work by what the example 
guides us to imagine. While there is no mistake that Wittgenstein' s 
contribution of sensation-language meaning can and does make a difference 
to our understanding of our world, this experience, however, only represents 
part of the picture that makes up our understanding of art and design work. 
One might construe that it is one's imagination itself that in part guides one's 
awareness of public understanding, but this is something which Wittgenstein 
denies (PI, §370). 
For Wittgenstein, intention connects to thought and action because it 
VẀŸŦŤVWVĚthat to intend is to do something, and perhaps to have a reason for 
doing something. For example, I intend to write my next essay on 
Hieronymous Bosch, I intend next to reduce the height of this table by ten 
millimetres, I intend to make a kite, or the teacher may ask the students 
whether their design solution matches their intentions. As Wittgenstein writes: 
"what makes my image of him into an image of him? - What makes this 
portrait into this portrait? The intention of the painter?" (PP 1, §262). 
Intention, therefore, is a description of doing something which mayor may not 
get fulfilled. Of course, what the student intends may tum out, as 
Wittgenstein remarks, to be a bad picture. But one could say that the reason 
why this painting turned out to be a bad picture, is because of what the 
student intended (I will further explore the notion of intention in a moment). 
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It should be kept in mind, as Hanfling surmises (1989, p.63), that 
Wittgenstein's various arguments about understanding amass reasons for doing 
things that justify the action. In the case of Wittgenstein' s notion of 
. perception, however, one saw that sensory experience has both intentional and 
unintentional aspects that affect the "organisation" of noticing an aspect. Even 
so, as I have stated, Wittgenstein claims that by describing something, I am 
illustrating a concept of it, whereby the criterion of understanding is 
presupposed by what is being deduced. Since art and design practice is to do 
with particular experiences, an important aspect of this is how one is 
comparing a specific experience. It might seem from one point of view that 
one can compare the form and content of a piece of art and design work, but 
difficulties arise about this that relate to how one can compare a blue area in a 
painting with the red area in the same painting or a horizontal line with a 
vertical line in the same object? It may turn out that the way that one 
compares involves making several observations about the work, of which no 
single observation in itself would be revealing. But as Wittgenstein argues, 
there is not: "one particular mental experience characteristic of comparing" 
(BB, p.86, §17). 
At this point, let me repeat, that for Wittgenstein it is only through 
observing our actions and circumstances by description that one comprehends 
understanding. Hence for Wittgenstein, comparing is not a "mental" act. As 
Elizabeth Anscombe argues: "Perhaps I can show you the way to saw a plank; 
I cannot show you the way to have a thought like that-so how do you learn? 
(1992, p.IO). Now not wishing to dismiss the merits of this argument, there is 
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nevertheless another side to this, for Kant foresaw what Wittgenstein was 
unable to grasp about art and design learning. Namely, that art and design 
learning does not necessarily presuppose a causal, descriptive or conceptual 
. relation between a student's aesthetic interest in an object and the object's 
purpose. Thus, art and design experience is not just part of an observed 
physical activity, it is also part of a much deeper perceptual process. For the 
best art and design practice is where there is freedom to form in a purposive 
manner. It might also be argued, that in sawing a piece of timber there is a 
level of subtlety in play that defies explanation, and which thus undermines in 
one sense, Anscombe' s argument. For subtlety is often of crucial importance 
to the sawing of timber and any artwork. Another dilemma facing 
Wittgenstein's argument is that two people may make the same object in 
exactly the same way, but have a different understanding and appreciation 
about their respective work. It is not clear how Wittgenstein handles this 
problem. 
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3.3 
The position that Wittgenstein takes, emerges not as a strict 
definition of what would constitute understanding, but rather as a general 
claim that "one pattern in the weave is interwoven with many others" ĜŸĚ
§569). In order to appreciate this remark let us delve further into why 
Wittgenstein rejects the idea that understanding can be defined in a precise and 
exact manner. In a simple sense, a teacher knows that a cup can be made to 
almost any shape and size with many different kinds of material. Given the 
number of variables upon which such an object can depend, one may find it 
difficult to define a cup other than the fact that such an object is used for 
drinking. However, one may argue that there are other objects which one can 
ŠŨŸĚuse besides a cup for drinking, thus confusing or extending perhaps the 
boundaries between a cup and its use and other objects which may function in 
a similar way. Still, the teacher might find it further objectionable if any 
student simply saw a cup as purely a drinking object. Understanding such an 
object presupposes from a teaching point of view being able to make many 
connections. Wittgenstein was undoubtedly aware of such problems, but an 
art and design teacher might assert that there are special problems in making 
such an object of this kind that thwarts the sense of knowing that a student's 
understanding could be dependent on a given range of factors. Art and design 
does not handle its problems purely in a scientific or engineering kind of way. 
Nor does it take the view that form follows function. Certainly a student 
needs to be aware of certain requirements in making a cup, but it would be 
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dubious for anyone to claim that in teaching, those factors relating to size, 
material, purpose, construction and so forth are used in any kind of 
straightforward manner in art and design education. What is definable may 
relate more to an intuitive rather than descriptive account. 
Pedagogically there are other difficulties with this straightforward 
manner as mentioned by Hanfling, when he states that: "It is , for example, 
essential to an understanding of 'yellow' and 'pencil' that one should be able 
to say what is not yellow and not a pencil; and essential to understand that 
'pencil' means an enduring entity, one that has a past and future" (1989, 
p.S9). Here, in relation to Wittgenstein's work, Hanfling asks how do we 
learn the word "yellow" and "pencil". As Wittgenstein argues (BB, p.2), as 
an instance of "yellow" and "pencil", one can learn by ostensive means by 
p<?inting to the object, and speaking what Wittgenstein calls its "proper name" 
(BB, pp.81-2, §6). Yet, could one learn what "yellow" and "pencil" 
represent by ostensive connections alone? Indeed, as Hanfling suggests, it is 
not just language that one is dealing with here, but also perception; a 
perception, that is, involving an image or a feeling for what a yellow pencil 
would look like. Plainly, to complicate the situation, the perception that a 
student has of a yellow colour and of a pencil, presupposes different 
conceptions and impressions as to what is a yellow colour and what is a pencil 
and how pencil and yellow can come together. Now, in this instance, it is 
conceivable that language and perception could interconnect through ostensive 
means. Not wishing to dispute this, the problem as Hanfling describes, is 
how is one to know when "the learner is assumed to be already in possession 
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of temporal notions such as 'before', 'duration', 'event'" (p.59). The flaw in 
the argument seems to be that to understand that one is perceiving a pencil, is 
to recognise that the pencil has a "before", "duration" and "event" attached to 
the experience. The assumption being, that what Wittgenstein failed to notice, 
is that one is not dealing with an object as though it exists without a learning 
history. To understand an object requires other forms of understanding 
interconnecting and extending from, past experiences that anchor current 
understanding. 
While Wittgenstein goes to some length in explaining ostensive 
definitions and their connections to early or "basic" learning, it is not clear as 
Hanfling argues, how one learns simply by pointing (p.58). The 
implausibility of this, as Hanfling sees it, is that the "before", "duration" and 
"event" are notions which "are all interwoven, and the idea of learning them 
one at a time is an illusion" (p.59). One might think that this brings us full 
circle to Wittgenstein' s earlier remark that one pattern is interwoven with 
many others, but Wittgenstein' s comments here, relate to usage only. In our 
example of "yellow" and "pencil" it may well be possible by ostensive means 
to identify "yellow" and "pencil", but in itself, one may be suspicious as to the 
usefulness of this approach. To identify "yellow" and "pencil" also 
presupposes that I can reidentify "yellow" and "pencil", but to reidentify this 
object involves more than a simple ostensive definition. Likewise, as 
explained, Wittgenstein argues that the meaning of objects can change from 
one situation to another which of course would undermine further the notion 
of ostensive definitions. This argument relies on the fact that meaning can 
I 
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change depending on how the object is being used. Hence, pointing to an 
object where the meaning has changed because of its use, is liable to confuse 
rather than enlighten what is being determined. Furthermore, Hanfling I s 
. argument shatters the view that understanding could be numerical, that 
understanding could be taught simply as an instance of some ostensive 
experience of an object (as in "yellow" and "pencil"). Wittgenstein, of 
course, never described understanding in this way, for he insisted that there 
were many tie-ups and criss-crossing between different concepts (PI, §§66 & 
203). It would also be unfair not to recognise the case that Wittgenstein 
brought against ostensive definitions, when he asserts: "But suppose I point 
with my hand to a blue jersey. How does pointing to its colour differ from 
pointing to its shape?" (BB, p.SO, §3). In addition, I have shown elsewhere 
(I.e Corbusier's VdJa SaH?Je) that individuals often identify and reidentify 
objects in different ways, which further suggests the difficulty that 
understanding can be variously interpreted. In showing slides to students one 
often finds that students are able to pick out things that one has not noticed 
before. There is a sense then that understanding is a cumulative and 
developing experience which undergoes perhaps many changes. However, one 
should not dismiss ostensive definitions as they can be a useful device in 
teaching situations. 
To know whether a figure in a drawing is fiat or three-dimensional, 
or whether an object is in relief or is a maquette, requires not only that I 
understand what "flat", "three-dimensional", "relief' or "maquette" supposes, 
but that I know in Wittgensteinian terms something of the use of these words. 
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The learner must learn to establish connections and this Wittgenstein argues, 
can only be achieved when the student knows how to relate and apply a colour 
in a certain fashion, knows how to scale a drawing in a certain fashion and 
knows how to explain his or her work in a certain fashion. To begin with, the 
connection that the student must establish in these examples, is how to 
produce a certain object that is conditioned by the desired effect that the 
student wished to be expressed of this object. But before one can get to this 
stage, one has to know how students could identify, for instance, a 
three-dimensional drawing, as this presupposes that they know the difference 
between a two-dimensional drawing and a three-dimensional drawing. Yet, 
this kind of thinking only works when there is no misunderstanding between 
certain sorts of drawings. A drawing may have a number of features that 
incorporate both two and three-dimensional space, some of these spaces could, 
for example, be overlapping, blocked out, receding or dispersed throughout 
the work in different ways. 
To discuss the above problem, Wittgenstein further maintains that 
meaning can be applied in more than one way (PI, §183). For instance, the 
word "flat" would be notoriously difficult to precisely define in art and design 
terms not because it might have a qualitative aspect to it such as the way that 
the material might reflect its colour, but also because one's perception and 
concept of flatness is dependent, to some extent, on its use. A print of a 
painting is often described as a flat piece of work, but to the printmaker who 
has lifted the surface of the print so that the oil-paint rests embossed on the 
paper rather than being embedded into the print, would not describe such work 
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as purely flat. Without this visual and touch sense to determine the work, it 
is doubtful the extent to which one could explore certain experiences of this 
kind. This reveals that there are many different ways in which a student can 
. experiment and identify what entails flatness. For there is a difference 
between a musical flat note, this colour looks flat, the car has a flat tyre, this 
flat pencil, the building looks flat when you look at it straight on, but curved 
when you look at it side on, this shadow is flat but it bends, and because of 
the weight of this colour on this flat object the shape of this object looks flatter 
than I had intended it to look, and there is nothing flat about this painting as its 
surface is thickly textured. One might begin to surmise from this, that in art 
and design learning the anchorage by which understanding manifests itself is 
characterised by the argument that one produces. In truth, the student must 
learn to construct his or her arguments corresponding to the pictorial sense in 
the work. What is easily overlooked, however, in learning terms, is that the 
student may make a lot of corrections and editing to his or her work which in 
itself manifests what learning is about. 
What is involved in the above examples, is that the student may 
creatively play with visual differences in his or her work by exploring how 
different spatial compositions can suggest a particular tension, weight, shape 
or form to the object. In one sense, perceptual properties change the 
dynamics of perspective, colour, texture, line, density and spatial 
relationships to the degree that these perceptual changes shift our 
understanding of the art and design work. It is for this reason, that just 
because at one level a Piet Mondrian painting can be seen as a flat painting, 
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this does not mean that one will interpret or experience this painting and its 
perceptual properties, as a flat piece of work. As Wittgenstein states: "What 
does it mean to understand a picture, a drawing? Here too there is 
understanding and failure to understand. And here too these expressions may 
mean various kinds of thing" (PI, §526). It is not at all obvious, as some 
might suppose in education, to identify the characteristics which will enable 
the student to understand an object, as his or her lines of thought may have 
to point in all kinds of directions in order to understand what the work is 
expressing. An obvious major concern of this work, is that the teacher's 
responsibility must be to help students realise and understand how perceptual 
qualities in the work can function. So much of this thesis is devoted to 
explaining the subtlety of these concerns. 
Since to some extent I have explained what constitutes description and 
expression in Wittgenstein' s thinking, it remains for me to say something more 
about the role that intention plays in his notion of understanding. Now, the 
question that currently needs to be asked is how does intention give meaning 
to understanding? At this stage, what needs to be taken into account, in 
relation to aesthetic intention and understanding, is visual experience. One 
cannot attribute connecting one's intention to understanding in art and design 
terms, without considering the range of factors that can affect the perception 
of what is seen. Since I have previously explained, in relation to Kant's and 
Wittgenstein's work, some of the aspects that can affect visual experience, let 
me go on to discuss briefly how intention can affect understanding. If 
Wittgenstein is correct then: "For, however, like I make the picture to what it 
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is supposed to represent, it can always be the picture of something else as 
well. But it is essential to the image that it is the image of this and of nothing 
else" (PI, §389). Once again, there seems to be several arguments that one 
could construct out of this quote, but the argument that I have in mind is that 
in much of art and design work (Cubism, Dada, Abstract Expressionism, 
Renaissance, Expressionism, Islamic, Gothic and so on), the formal aspect 
alone may not be enough to understand the work itself. One must conclude, 
that in certain situations the student needs to know the intention of the work, 
in order not to misconstrue its understanding. However, as Anscombe points 
out: "that in general we are interested, not just in a man's intentions of doing 
what he does, but in his intention in doing it, and this can very often not be 
seen from seeing what he does" (1985, p.9, §4). In which case, simply 
observing what the student is doing may not be enough to determine why he 
or she is working in a particular manner. The formal aspects of an object do 
indeed describe something about the object, but as Wittgenstein states, there 
are various ways in which an object can be interpreted. The danger seems to 
be that unless one is familiar with the object, there is always the possibility 
that one's interpretation could be mistaken. For example, one might think that 
a student is making a table when in fact he or she is making a cabinet 
Similarly, what looks like a well crafted wedge shaped piece of timber suitable 
for a doorstop, may tum out to be a device for a new piece of furniture. 
Further difficulties seem to be that in making a clock is the intention simply 
to make a clock or is there something more to it than this? In observing a 
furniture maker making a table, I notice that his or her actions are not 
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arbitrary, but intentional. Yet, does this mean that by selecting certain tools 
and by performing certain actions the intention can be found? In reply, 
Anscombe argues (p.28, § 19) that the intentional character of selecting or 
performing presupposes that the student should give the description under 
which the selection and performance was intentional. Immersed in this 
argument is whether the character of the experience, as an intention, justifies 
the action. 
It is certainly a condition, as Wollheim asserts (1993, p.139), that an 
artist's intentions are of critical relevance to the work. To countenance this 
argument further, knowing what a student's intentions are might decide for us 
just how critical his or her work appears to be, as the significance of the 
student's work may lie, as suggested by Anscombe, in his or her intentions. 
For our purposes, for the intention to mean anything, the intention must 
constitute part of the work itself. In this way, Wittgenstein would argue that 
the intention becomes part of the use and its understanding. In examining this 
further, one might suspect that it is unclear just how intention can work for all 
kinds of art and design experiences and meaning. While knowing the student's 
intention can make a difference to understanding the work, it is also the case 
that the intention may not be something which can be clearly identified. For 
even if the student is able to identify the intention (which in any case may 
change from one moment to the next) how much difference does this make to 
the work itself? If one knows the student's intention prior to the work itself to 
what degree does the intention affect the work, and if one sees the work prior 
to knowing the intention how much should knowing the intention change one's 
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view of this piece of work? On another level, intention can be regarded as a 
singular identity-statement, but this identity-statement (which may itself be 
variously interpreted), may not describe in an important sense what is actually 
being perceived in the work itself. It is not always clear from the way that 
Wittgenstein and Anscombe think, how one can always give a true description 
in art and design of the artist's or designer's intentions in acting as they do. 
The assertion being, that an art and design experience may be more of a felt 
response which does not lend itself necessarily to say what is true or false 
about the work. It may also be argued, in art and design educational terms, 
that intention can get in the way of creativity. The art and design teacher 
knows that free association and automatic drawing and making can break the 
ice or stubbornness of thought that can prevent a student from visualising other 
ŠŸŮŤȘWVĚof reality. For art and design students to work without any intention 
can be an important aspect of their learning. The discovery that one can work 
by free association can be seen to undermine both the concept of use and 
intention. 
Knowing that a student has intentionally designed a folding chair as 
mass-produced domestic object, in one sense tells us something about this 
chair, but on closer inspection a "folding chair" and a "domestic object" can 
be designed and constructed in various ways. There are, as I have suggested, 
difficulties standing in the way of constructing a clear and precise description 
of intention in art and design terms, since the student's intentions, one 
suspects, must change as a consequence of what is being perceived and 
developed in imaginative terms. It is difficult to imagine, for instance, even if 
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one knew precisely what Reitveld's intentions were when he constructed his 
Red and Blue Chair, what this object would eventually tum out to look like. 
Clearly, how an object gets expressed relies on many aspects of which 
intention is only one possible indicator relating to the objects development and 
its understanding in art and design education. From what I have explained so 
far, it should be obvious that art and design experience is physically and 
"mentally" demanding, for any object which is made by a student requires acts 
of judgement based on knowledge and experience; a point perhaps that needs 
further substantiation. 
I want to emphasise that how the student secures the sense of the art 
and design work is dependent to some degree on what the object is expressing. 
Rietveld's Red and Blue Chair showed in part, how one could demonstrate the 
VŤŸVŤĚof the work being perceptibly accountable. Within this, one deduces 
that Wittgenstein' s concept of usage can have practical application for teaching 
practice, since such a policy provides a means whereby one can show in an 
ordinary way what is noticeable about a particular visual effect and its 
understanding. Teachers, therefore, must help the students to clarify their 
understanding by showing to the students how they appear to be using certain 
expressions. During the course of this interchange between teacher and 
student, the student must learn to apply and develop a personal strategy based 
partly on the concept of what determines aesthetic meaning in the formal 
sense. Wittgenstein' s point is that self-realisation requires that the students 
must be able to construct for themselves concepts of understanding by adopting 
public conceptions of meaning, such as "vertical" and "horizontal". Although 
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one cannot simply understand aesthetic experience by an understanding of 
what constitutes such notions in "vertical" and "horizontal", the concession is, 
that it is the deployment of such notions in one's work that can affect art and 
design understanding. On the other hand, can the mere concept of what 
constitutes a "vertical" or "horizontal" element, establish aesthetic experience? 
It would be rash to claim, that the execution of one's behaviour in the use of 
vertical and horizontal planes in a painting or object, distinguishes all there is 
to know about art and design experience. As Nick McAdoo writes: "Anyone 
with normal intelligence and eyesight can see that Monet's painting depicts 
poplar trees, but to see the flowing dance of their slender trunks requires 
something more" (1995, p.165). 
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3.4 
What Wittgenstein infers about learning, is that the perception 
clarifies how I am now seeing the object of my experience. For example, in 
claiming that this object or drawing describes a house, a bird, a monster, a 
lion, a tree in a meadow or a fairground, I am indicating my sense of 
understanding. The way that the student draws these objects tells us something 
about these objects (Z §255). The implications of this passage for 
Wittgenstein is that the drawing incorporates itself into the "seen", the 
drawing becomes part of the performance of learning and understanding. 
Accordingly, aesthetic learning happens when one is able to devise ways in 
which by rubbing out different areas of the drawing and adding newsprint to 
it,. overpainting certain areas while discarding others, changing both the height 
of this chair and the position of its joints, suggests that the student partly 
learns to judge correctly or incorrectly by the kinds of actions that he or she 
performs. That there is a personal handling of these factors that seems 
important to the search and authority of the work, is again crucial to learning. 
Equally what is at stake perhaps, from the teacher's point of view, is the 
expressive significance by which such practice (painting, drawing and making) 
enables students to develop and realise themselves. What determines this 
experience must be how the students are able to say something about 
themselves in the work that shows, through an explorative approach, 
creativity. But one factor standing in our way of accepting further 
Wittgenstein's premise concerning understanding, might be the argument Pears 
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considers, that each one of us, has a different centre of consciousness (1988, 
p.3(0). For if each one of us has a different centre of consciousness, and this 
seems to be a fact, it remains a problem about the extent to which the teacher 
can report on another student's experience. Despite this, the reality is that 
one learns about another person's understanding by the kind of argument he or 
she puts forward in the work. 
In one respect, Wittgenstein proposes that the student learns by being 
given certain examples to work from. It is not, however, at all obvious that 
the teacher's example to their students, for instance, by pointing out how 
Gerrit Rietveld used colour, will throw light on Eugene Delacroix's or Henri 
Matisse's application of colour. The difficulty here is, that the teacher might 
want his or her students to use their creative imagination when interpreting 
ȘŤŸĚartist's or designer's work. To a large extent, using one's creative 
imagination does not evolve simply around any determinate or conceptual 
understanding of an object. The fact that an object is a chair, an apple or an 
elephant, says nothing about the singular judgement of an aesthetic experience. 
The art and design work is stimulated by feeling. However, the way that one 
compares and differentiates Reitveld' s work, suggests that the perception of 
this work by the way it is constructed and relates to certain ideas about space, 
harmony and colour, represents a different kind of understanding of these 
notions than one will find in Eugene Delacroix' s or Henri Matisse's work. 
Crucially, learning takes place when one can show how to extend and develop 
a certain argument, a drawing, a painting or making of an object. In agreeing 
that there is no commonly accepted way in which a person will experience, 
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one distinguishes, nevertheless, that this experience, if it is to be 
communicated, must do so in a manner that makes it possible to argue this 
experience. From one perspective, the art and design argument involves as 
E.F. Carritt writes: "a becoming aware, not indeed of the nature of things, but 
of our own inner nature and processes" (1923, p.ll!), but from another 
perspective, it also involves being able to conceptualise, as Wittgenstein 
thought, a description which defines its sense. In art and design education, the 
student needs to learn how to handle both arguments, even if, there are 
problems with how one defines the work or understands one's own "inner" 
nature. One is prone to argue, that it is the way that one imagines things that 
is aesthetically important. The criticism is, that in art and design education, it 
is not enough to say that one can recognise an object and its content by 
se.nsation-language means, for such experience at best will only clarify one 
aspect of art and design learning which in itself may not be very revealing at 
all. In general, it is reasonable to suggest that the art and design teacher must 
make sure that he or she neither reduces nor narrowly defines the terms under 
which an aesthetic experience can be pursued. Indeed, because art and design 
understanding relies on imaginative creation, and the fact that the art or design 
work may be discernible in various ways, it would be controversial not to 
allow the student the opportunity to explore and develop this awareness. 
Education argues, that there must be some corroborative way in 
which the work shows its understanding. It is further held by Wittgenstein 
that, for the teacher and the student, the issue must be: "' How must one react 
to this description in order to understand it?'" (RC, §55). Perhaps one should 
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not be surprised that there is a danger here, that our reasons for understanding 
might threaten to overpower our imaginative impulses, if one sees the 
description in purely rationalist terms. To overcome this problem, 
Wittgenstein argues, that it is the expression and not the reason that articulates 
the work. Thus, one might have a reason for putting a green colour next to a 
red colour, but it is what the expression of this green next to the red means 
that shapes its aesthetic sense. The requirement being, that the teacher must 
be careful to stress and create situations that provide visual stimulation that 
allow the felt intensity and drama of the work to come through and manifest 
itself. It may be said, that because the aesthetic pursues self-expression, in 
part as a felt intensity, that to understand this is a question not only of 
description, but also of "spontaneity", successive judgements, and imaginative 
involvement. Art and design involves a series of absorbing events expressing 
the involvement of emotions, ideas and mood, an experience perhaps that one 
must be capable of not just noticing, but also having. I reject, then, 
Wittgenstein's argument that one merely needs to consider meaning in terms of 
usage, for in learning terms, much more is involved in education. 
Of course the teacher must encourage students to work in a creative 
fashion, but Wittgenstein makes no mechanistic or categorical claim for what 
constitutes the significance of such experience, as everything is dependent on 
the particular circumstances that manifest imaginative understanding. It is 
without question, that by considering, comparing and differentiating, concepts 
of understanding become noticeable, because this experience brings into 
prominence the student's methods, examples, values and understanding. This 
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is not to say that such concepts remain the same, do not get modified, or 
abandoned altogether, for such experience would be contrary to the aesthetic 
and to learning in general. But aesthetically, what one considers may be a 
question of feeling, of mood. The difficulty is, that in learning one may not 
always be aware aesthetically how one is employing one's values, 
understanding or perceptions, because such experience in art and design 
education may be too subtle or overpowering. This concedes a lot about 
"states of mind" and challenges the denial that Wittgenstein makes about 
cognitive experiences. The argument being, that it is quite possible that one 
could have contradictory perceptions coexisting in a piece of art and design 
work, to the extent that the work itself is not operating as a determinate 
conception of human knowledge, but rather, operating to intensify the vivid 
realisation of one's own experience as "menta1life". Art and design activity 
gives life to the fact that individuals do dissolve, diffuse and reorganise their 
thoughts and feelings in creative ways. 
It might be thought, as Frank Jackson points out that: "Our statements 
about visual images are not just to the effect that an image is red, or square, or 
whatever; they are also to the effect that an image is red and square and ... " 
(1988, pp.119-20). In other words, a red image would involve many other 
properties or sensations which one may sense, but that these sensations are 
not necessarily equivalent in any manner to what can be described as 
properties of a particular sensation, yet for all that, these are real experiences 
which do affect one's understanding. These are not, however, undifferentiated 
experiences, for how I feel about this colour, its charm and excitement, is not 
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something that I can relinquish. It may turn out to be that these feelings are 
part of the idea of the colour itself, and to attempt to relinquish these feelings 
would probably change my understanding of this colour. If one relinquishes 
"my" feelings altogether as being connected and operated by cognitive and 
emotional experience, which is what Wittgenstein implies, in favour of a 
description presupposed by sensation-language, one ought to ask, how far 
can this sense be used to describe aesthetic experiences accurately? 
As a counter-reaction to the Wittgensteinian position, what seems 
right about our thoughts, in the Strawson sense (1990, pp.87-100), must in 
part be determined by the experience that one ascribes to oneself. Being able 
to ascribe experiences to oneself represents a sense of awareness of oneself that 
can further serve how one can come to some agreement concerning the 
work. Strawson' s argument, at this point, is that the learner must realise that 
it is his or her experiences and one's subsequent awareness of the experience, 
that forms an idea of the world around them. He mentions the fact that the 
learner: "to have the idea of himself, must he not have the idea of the subject 
of the experiences, of that which has them?" (p.88). Strawson's explanation 
here is that it is one's "orientation" and where one sees this from, that is 
initially crucial to a person's understanding. Facts about ourselves or about 
other bodies are still facts about ourselves, though not necessarily as the same 
person in each case. Strawson argues (pp. 90-1) that one can have different 
perspectives about our world, as the student who is having these experiences 
may be having various kinds of perceptions taken from different positions, 
body involvement and sensory experiences. The student in a proper way, 
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could well be moving around and integrating various aspects of these 
encounters into the work. My experiences, therefore, as Strawson claims 
(p.97), may not be dependent on either a single point nor necessarily upon the 
same type of experience. This accordingly makes "my" claim that these 
experiences are "of" this object, complicated, if there is no single point and 
type involved. In art and design learning this seems more the norm rather than 
the exception. But to clear up any ambiguity in a student's experience, the 
teacher's role is to develop ways that assist the student to determine his or her 
positions and what such positions seem dependent on. The essential issue here 
for the art and design teacher, is that one needs particular states of "my" 
experiences in order to make particular states of these experiences transferable 
at all. Strawson' s reason seems to be that students need to experience 
ŸŤÜVŤŨẂŤVHĚin order to have an idea of their experiences. In learning terms, a 
point of view determined by self-ascription would seem a prerequisite for art 
and design experience. The student needs to learn how to experience and be 
aroused by objects, but he or she can only do this by becoming aware of what 
one is doing or feeling. The art and design teacher must set up situations that 
allow students to become aware of their perceptions by designing projects that 
enable students to question and analyse object understanding. The learner gets 
the meaning of things only if he or she can feel the sense of the teaching or 
learning, by feeling perhaps the presence of his or her own mind and body. 
In relation to the above argument by Strawson, Pears rightly argues 
in the Wittgensteinian sense (p. 266), that it would be wrong to think that all 
our sensation experiences are obtained in this fashion, for I can and do learn 
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about my sensations through discussing my feelings with others, by listening to 
others, and by observing how others express their "ideas". It follows that an 
art and design teacher would want to see the students explore and respond to 
these different claims about how one learns from "ideas" and thoughts. In 
contrast, the assault ,that Wittgenstein makes against one's "own" thoughts and 
ideas, and one that to a large extent may be justified, as Pears goes on to say, 
is an attempt to demonstrate that our experiences are seldom purely of one's 
own making. However, it is contentious for Pears to claim that X 
self-ascription, in the Strawson sense, could be considered merely the "first 
step" (p.266). For while not all experiences are a product of an individual 
"mind", without this ability to create imaginatively, one will not get very far 
in stimulating different interactions and thoughts about objects. My stand on 
this view, is that the distinctions between self-ascription and "non-ownership" 
experience are difficult ones to sort out when considering the art and design 
work, and may be closer together than one might surmise. Strawson makes a 
similar point to this, when he argues that a person must be both a 
"self-ascriber and an other-ascriber" (p.l08). This idea gives us grounds to 
argue that the student's art and design work is dynamically constructed, an 
achievement expressive of imaginative thought, which from an experience 
point is expressive of the student's self in the making. In learning terms the 
student may be· so intensely involved in the work that he or she is unaware of 
any practical or theoretical differences, preferring instead to be led by this 
intensity of experience. 
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Clearly, art and design learning cannot be reduced to following a 
sequence of steps to identify certain facts, as this would misrepresent aesthetic 
understanding. But it remains true to say, that the teacher must look to see 
that aspects of both self-ascription and non-ownership experiences are being 
considered and developed in the work. The students must show that they are 
capable of responding to criticism of their work, but nevertheless must feel 
free to express themselves, to be inspired. However, one of the difficulties 
here for the art and design teacher, is as Strawson argues: "Limits may be 
different for the speaker and hearer" (p.19). This suggests, then, that there 
could be differences in the kind of judgements which the speaker identifies and 
the hearer distinguishes. In considering this, what the student makes in art 
and design happens because he or she has made numerous changes in the 
content or form of the work. It is far from evident, therefore, that this 
learning process is present in the work itself. For the teacher, their 
judgements may at times only be a response to what is purely given in the 
work itself, for he or she may ignore certain features of the student's learning 
experiences altogether. Unlike the student, teachers may not be inspired by 
what they can see, for their emotional or conceptual responses to the work 
might be coming from a different angle to the student's. One might object to 
this in educational terms, but one should be careful here, for the student and 
the teacher may have to make various kinds of judgements at different times 
as an ongoing concern. For the teacher, it is essential that a student must be 
able to notice and form for him or her self the various conditions upon which 
different judgements help to identify, arrange and situate the work. A 
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student develops an attitude towards reality only when he or she engages issues 
that are brought up in discussion and through the work. It may be said, that 
the student must learn to compose different arguments relating to his or her 
. work. It is not unusual that the student's judgements in relation to object 
experience, should be modified and developed as the work progresses. This 
should be positively encouraged. A piece of art and design work will involve 
developmentally many different observations which as a process can be 
interpreted in different ways. But to repeat, it does not follow necessarily that 
what the student hears reidentifies what the teacher requires. Whatever the 
kind of reference one makes, both the student and the teacher, as Strawson 
writes (p.32), must identify common factors that both parties can agree on. 
In art and design terms, Wittgenstein does not deny that one has 
feelings, nor their possible significance in a given situation. But it may seem, 
that his analysis of these experiences has severe weaknesses. It is arguable 
that the quality and subtlety of feeling experiences requires a deep level of 
sensitivity which language use and its understanding often fail sufficiently to 
comprehend. What I am suggesting, and this is a point that I will discuss 
later, are that feelings can represent a character of experience that defies 
exact copying by sensation-language. It would be wrong to think that such 
feelings are not steeped in thought and reason as aesthetically there is often an 
interplay of feeling between imagination and understanding, "promoting the 
sensibility of the mind" (CJ, intro. IX, 197). Our conceptual devices, as Pears 
suggests (p.217), may not always be what starts our interest, but it may also 
be the case, that conceptual understanding may not be what sustains our 
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interest either, for there are emotional and imaginative connections that 
students in art and design would wish to evoke and sustain in their work. The 
student may be stimulated by different sensations that arouse a heightened 
awareness about the work. The expressive sense of such work may not be 
held conceptually but rather as a feeling quality. This is a point that needs 
further discussion. 
If one sticks adamantly to Wittgenstein' s concept of description, such 
ideas will not explain one's cognitive-feeling involvement and so lack a 
clear understanding of the conditions which affect creative intelligence. The 
reader will note, that the aesthetic proves its worth not only in the 
Wittgensteinian sense through description, but educationally by being aroused 
by genuine insights of human life. The discovery of these insights come about 
in art and design by means of the imagination. One tends to forget, that the 
experiencing creating person is testimony itself of learning. A young child can 
show relations of experience that can be quite intimate and revealing long 
before they have learnt verbal communication. Significantly, one conclusion 
that can be drawn from this, is that an aesthetic experience whose very 
existence depends on the life of the individual, cannot be anything but useful. \ 
It is worth reminding ourselves, from the point of view of those who 
teach art and design, that the aesthetic in kind is not indiscriminate, and this is 
the argument that Wittgenstein is partly making when he asks us to consider 
how one's perception of the object gets formed. The image or picture is 
lifeless, argues Wittgenstein, unless the student knows what he or she is 
thinking and how to explain it (PI, §XI). How then does the student bring 
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into existence this experience? Obviously, by students exploring the object 
concerned, they can begin to determine a particular expression of this object. 
But what is the condition of "exploring" in the aesthetic sense? The problem 
here is, that the student certainly does not explore aesthetically in terms strictly 
supposed by language-description, but as Kant thought, by means of the 
imagination (CJ, § I). The point that Kant is making, is that an aesthetic 
experience being imaginatively created is not realised by concepts alone. On 
first view, one might think that this cannot have anything to do with learning, 
since it is clear, in this instance, that students who are absorbed by their 
imaginative processes have no clear reasons to support their own actions other 
than the possible fact that they may be responding to the "inner" play of 
thought. Can this action then be justified in teaching and learning terms? 
ĿŸŨŨÙŪŦŴŬŬTĚwrites: "What we hear, for example is, merely sound. What we 
attend to is two things at once: a sound and our act of hearing it. The act of 
sensation is not present to itself, but it is present, together with its own 
sensum, to the act of attention" (1958, p.206). Without the act of attention, 
one can safely say that an art and design student will not produce anything of 
quality in his or her work. Here, Collingwood goes on to say (p.215) that the 
imagination is the conscious idea of this experience as thought. It would be 
nonsense then to think that imagination is not important to learning and 
education, for not only does one have here the notion that the imagination is 
thought, but also the suggestion that the imagination relates to ideas. The 
notion of an idea being for Collingwood, how a student would perpetuate and 
stabilise an experience (p.218). Hence, it is not just the fact that a student be 
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may aware of touching an object in a particular kind of way, but rather that he 
or she must has an idea of this experience. Such arguments seem to 
presuppose, furthermore, the educational value of art and design, in that to 
perpetuate and stabilise an experience are particular learning accomplishments. 
It also seems, as mentioned by Armstrong, that: "If we think of the wealth 
and subtlety of the information that we gain by our eyes, to take one example 
only, we see that much of it eludes the relatively coarse mesh of the net of 
language" (1988, p.127). In which case, the student's understanding may be 
in the perception itself rather than the reason, an experience which defies, in 
part, linguistic categorisation. The impact of Collingwood's and Armstrong's 
above remarks, are that the student must be careful about how he or she 
judges a piece of art and design work as his or her sensitivity to understanding 
may be searching a deeper level of awareness that may not in any sense be 
implied in our language use. 
Expression in Wittgensteinian terms, connects through usage alone, 
but this is not to say that reason is not part of the usage. In other words, 
there may be all kinds of important reasons which the student develops and 
acts upon in his or her work, but there may not be a reason involved at every 
moment in the action or play of the work. Further support for this argument 
comes from the fact that one's possible reason for doing a painting, may be 
something separate from the actual painting itself, from the activity of painting 
and its creativeness. For it is quite possible that I might be less interested in 
the effect of the painting as a skill or aesthetic exercise and more interested in 
its political message. A student may make an object not because he or she is 
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interested in the object itself, but because this object allows the student to get 
something else that they want to have, as a means to an end. Moreover, a 
painter or a craftperson will respond to things that are being explored and 
coming out of the work itself. The creative activity may not always have a 
reason, in the sense that one's response may be intuitive. Let us also consider 
Wittgenstein's point, concerning whether it follows that just because I do not 
have a reason for my action, then this action cannot be meaningful (BB, 
pp.85-9, §14-7). The argument seems to be, as an alternative to the intuitive 
response, that if I reacted to the object automatically whether in using a 
paintbrush (in the way that Jackson Pollock might use it) or in using a 
jack-plane to plane a surface of timber, then by acting spontaneously what was 
I able to recognise in order to perform this task? How did I know what paint 
marks or planing needed to be created? Accepting in part this point, 
Wittgenstein's conception here is, that while the action itself does not appear 
to correspond to a reason for the action, the step prior to the action may have 
been the reason for the action. The condition is that to recognise what the art 
and design student achieved by a spontaneous way of working, one may have 
to recognise the prior reason which explains this action. In the case of 
Jackson Pollock's work, one would have to consider the notion of free 
association. It may also be replied that a craftperson who makes one hundred 
bowls to be sold in his shop, need not be fully conscious of each bowl he or 
she is making. In which case, the student may not be fully aware of his or her 
actions at the time those actions were carried out. What is more, making and 
painting may simply be an explorative exercise, which the teacher and the 
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student may use as a way to generate ideas, it is only later perhaps that the 
student's reasons begin to condition the work, if at all. One might surely 
suggest that by just picking up a pencil to scribble something down is a reason 
in itself, but to what degree is this reason on its own revealing'] A student 
may have a good reason to make a certain object, but the reason here is not a 
description of the object. Just because a student has a solid reason for doing a 
certain piece of work does not in itself make this piece of work meaningful. 
At the same time, it may be further argued, in the Wittgensteinian sense (PI, 
§XI), that a drawing itself gives a reason that justifies the object expression. It 
would be wrong not to conclude that for the teacher, the work itself is 
evidence of reasoning. But just what kind of reasoning it is relates to different 
kinds of creative experience and understanding. 
One deduces that while the student may not have been fully aware of 
what he or she was creating at the time this action was being produced, this 
action does not negate meaning, because it was found that his or her actions 
were being determined by some prior reason, the prior reason as a cause, 
justifying the action. Wittgenstein might reply that until one knows what these 
actions are for, one cannot be sure what explains the work. This is one reason 
why one must be careful in explaining Wittgenstein' s notion of understanding, 
for it is not just a simple matter of observed behaviour that he uses to support 
his arguments. Still, it might be argued that consciousness is important to the 
work in the sense that the student's work is conditioned by creating visual 
experiences and ideas which must involve a level of consciousness essential to 
this creation. However, the teacher may want judgements about the art and 
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design work be put to one side in order to encourage spontaneous ways of 
working, that awaken new relations of experience. But now let us suppose 
that a student uses a tenon saw without realising the kind of cuts being made 
because he or she has made similar cuts with the tenon saw many times in the 
past. The student may certainly have a reason to make these saw cuts, but it 
is not this reason itself that is determining the saw action, as this action is 
more closely attached to his or her cognitive-bodily experiences peculiar to 
the student's centre of consciousness. In this instance, it is how I experience 
this saw action that will determine whether or not I take my saw actions for 
granted. This begs the question, to what extent can one construe that 
meaning is purely in the reason and description, for are there not other 
important learning ties that one must consider to substantiate meaning? It is to 
be noted, however, that Wittgenstein would argue with this by stating that the 
student's actions are determined by what he or she noticed in the work. 
Thus, the case seems to be, that the student's experience only changes by what 
he or she is able to notice in the work. Yet, what he or she notices in the 
work, may be a response to feeling rather than an observation. 
What Kant realised, and this is something the teacher needs to be 
aware of, is that an imaginative experience does not always bend over easily to 
reason, in that this experience may have a life of its own, contingent only on 
what gives meaning to the life of the individual in conjunction with his or her 
understanding. What I am suggesting is that one does not analyse strictly an 
art or design object in terms of reason, for on the contrary, one makes as 
Lars Hertzberg argues "responsible appeals to the imagination" (1991, p.144). 
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The imagination may be a response to intuition rather than knowledge, an 
image rather than a teacher's explanation. Kant's central doctrine being that 
the aesthetic represents the mutual harmony between imagination and 
understanding and the capacity to produce instances where meaning is not tied 
to concepts alone. The only appeal that Kant insists is indispensable for the 
aesthetic, a fact that must not be overlooked by the teacher, is that art and 
design work must connect to actual perceptions. If the concept of aesthetic 
experience must involve perceptions of an object, this notion changes the way 
art and design work can be viewed in imaginative terms, but this is an issue 
that will be pursued subsequently. The point to notice is that having 
perceptions of an object presupposes that one knows what these perceptions 
are, which of course, may not be the case at all. 
From the beginning, learning for Wittgenstein is a matter of being 
able to do certain things, but the student in an art and design situation, does 
not generally say I am going to put in a reason here, or at this point, that I am 
going to make a judgement (for it happens to be the case that one is constantly 
making judgements in the work). It appears that learning in art and design is 
much more dependent on what is being experienced, what comes out of the 
self-expression and activity itself, and what is being evoked. Objects in art 
and design also get modified because of the cognitive-intuitive response that 
one experiences imaginatively, and the mistake that Wittgenstein made was to 
try to intellectualise what is not always intellectual. What Wittgenstein gives 
us, which is in one sense useful in education, as Pears remarks (p.325), is an 
"extrinsic" notion of understanding, but he seems to miss out on the fact that 
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understanding also has an "intrinsic character". However, this is not entirely 
correct, as the contribution that Wittgenstein makes, is an attempt to explain 
the "intrinsic" by "extrinsic" means. One must credit Wittgenstein's 
understanding in attempting to demonstrate that one often learns to understand 
the "inner" by what confirms this experience through practice. Where he 
fails, is the extent to which one can see understanding in relation to external 
characteristics. If the teacher only judges by the external characteristics of the 
work, his or her understanding of art and design education will be severally 
restricted. For one will not properly understand art and design experience and 
its learning unless the teacher is aware of how the students involve themselves 
in creative play. Moreover, it is quite possible that the play activity that a 
student experiences and reveals in the art and design work, is adequate 
fulfilment in itself. 
The argument about learning manifests itself when satisfaction, 
interest and understanding interconnect, not as separate concerns, but when 
they criss-cross and overlap. It is here that one gets a sense of aesthetic 
learning emerging from the Wittgensteinian argument. What does the 
explaining, therefore, is connected to the making itself. For the student to be 
able to mix colours, to make dovetail joints, to make a drawing of his or her 
holiday, and to distinguish in the process the experience itself, denotes an 
attitude, an imaginative content, and a desire which takes account of the 
student's fulfilment of this experience. Even so, as Harrison asserts: "The 
difference has to do with the maker's actions, not with what he makes" (1978, 
p.65). In the making the teacher can perhaps to a degree, see what the student 
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is concentrating on, what kind of judgements he or she is making, where the 
student's attention is drawn and thus offer appropriately advice as needed. 
The argument that Wittgenstein insists on, is that thinking and learning are not 
an accompaniment of the work, it is part of the activity itself, the colour 
mixing, the making of joints, the holiday painting and so on. This brings me 
to the point, that learning involves, through the making procedure, testing, 
confirming and recognising student's ability to do these things in a certain 
way, in order to justify the experience and what it teaches. 
If things go wrong in art and design one refers to the making 
procedure and its realisation. The conditions that influence what seem to be 
accountable in art and design are the connections between imaginative 
impulses and usage, and it is through these experiences that one realises how 
sophisticated the aesthetic can be. To some extent, the traditional view of the 
aesthetic in education has always stressed the "inner" importance of experience 
and rightly so, but it has failed to recognise the possibility that what makes the 
"inner" secure, is that it also connects to a public conception of understanding. 
One may surmise, that learning is severely hampered aesthetically when the 
student is unable to spot how he or she is using something or when he or she is 
unable to make a gesture, utterance or action in connection with what 
stimulates individuality and interest. For unless one knows something about 
these gestures, images, utterances or actions, art and design experience 
becomes difficult to sustain. In this respect, knowing something about these 
concerns, amounts to knowing how to express interest in a creative fashion. 
It would be wrong to think, however, in art and design education that 
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familiarity is a matter relating only to usage. For there is in educational terms 
the challenge of the work itself and the evocativeness that this can bring in the 
imaginative play of the object. Putting this aside, though, one of the teacher's 
main tasks must be to enable students to become familiar and critical of their 
own self-expressions and what they form. One of the arguments here is that 
the stand that a student takes in his or her work by the visual connections that 
he or she makes, presupposes that the student should recognise that what he or 
she is constructing occupies a certain position, a certain visual experience 
which represents a particular point of view that transforms and identifies the 
work. 
There is, of course, the argument that if some of the factors which go 
to determine the character of the art and design work cannot, as suggested, be 
seen in the object itself, then how does one know whether the student's 
intentions have been fulfilled in the painting or object? This brings us to the 
point that has been already echoed in this thesis, that the teacher must enter 
into a dialogue and discuss with students, their interest, background 
understanding and knowledge of art and design. In this way, an interaction is 
set up between students and teacher, that further enables the teacher to assess 
whether certain intentions are being fulfilled. What must interconnect with 
any discussion of this kind, is that the work closely resembles certain thoughts 
and ideas. So, in this respect, the visual sense of the work becomes 
important. Immersed in this, one could argue, is that the student must learn 
to scrutinise his or her perception, when as Wollheim argues (1993, 
pp.133-42), this experience modifies and demonstrates reinterpretation. By 
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this I take it that Wollheim means that there is a certain regularity of 
adjustments and readjusting that one expects students to do in their work, as 
this is how one becomes acquainted with the kind of evidence and experience 
that also connects to fulfilment and intention. I concur with Wollheim, that 
understanding, in art and design terms, must involve through actual 
acquaintance not just a perception of the work, but recurring perceptions of the 
work, as he writes: "Reinterpretation of Cezanne's early work requires that we 
go back and look at it again" (p.142). This serves to illustrate the problem 
and in part a possible solution, that the aesthetic requires successive 
experiences in order to realise certain aspects of the work. These successive 
experiences, as Strawson suggests (1990, p.36-7), must not only be taken from 
the object itself, its colours, patterns and so on, but furthermore, how is one 
locating and arranging these characteristics? When a student observes an 
object, such an object exists from one point of view in relation to certain 
positions and relations in three- dimensional space. In the course of the 
student making adjustments in his or her work, such perceptions can be 
sharpened up or expressed in another way, so that these adjustments become 
through his or her perceptions, a critical factor in what constitutes the work. 
The feeling is that educationally, aesthetic learning cannot be something 
taken for granted, as it involves interpretation and reinterpretation as an 
ongoing multidimensional concern. This kind of involvement, however, in art 
and design education experience is not simply secured by formalistic means. 
The concept of imaginative play, in the aesthetic sense, has a lot to do with 
how the student takes upon themselves the task of learning about art and 
196 
design experience. For the decisive argument in art and design education is 
the personal sense of the experience that gives the work its character. 
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3. S 
I have shown in Wittgensteinian learning terms, just how significant 
and justifiable art and design practice can be for education. This experience 
is further enhanced, but made difficult, by Kant's assertion, that art and design 
involves an act of imagination. This is a topic that deserves scrutiny because 
this experience grounds all aesthetic awareness and understanding in art and 
design education. It is my contention that Wittgenstein distorts our concept of 
art and design education when he asserts that: " One ought to ask, not what 
images are or what happens when one imagines anything, but how the word 
'imagination' is used. But this does not mean that I want to talk only about 
words. For the question as to the nature of the imagination is as much about 
WUŸĚword 'imagination' as my question is" (PI, §370). Wittgenstein's thoughts 
here are undoubtedly pointing in several directions in an attempt to link a 
number of ideas together. But his main arguments in this passage centre on 
sensation-language experience, and on the fact that the imagination is to be 
seen in terms of description and so accordingly, as an observed 
sensation-language encounter. Not wanting to deny the important points that 
Wittgenstein makes in this quote, the sketch that he draws, however, gives us 
an inaccurate representation of imaginative experience. His fault lies in the 
fact that there are other aspects to consider that in one respect, challenge and 
undermine his understanding of this crucial experience. Let us investigate 
what these concerns might be as they have consequences for furthering our 
understanding of art and design education. 
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Any art and design teacher knows that imagination and "seeing" are 
crucial aspects that can reveal and stimulate a wealth of detail and 
understanding about objects and one's experience. Of course, this is not 
something that Wittgenstein would deny, however, his concept which connects 
recognition and description to usage, comes under fire from one quarter of art 
and design thinking. The criticism is that one cannot understand art and 
design work solely from this Wittgenstein synopsis. It is important for the art 
and design teacher to realise this challenge because of its possible 
consequences for "seeing" and imagining in art and design teaching. The 
argument is, as previously remarked, that it is not possible to appreciate Marc 
Chagall's The Green Donkey through description. To emphasise this point, one 
wonders how a student through description could come to understand and thus 
appreciate Kasimir Malevich's Black Suprematist Square of 1914-15? 
Similarly, as I will discuss later, how could a student come to understand 
Mark Rotho's work when this painter is not interested in "seeing"? 
Furthermore, to pick up Arthur Danto's point (1994, p.61), no perceptual 
criterion can be found to be given to Marcel Duchamp's Fountain (urinal). 
The reason being, that such an object cannot be picked out from thousands of 
other objects of the same kind making the perceptual criterion redundant in the 
case of this art work. As Danto declares: "no formula, which will enable us to 
pick out artwork in the way we can pick out the bagels out in the bakeshop: 
for if 'bagel' had the logic of 'artwork', a pumpkin pie could be a bagel" 
(p.61). What is more, if Wittgenstein is correct, then the art work, as Danto 
suggests in relation to the above, is just the material from which it is made. 
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One has difficulty understanding this, for the child who uses a tennis-racket as 
a guitar, a chair as a castle and a plank of wood as a stage is experiencing an 
object and its events in ways in which the plank of wood does not reveal. 
From the above remarks, one could also construe, as Carritt states, 
that: "asking what the picture is 'of', what the poem is 'about', and, getting 
in reply words which express concepts" (p.1l4), may be distorting what 
constitutes creative imaginative experience. For as Carritt also implies 
(p.l08), it is the way things are imagined, the aesthetic activity itself, as 
opposed to a picture or image of an object, that creates the art and design 
work. Aesthetically, imaginative activity itself can perceive objects without 
having to contemplate their conceptual sense or purpose. In point of fact, the 
student's art and design work, is not striving purely for conceptual ends, but a 
ŴŸXĚof feeling and expressing "inner" form as a particular experience. It is 
not a process about images themselves, but a process concerned with the free 
creative power to actualise and form objects which appeals to our sensible 
understanding. This is not to deny that the student's imagination may be 
constrained by what he or she is able to conceptualise (PI, §370), but creative 
experience does not relate purely to establishing images and their recognition 
by concepts alone, if at all. If perceptive, an art and design student will 
experience many changes in his or her work relating as much to how he or she 
feels as to how he or she conceptualises. The constant struggle that goes on in 
art and design work relates to the perception that creative imaginative 
experiences extend and play with thoughts and ideas in an unbounded fashion. 
A free aesthetic activity cannot be embraced firmly in language, because it 
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exceeds the limits as to what can be conceived by precise conceptual means 
(CJ, §47). The teacher must be alert to this fact, for the freedom to create 
compounds the difficulty of teaching in art and design. Knowing that the art 
and design work cannot be classified in any defined and rigid manner, must 
open up the teacher as well as the student, to the sensitivity of experience, its 
absorption and justification. 
Through creative imaginative experience, students are not bound by 
their conceptual understanding of an object, but rather, are invited to explore 
their own awareness of such matters. Equally, in the Kantian sense, Ernst 
Cassirer wrote: "Each individual, by virtue of his inclination, has a right to 
principles which do not destroy his individuality" (1981, p.5). For Cassirer, 
this means that the individual must be allowed to feel and harmonise his or her 
ŬŸĚexperiences, free of any manipulative, or deterministic intent. To feel 
one's own experience, as Kant claimed, involves aesthetically, the subject's 
subjective feeling and his or her perceptions of these feelings in a purposive 
manner. The argument being, that these feelings themselves are a ground for 
art and design understanding. One is not dealing then, with a definite 
conceptual phenomena, but as Collingwood surmised: "imagination seems to 
occupy a place intermediate between the less free activity of mere feeling and 
the more free activity of what is generally called thought" (1958, p.197-8). In 
which case, the teacher needs to realise that to encourage imaginative thought 
and individuality, is to accept that each individual has a voice of its own. In 
relation to this matter, F.M. Berenson writes: "My level of understanding of a 
person's situation is dependent on the particular relationship in which I stand 
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to him" (1991, p.Sl). This cannot be described as a conceptual matter, since 
my feelings for another person strike a chord at a deeper level of experience. 
This requires that on the part of the teacher that he or her knows something of 
. what it is to be a person, and to experience the aesthetic. But it also requires, 
that the teacher knows how to establish a personal relationship with a student 
and how in a particular situation the aesthetic experience is being explored by 
the student in relation to his or her experiences. If one takes this point of 
view, a teacher must recognise that in art and design, a student will bring and 
develop a different perceptual understanding about object creation, one that is 
peculiar to his or her imaginative ability. 
Strawson implies (1990, p.31), that a student may identify an object 
in one sense, but fail to identify the same object in another sense. This might 
happen for instance when the student is unable to see that the colour red has a 
different relationship to a yellow colour than it does to a black colour, or when 
one is able to see how a motor works in a water pump but unable to see how a 
motor works in a lawn mower. The teacher needs to be aware of these kinds 
of problems, for it is not just what makes a successful piece of work that the 
teacher should be concerned with, but also why a student's work might have 
failed. But even if a student was able to identify where he or she went wrong 
there is still no guarantee that knowing where one went wrong is sufficient in 
itself to correct one's mistakes. Nevertheless, one might expect art and design 
students to make a number of identifying references or particulars about their 
work in various ways. One of the great successes of this approach is that it 
helps the student and the teacher to locate and place the designed object within 
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a structured framework. The student by exploring his or her objects in various 
ways is helping to establish the focus and sense of the work. 
Since art and design work is partly conditioned through imaginative 
free-play, the teacher needs to find ways which encourage and channel this 
experience as a fundamental originating concern. From a Wittgensteinian 
point of view, one might object to this, by claiming that the free-play of the 
imagination is educationally an unsound practice, that perceptually, it is an 
"intrinsic" experience which cannot be observed. But this would be to 
misconstrue the meaning of free-play, in that free-play is a spontaneous and 
interactive activity which can intensify the aesthetic experience and its 
development. Thus it can enrich our cognitive and emotional learning about 
objects and experiences. Essentially, one cannot determine such experience 
as being intellectually conditioned in the way that Wittgenstein thinks such 
experiences can be. It seems to me, that since this experience heightens one's 
awareness of art and design, then in part, this experience helps to account for 
certain features of the experience that allow the student to envisage and 
conceive of certain aesthetic relations. The first claim that one should make 
from this, is that art and design is vindicated by this act of imagination. It is a 
misunderstanding not to realise that it is the imaginative activity itself, and not 
its use or sensation-language situation, that grounds the experience. The 
aesthetic achievement and its individuality require a personal commitment of 
this kind in order to create, extend and sense new possibilities of experience. 
This leads me to concur with Collingwood, when he states in relation to 
imaginative experience that: "to appreciate its value is not the delightfulness of 
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the sensuous elements in which as a work of art it actually consists, but the 
delightfulness of the imaginative experience which those sensuous elements 
awake in him" (p.148). 
Faced with the claim that an imaginative experience has a particular 
character of its own that happens to be a matter of feeling, why might one 
consider such experience as being important for education? Firstly, aesthetic 
learning can be considered as offering more scope in which to explore new 
experiences than any other SUbject. Secondly, imaginative involvement can 
help to broaden and deepen one's understanding of objects, since this activity 
does not attempt to put up barriers, because as Kant claimed, it is an 
unconditioned experience. One might object to this, by claiming that what is 
conceived in art and design may still be false, for there is no guarantee that 
what the imagination reveals is actually the case. But from an educational 
point of view, it is not the issue of what is false that matters as this would 
imply that one also knows what is true, but whether such experience can 
demonstrate that learning has taken place. Truth, in part, must satisfy the 
demand of learning in education. To demonstrate learning, art and design 
experience must show that it is accountable and perhaps meaningful. Among 
the problems that a student may have here, is convincing the teacher and 
fellow students, as Wittgenstein implies, that the relation between what is seen 
by the student is a necessary condition which explains the seen experience and 
its object. Put differently, how does it follow that what is produced in the 
work, is a sufficient explanation of the object's expression? Colours, lines, 
shapes and so on can have all kinds of interpretations. What is seen, then, 
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appears to be important, but such understanding manifests itself 10 
Wittgensteinian terms through "seeing" and "interpreting". A difficulty here 
is, that any "seeing" and "interpreting" in art and design education involves 
diversity. The teacher knows that there are various ways in which such 
diverse understanding and its accountability can be scrutinised. The art and 
design teacher must consider that there are many different ways in which one's 
understanding is realised and expressed. To reiterate, it needs to be 
acknowledged, that this accountability involves not just what is seen in terms 
of the sensation-perception, and what this explains, but it would also 
involve our cognitive-feeling powers of experience. One should not commit 
ourselves in art and design education purely to the view that aesthetic activity 
is a matter of sensation-perception, as this would jeopardise the fact that such 
experience is fundamentally imaginative. 
Since the aesthetic, as Kant thought, is undetermined, it can assume a 
much more adventurist, creative and experimental approach to learning. A 
possible implication of this is that one can avoid labelling what learning should 
and should not contain, for as Kant and Wittgenstein realised, everything is 
dependent on how the object is perceived. Aesthetic learning, in a particular 
way, avoids ruling out anything that might enrich art and design experience. 
So, while art and design experience may appear as though it is "shifting" from 
one moment to the next (which one must do in order to explore other 
perceptions), the reason why it may be "shifting", is to comprehend what is 
being experienced in a particular way. By moving around an object and 
searching through it, the student begins to understand the object and set limits 
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to what he or she is doing. This "shifting" is crucial to the learning process. 
For the fact is, that the student's perceptions will almost invariably have to be 
multidimensional in order to determine and extend the content of such 
experience. He or she is involved in a world of ideas which as Oakeshott 
mentions, can never be reduced to a mere relation (1991, p.60). However, if 
everything as Kant and Wittgenstein thought is dependent on the "seen" then 
this experience throws into difficulty any prescriptive ideas, tests or 
predetermined objectives that the teacher or examiner might possibly have 
about what constitutes learning and understanding in art and design. The 
student's individual aesthetic experience will use all means available 
(perception, intellect, knowledge, feeling and skill) to recognise and express 
certain observations and expressions of thought. In a critical way, this kind of 
experience is not discursive, as some have supposed (an attempt no doubt to 
partly discredit this experience). For what the student's aesthetic experience 
is attempting to achieve is to discover and reveal, through successive 
judgements and gradual transcendence, what is contained in an experience and 
how best to represent this encounter. It seems that there is a special sense in 
which understanding in art and design education operates. 
Now pleasure as I have discussed in Kantian terms, is due to the 
harmony between imagination and understanding. From an educational point 
of view, the question might be, should one concentrate on this pleasure in 
order to determine the aesthetic understanding? Certainly, putting the 
question this way does indeed cause us problems. To concentrate on the 
pleasure will not explain the student's meaning in his or her work, because 
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pleasure, as explained, is merely contingent and determined by the mutual 
harmony of imagination and understanding. The teacher's role, however, is 
not to determine what constitutes pleasure for their students (which would be 
an impossible task) but to engage students interest and understanding in an 
assignment. One of Kant's main arguments is that the aesthetic is an 
independent experience resting on personal conditions that are determined by 
oneself. The thing that needs to be said about this, is that education is 
somewhat turned upside-down in the aesthetic, for aesthetic experience in 
general seems to go against the grain of educational practice. That is to say, 
that in the aesthetic such experience establishes what the individual is 
interested in and his or her involvement in this interest. Art and design 
experience does not attempt to condition as a prerequisite, what needs 
de.scribing. By drawing on this experience, learning becomes something 
which is handled by the students and not something which is dictated to them. 
This brings me to three interrelated issues that I now want to discuss. 
Firstly, that one must avoid having too much teacher control going on in the 
art and design classes, secondly that one must encourage more self-criticism 
of the student's work and that of others, and thirdly the art and design 
curriculum must be centred on the student's own interest. How is it then 
possible to encourage this approach? It seems to me that these issues cannot 
be separated since they overlap extensively with one another. In short, I will 
attempt to grasp these issues collectively. One of the problems of the teacher 
taking charge of situations, is that it can have the affect of both predictability, 
curbing creativity and making the work appear visually uniform. This as I 
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have claimed, cannot constitute aesthetic experience, since individuality in the 
Kantian sense, is missing from this experience. In this respect, one often finds 
that when the teacher takes control of the art or design work, the work reflects 
the teacher's interest and not that of the student. Similarly, one could argue, 
that the student's imagination is being curtailed, since it is the teacher 
dictating the terms of the work and its subsequent understanding. If the 
teacher has too much of a say in the direction and development of the work, 
students lose not only interest in the work, but become unable to articulate 
what they are producing in a genuine sense. This happens because the 
ownership of such experience is not the student's, but is felt to be that of the 
teacher's. The student comes to articulate someone else's thoughts and ideas. 
This then leads to all kinds of difficulties, for one soon comes to realise that 
ŸẀVŤĚthe aesthetic experience is not the student's own experience, his or her 
recognition, understanding and perception does not stand up to scrutiny, when 
being questioned about his or her work. 
Let us now consider whether there is a need in art and design 
education for the teacher to insist upon a systematic approach, in order to 
demonstrate the consistency and realism of the work. The kind of student 
aesthetic activity and its learning that Kant emphasises, is from the side of 
self-expression, from the execution of an intuitive experience without ulterior 
aim, an experience preoccupied with its own distinctions and images within a 
social context. The argument being that aesthetic experiences presuppose 
creativity, because such imaginative experiences do not imitate but are created 
from self-ascription and discovery. If art and design experience is essentially 
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an imaginative experience then how can one insist that student experiences be 
acquired through a systematic study? How can one insist further still, that 
design objects or works of art are created in this fashion? Certainly, the 
teacher must insist on accountability, but accountability, as suggested, comes 
in many forms. I have discussed previously Wittgenstein' s view on this, but it 
is worth reminding ourselves that accountability in his terms, comes about 
when there is a correspondence between what is seen, its application and 
expression. To appreciate this, it could be that the art and design teacher 
needs only to develop ways whereby learning situations and teaching are 
designed to take account of these factors but not perhaps through some kind 
of predetermined and systematic study, as this would negate how one 
experiences aesthetically. A systematic study implies that once I have 
exhausted" A's" experience I can then move onto "B's" experience and so on, 
but this would be a rather artificial and misleading way of understanding 
creativity . 
In rejecting outright any systematic view, what can one put in its 
place that will allow us in educational terms to determine and understand 
properly art and design work? Certainly one may agree with Wittgenstein' s 
argument concerning sensation-language use, but as I have indicated, in the 
Kantian sense, this is not enough. In the intuitive---cognitive sense, art and 
design experiences happen to involve spontaneous and reflective responses. 
Yet, quite clearly, such a response, may be objected to on the grounds that it 
involves a content of thought which would not be systematic, that one could 
not follow logically the art and design argument construction. An adequate 
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response to this line of confused logic, is that a systematic approach would not 
reveal, in art and design terms, what one should consider necessarily as 
consistent and justifiable. It is not a systematic approach that matters, but 
whether the art and design experience in question creatively reflects the way 
that people connect visual space and its understanding. I have already 
indicated how different perceptions can affect art and design experience, but 
this point needs further discussion later in this work, in order to explain how 
Kant sees that perception includes an imaginative content. 
In dealing further with this problem of educational accountability, the 
root of the aesthetic for Kant, requires an obligation on the part of the person 
doing the experiencing, an obligation that is, to seek and establish one's own 
voice. As indicated, this could only be achieved by imaginative means. 
Kant's position seems to be that when the imagination is in free-play it is 
"productive", an "originator" of experience itself. The recognition that the 
imagination is a "productive" and "original" experience seems in a certain 
light to touch the nerve of what art and design education involves. The 
concern is, that the aesthetic does not constrain the individual, but confirms 
the imaginative mind of the subject's aestheticism. For this to happen, the 
aesthetic, as Ernst Cassirer mentions, is intuitive, it has no need necessarily to 
link propositions, knowledge, concepts and reasons according to strict rules of 
deduction, for: "All living things owe the individuality of their particular 
being to the specific form actual in them ... " (1981, p.282), that is to say, to 
realise the character of one's experiences and their independence. The point 
being, that one cannot realise the character of one's experience without 
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independence of mind. Kant argues first of all, that this specific character is 
none other than intuition, a capacity which all human beings have, a capacity 
which Kant thinks is central to independent thinking, knowledge and a 
determining ground for sense experience. Now, for the art and design teacher 
this has important consequences. If one agrees with Kant and Cassirer on 
this, then the role of the teacher here is to devote his or attention to helping 
the students realise and express themselves, in part, intuitively. One of the 
distinctions here is, for example, that a historical or a contemporary exhibition 
of objects and paintings requires that the students on the one hand, should be 
able to distance themselves from the work, while on the other, display a sense 
of human affinity and common capacities with certain objects or paintings in 
the museum or gallery. But is this enough? In art and design one should be 
ŸȚẀŨĚfrom a teaching point of view, of this notion of "distancing" oneself 
from the art and design work, in some detached way. A similar argument is 
often made, in certain art and design curricula, that students should 
demonstrate a "balanced" view. 
The argument in support of an intuitive response comes in one sense 
from the way some artists and designers use notebooks, models and 
preliminary drawings to record their perceptions. As Richard Serra wrote of 
I.e Corbusier's sketchbook drawings: "They represent such a simple way of 
noting a very complex involvement with space. A few lines will summarise a 
building on a mountain top, the road leading to, the horizon; the sea. He 
made drawings of everything that interested him in a given day, in a given 
place; entire towns, ports, Egyptian tombs, ships, aeroplanes, cows, giraffes, 
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monkeys, anything, everything. One might want to dismiss his notations as 
cursory doodles, until one sees that a drawing of the most trivial subject will 
end up becoming a source for his architecture. Whether he draws his hand or 
a hydraulic dam, it all becomes reference material. If you look at the 
notebook you realise that Ronchamp is a combination of the most diverse 
source material, a mosque, a periscope, a dam, a crabshell, the prow of a 
ship" (1992, pp.19-21). At first glance at least, these intuitive drawings 
were not drawn with a reference to some detennined and definite purpose in 
mind, but rather are imaginative responses to visual stimulus. The drawings 
themselves, have a felt quality which cannot be grasped conceptually, for the 
life of the drawings are presupposed by a feeling response that lies upon the 
very texture of what is being experienced. Such drawings do indeed reveal 
VŬŸŤWUÙŪŦĚabout Le Corbusier's thinking, but one would be hard pushed to 
realise this, if the felt quality of the work was removed. Indeed, an aesthetic 
experience can move us, without knowing the set of features which brings this 
about. One might regard intuition as a crucial principle of not just art and 
design practice, but of education in general. Kant's contribution in relation to 
the aesthetic argument is that the individual brings something unique of itself 
to the work, something which is rewarding and precious that can weaken or 
extend all manner of supposed knowledge and understanding. Education must 
learn to cultivate and appreciate "private" experience which appears contrary 
to Wittgenstein' s thoughts. The whole point of this experience is that it 
awakens a more sustained sense of self-experience in action, for the aesthetic 
experience allows us to touch the depths of our centre of consciousness. This 
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happens because self-expression is in contact with the totality of one's 
experience which has the capacity through creative experimentation to exploit 
and recognise relations in a responsible and relevant manner. The object's 
sense aesthetically, has many relations. To exploit ways of n seeing n , 
presupposes an imaginative content which cannot by definition, be derived by 
standards of measurement. This is an issue that deserves to be taken further 
because if there is no standard test of success which determines imaginative 
experience, how does the art and design teacher maintain and develop 
standards of learning? 
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3.6 
The fact that a drawing may be a thumbnail sketch, a doodle, a 
polished drawing, drawn by rote, or by formula, is not the issue here, for all 
these drawings may have their place in the art and design learning process. 
For Kant, a drawing by formula may be as intense and moving as a drawing 
by observation. The reason being, that creatively what seems to matter is 
whether a drawing captures in spontaneity or reflection an aesthetic 
experience. Put another way, the imagination as a sense of feeling, is the 
ground for an aesthetic judgement. By conceptualising creatively, the student 
must learn to condition his or her responses to an object. However, the 
teacher should be aware of the fact that in any kind of drawing or 
ÜŸŨĤÜŠÛÙŪŦHĚthe naivete of its conception or the clumsiness of its execution 
are further factors that can influence the sense of learning and understanding 
that has taken place. What the student is considering in his or her art and 
design work, must as Pears argues in learning terms (p.333), involve 
discovery. For unless the students are aware of what they are doing they will 
never be able to maintain any proficiency in their work. Two points seem to 
follow that affect a notion of proficiency in art and design. Firstly, as 
mentioned, a student's centre of consciousness differs from one student to the 
next. This in tum has the aesthetic effect that our perceptions are 
constructed to various degrees on different spatial frameworks. Secondly, if 
one considers Wittgenstein' s notion that everything is dependent on the 
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perception, then our ability to see and interpret will also affect one's 
proficiency . 
The importance of an intuitive and creative experience must not be 
underestimated in education. There are several reasons which seem to support 
my argument on this point. It might seem, that there are certain difficulties 
about how much, for instance, it is possible for a three-year-old's drawing to 
have a spontaneity and creativeness that confirms not only an imaginative 
mind, but confirms a deliberate attempt to construct meaningful expression and 
understanding. Drawings of this kind are indeed sophisticated as any 
three-year-old will show you. As an intuitive and cognitive-feeling 
experience, a three-year-old's drawing is operating at one level by what is 
seen, although it is worth pointing out that what is seen here may be a 
spontaneous and imaginative response. Yet, such drawings represent through 
the freedom of imaginative experience almost a disregard for what constitutes 
certain established conditions of understanding, if one sees understanding, that 
is, in strict terms. Drawings of this kind seem to conflict and challenge in the 
process, institutionalised ways of working, as they do not obey 
predetermined thought out plans. Furthermore, one must dismiss, any 
thoughts that spontaneity and intuitive understanding are inconsequential, for, 
as Edith Cobb argues, spontaneity and creativity are essential elements in the 
health and growth of the child (1993, pp.15-6). Connected to this, is that 
Cobb sees spontaneity and creativity as attempts to extend one's fulfilment 
through an exploration of one's environment (p. 30). Thus to explore one's 
environment in any meaningful way, requires, Cobb argues, that every child: 
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"must integrate a world image with body image in order to know where and 
who he is" (p.16). Here, the argument that Cobb is further constructing, is 
that infants can only learn to create a sense of themselves and their 
environment through the making of their own cultural history in creative 
tenns. To deny the individual the space to be creative, may result, according 
to Cobb, in severe depression, loss of identity and schizophrenia (p.75). Her 
argument centres on the fact that: "I would say that the child is deeply aware 
of himself as an unfolding growth phenomenon, a living bit of spatiotemporal 
extension. His entire body is a figure of 'the principle of expectancy', 
temporal sequence and spatially changing form. The small child is, in fact, 
consistently, even when nonverbally, concerned about when and where events 
will happen, even before he is able to think in terms of how or why" (p.37). 
ŸHĚbabies will cry if they feel too hot, cold, or uncomfortable, or 
perhaps when they become awakened from a deep sleep when a sudden strong 
light is cast in their eyes. They smile at us and touch our face and one, too, 
feels a sense of their wonder and being in the world. Such experiences 
stimulate the senses and the perceptual discovery that these human beings and 
their environment can play a vital role in the creative process. Educationally, 
to mould clay, to ride a bicycle, to blowout candles, to paint, to build straw 
structures, to grasp a string of rope and feel its texture, to cut out shapes and 
so on for oneself, represents a sense of achievement and an awareness of 
oneself in the world. Touching and feeling a piece of string can be thought 
provoking and may indeed be for the learner a formidable experience. By 
making and exploring objects and events, children learn to transform their 
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environment and with it an understanding of themselves fashioning and 
perceiving these changes. The student gets to understand him or herself when 
he or she discovers and creates in time and space. As the individual moves 
from infancy, "latency" and adolescence to adulthood, much of our non-verbal 
understanding of things gets pushed to one side, to make room, it seems, for 
more intellectual and semantic experiences. Yet, it is doubtful whether our 
intellectual and semantic experiences could exist without the child's creative 
responses being present in such development. In art and design, one learns to 
make one's own world through one's creative powers that sense and evoke the 
consciousness of being. 
To recall, one might think that there is a certain indeterminacy in art 
and design, in that such work is not designed as predetermined instances that 
ȚŬŸŬŴĚrules. Kant never thought, however, that the aesthetic was haphazard, 
but rather represented a unity of experience. Apart from Kant's important 
argument concerning how purposiveness would condition this experience, it is 
clear that in order to avoid any indeterminacy and to demonstrate a "unity of 
experience" in art and design education, the student ultimately needs to show 
how he or she is able to observe, imagine, analyse and create in various ways. 
In the Wittgensteinian sense, as I have claimed, the student needs to identify 
and construct by seeing and interpreting what corresponds in some sense to a 
public recognition of aesthetic understanding. To understand an expression 
created by aesthetic means can only be answered, as Kant surmised, by an 
explanation of the specific aesthetic response. In analysing the aesthetic, one 
must judge according to the response, for as Kant mentions, one cannot 
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determine the aesthetic prior to finding out what our responses are to the 
object (C!, intro. VIII, 191). The teacher then should not restrict what a 
student's response should be to a given object, as the point is to allow the 
. student to explore the depths of his or her own mind. 
The above points perhaps can be put another way. What happens, 
for instance, when students are only given a pair of scissors, some glue and 
some colour paper to work from. The task the teacher gives to the class in this 
situation, is to cut out paper animals, flowers, or groups of figures, that one 
saw from yesterday's school trip to the zoo. In this situation the class is asked 
to join these objects together so that they form a collage of their experience 
from the zoo. What might one expect from this experience to avoid the label 
that such work is indeterminate? In this example, the visual experience is not 
predetermined, nor is the teacher dictating the expression and its use. Each 
drawing would, no doubt, be individually executed and through discussion, 
action and exchange of views, the form and content of these drawings would 
begin to take shape. Working in this way, owes nothing, as Oakeshott (1959, 
pp.12-4) claims (and this is no different from Wittgenstein's or Kant's 
position), to an externally imposed standard; the participation and expression 
is dependent on how students exercise their imaginative powers. Similar 
stories may be told here relating to going to the fair, a trip to the beach, a 
puppet or clown show, a novel that one has recently read, an artist's work in 
a gallery and so forth. The teacher is not determining the experience, as he or 
she is leaving this up to the students to decide. At one level, the significance 
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of this is that students through imaginative free-play strive towards an honest 
showing of their own thoughts and feelings. 
What students must decide in such a situation as this, is how to 
establish and construct their particular experiences so that they communicate 
in a visual and aesthetic sense. The problem is, of course, that one cannot 
predetermine such experience, and indeed, it may take some time to put this 
experience together. It would be unsatisfactory for the teacher not to realise 
this, for the student may have to explore many impressions, conversations and 
feelings that he or she had at the zoo, much of this experience being 
fragmented or layered with several images. To get at this experience and to 
understand its meaning the students may have to play first of all with this 
content and manipulate the imagery so that it reflects their own engagement. 
ŸŤĚstudents use the drawings, notes and leaflets that they have made and 
collected at the zoo to help construct their work, as such material can act as 
"memories" of their experiences. The teacher may decide to help this process 
along, by asking the students to recall what the weather was like, what kind of 
sounds did particular animals make, what kind of skin or fur did certain 
animals appear to have, what kind of facial expressions did they express, and 
whether these animals were small or large, and whether they all had tails, what 
animal rides did they go on and so on. Perhaps as it stands, one might question 
what this has got to do with creative experience. Let us then develop this 
argument further. 
To begin with, the teacher is attempting to stimulate in an 
imaginative way, thoughts and feelings about what the student might have 
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experienced at the zoo. The difficulty here is that there is no standard of 
success that the student can tum to for guidance in determining the work, 
because each piece of work must be judged on its own merits and the student 
must learn to respond to the work as it is developing. One problem here 
relates to the material itself, which is by no means an easy medium to work 
with in order to get across one's personal experiences. Working within these 
limitations, in one respect, would have to involve an imaginative experience, 
since one could not cut up any shape to represent successfully one's 
experience. For example, the skin of an alligator would be different to the 
skin of a spider or monkey, and the student who was interested in getting this 
experience across in his or her work, would have to explore various ways 
whereby this impression could be expressed as one intended in collage form. 
ŸWĚis more, the way that one would handle the skin of a alligator to the skin 
of a spider or monkey, suggests further differences in the handling alone that 
the student should learn to notice. Among the difficult problems that a student 
will have is how to build and communicate the structure and form of the 
object. The power to make, one might well argue, is essential to 
understanding and hence to education, at it involves the ability to know. One 
comprehends oneself in the making process as one learns to construct one's 
thoughts and what they express. Yet, the teacher knows that there are limits to 
what can be expressed given the level of understanding and experience that 
students may have and will therefore design their lessons with this in mind. If 
the argument under discussion is dependent on student interpretation, then it 
would seem that this kind of interpretation is dependent on the seen. One 
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cannot suppose that the seen is referring purely to observation, as it seems that 
the seen is not restricted to just this experience. The teacher understands that 
such objects need to be imaginatively constructed if one is to capture 
something of the quality of the experience. None the less, not wishing to 
discuss interpretation, since this issue has been previously debated, one is led 
to consider what the teacher's role should be in student interpretation. 
From a creative and imaginative point of view, the teacher realises 
that his or her students will not make a success of this experience unless their 
attention and experiences are selective and they can delve into the character of 
this experience. In this instance, it would not be possible to include 
everything that a student saw, experienced and recorded, as this would include 
a lot of material that (1) may not be relevant to the exercise, (2) the time scale 
inyolved would itself impose limitations on selection, (3) it is not possible to 
capture everything that one has experienced and (4) it is in the nature of art 
and design that one wants students to be selective. It remains, for example, 
that one of the possible things that a teacher might be looking to see from a 
student is how he or she is using materials. A student using cotton wool to 
represent the particular quality of a sheep's coat, would have found a way of 
communicating perhaps the warm sensuous side that one often associates with 
this animal. However, one must be careful here, for all kinds of materials 
could be used and the problem is also one of handling the material and the 
relation that this has to the pose or gesture that one is attempting to capture. 
The teacher's role in this kind of exercise is partly to encourage 
selectivity as an ongoing successive concern in respect of materials, spatial 
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ȘŬŪVÙTŤŲŠWÙŬŸVHĚtonal values, textures and so forth. According to Kant, when 
the student response is singular they bring to bear his or her own individuality 
into the work, and can focus more thoroughly on certain aspects, which would 
. otherwise be ignored. For example, a student is interested in exploring an 
elephant he or she saw at the zoo. Now to begin with this is not an unusual 
experience, for it follows a tradition in art and design experience, that starts 
with Stone Age cave drawings and includes Rembrandt Hannensz Van Rijn, 
lean Millet, George Stubbs, Vincent van Gogh, Pablo Picasso, Ettore 
Sottsass, and more recently the Gennan painter Georg Baselitz all of who, in 
one form or another, draw upon this kind of perceptive experience. One 
might, as a response to this, ask what grounds are there for saying that such a 
drawing has the potential to be an important element in learning? The teacher 
knowing this, might ask his or her students to consider how the elephant was 
walking and how one might capture this experience. Alternatively he or she 
might ask the students to consider how they would get across the scale and 
weight of this elephant into their collage, if they felt it was necessary. There 
is without doubt, many ways this can be achieved, but it seems important that 
one should, through individuality, know how one selects, perceives and makes 
connections of these kinds. It is one thing, however, to note that the elephant 
was limping and quite another to know how to capture this experience in 
sculptural, collage or pencil form. What needs pointing out here, is that the 
building of structure and form is a complex business in art and design practice 
that requires in part, an ability to handle materials in respect of understanding 
not only how the material responds but how the material can be manipulated. 
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It is not just the fact that one has noticed that the elephant was limping, but 
how does one communicate the sense of this in visual language? To further 
complicate the issue, there is the picture arrangement, the composition of 
which will also affect how the experience is communicated, not forgetting that 
the experience may be whimsical, a straightforward observation, a sad 
experience, a colourful or magical experience and so forth. Never having 
worked with these materials before, the student notices that the materials have 
limitations, but also possibilities that seem somewhat unique to the materials 
and the tools themselves. Some of the images that this person draws are in 
profile, others are in perspective and others seem flat. Suppose furthennore, 
that part of the background is in paper-chains, one of the figures is silhouetted 
against what appears to be a mountain range, another figure has one of its ears 
missing and standing next to this figure is a lion which has a huge head in 
relation to its body, offset against this is a small animal figure in the corner of 
the collage which appears to be shivering. One could go on with this 
description adding more detail and observation to the work. But if this 
experience presupposes imagination and description, and it seems to me that it 
does, one might say that these features, as aspects of the work itself, can 
become important in the way that one justifies the relevance and objectivity of 
the experience. 
However, Kant's argument asserts that the student's imaginative work 
and his or her subsequent pleasure attached to this experience would as 
Makkreel points out (pp. 46-7), be tied to some definite form of an object, 
such as an elephant. In other words, one's imagination has to conform to the 
223 
laws of understanding. What this means is that when art and design positively 
embrace this concern, it does not treat such experience as anything other than 
primary. In making a drawing of an elephant, Makkreel goes on to say: 
"aesthetic judgements are comparable to perceptual judgements" (p.52) as in 
saying that the elephant's colour was grey or the monkey's fur was soft. Here 
visual and tactile qualities correspond to our perceptions. But such 
perceptions are not merely sensible properties of a certain object, as they may 
also embrace or conflict with imaginative responses. The teacher knows that 
one can tum such experience into something else. A student may use an 
elephant, for example, in a metaphorical sense to represent perhaps a symbol 
of strength and wisdom. The fact remains, however, as Wittgenstein 
recognised, that my observation of an object may not coincide with my seeing 
of this object, for what I see may relate to an interpretation of the object, but 
not from the point of view that this seeing can necessarily be observed in the 
object. The argument that one might deny Wittgenstein here, is that while I 
may abstract a felt quality from the object, this felt quality is nevertheless 
something which I would have observed in the object. Can one say that this 
felt quality is anything other than an observed experience, albeit an 
imaginative one? It would seem, that observation and seeing often coincide. 
While in the ordinary sense one can assert that the colour of the 
elephant was grey, to paint this elephant would require a great deal more than 
just the application of the colour grey. It would seem that if one thinks of an 
elephant in observation terms one would invariably be thinking of its size, its 
mass, its scale, its movement, its three- dimensional form, its different skin 
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qualities and so on. But the difficulty is, that to draw, make or paint such an 
animal of this kind would in one sense relate to what one is observing. 
However, observing would also involve an intuitive and imaginative response 
towards this animal. It is by no means clear that the student could analyse 
what is being observed any better than what is being intuited. For the 
observation and the intuition both have their problems, which are not 
necessarily related, but can overlap. It is a requirement here, in this drawing, 
that not only should the student realise that the elephant has a certain shape, 
colour, texture and so on, but that he or she knows how to bring this 
experience to life. I see no way that one could bring to life certain 
experiences in art and design, without the content of such experience being 
dynamically related and interconnected to different perceptions that capture 
WUŸĚcharacter of this particular experience. In art and design education, it is 
difficult to know how one could capture an experience by how one simply 
classed or typed an object. For while the student can be claiming to be 
talking about a "pin", a "rod", a "cup", a "bowl", a "handle", a "wheel", a 
"wedge" and a "timber" surface, the maker, as David Pye asserts (1988, 
p.24), is concerned with what kind of individual shape and arrangement the 
student is talking about, what kind of intricate device or function such forms 
belong to? The distinction is, that while in many cases a maker will need to 
know what he or she is making, simply knowing how such an object is classed 
may not tell the maker very much about the particular object that they have to 
make. It seems that an object embodies many qualities which do not belong 
to any class of object. It follows that if a student is to make an object, the 
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making of this object requires an understanding of a range of particular 
qualities which such an object possesses in order to make it properly. Thus, 
the students understanding would relate to a range of particulars only. But the 
problem with this, is that even these particulars need interpreting, for the 
quality of finish in any object presupposes many sensitive judgements (refer 
back to Gerrit Rietveld's Red and Blue Chair). 
If one examines the worked surface that a maker has used to cut into 
some material, one soon realises several things. That the depth of the cut, its 
width, its length, the angle of the cut and the serrated edge of the cut, have to 
be seen against the density, opaqueness, transparency of the material, the age 
of the material, the diversity of colour and texture, the effects of wear, the 
shadows which the cut makes, and other such qualities, when taken together 
in experience, are not factors that can be described as purely conceptual. To 
enquire further into this, one might ask why it is common practice in art and 
design education, for the teacher to say to students: "look and see" or "look 
closer at"? It is worth pausing to see how this comes about, for what the 
teacher is suggesting by this comment, is that one should in certain 
circumstances, unequivocally, "look and see" and learn from this experience. 
That the "looking and seeing" of these features described above can leave us 
with impressions too subtle and sensitive to be picked up, at times, by 
language use. The assumption is, that there may be qualities in seeing that 
cannot be grasped strictly by concepts. When it comes down to it the answer 
to what is educationally sound in art and design cannot be given purely in a 
verbal interpretation; one needs to "look and see". The misconception that 
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needs to be rebutted here is that "look and see" does not explain anything. In 
an analogous sense, could one not imagine uses for "look and see" to be 
sensibly employed? Certainly, the teacher would have an idea of why he or 
she wants the students to "look and see" but not necessarily in the form of "tell 
me what this object is". In looking and seeing one may be simply stressing the 
point that one should examine this experience more closely. Furthermore, if 
one takes our current example of the kind of marks that a maker can make, the 
different visible features that the student can pick out of from this experience 
often seem to depend further on "memories", intention, other formal aspects 
of the object, one's sense of touch, and the "mood" that he or she is in. 
These factors are not studied one by one, but involve in imaginative terms the 
participation of play and its unity. Of course, it is possible to neutralise or 
ip.ore some of the elements which seem to serve our experience, but if so, 
does this not change our experience and thus perhaps what is educationally 
important in learning? What kind of educational practice would one be 
construing if one attempts to dismiss what is affecting, without due 
consideration, our sense-perceptions in art and design experience. 
The above argument, also requires us to note that it is not always the 
case that what one observes purely according to our sensation-language use 
will add anything to our conceptual understanding. Our observation and 
conceptual understanding may merely stand as a relation to one another, as 
opposed to criss-crossing each other's boundaries. In which case, there may 
be differences in each of these terms that cannot be reconciled or be merged 
together. When this happens, it is possible that our sense-impressions, as 
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Kant thought, are ones of feeling, a coexistence between understanding and 
imagination. In other words, the particular experience that the student is 
having cannot be clearly categorised and sensation-language typed. When 
one describes an experience the teacher may expect the student's reply to be in 
the form of sensation-language type, but can it be claimed that I am holding 
my understanding of this experience purely in these terms? The teacher knows 
that by looking at the art and design work that this is indeed not the case. 
Similarly, one should not assume that a sense-impression which cannot be 
categorised because of the nature of the experience, makes it necessarily 
inferior to one which can be categorised. It is arguable, that an experience 
which cannot be so defined in sensation-language terms, may be extending 
itself into a deeper level of experience, which the sensation-language type 
cannot comprehend because of the limitations imposed by its categorisation. 
What seems to influence aesthetic understanding most, is how one 
sees the object now, as this experience influences the next step that one takes. 
How one is seeing it now, fonns the significance for us, it is this 
understanding that brings about seeing the connections that the student needs to 
make in his or her work. The view, however, that the aesthetic might 
correspond to sensible perceptions must be treated with caution, for as Kant 
claimed, what is apprehended in aesthetic form, as Makkreel points out: "is 
not just perceptual shape, but a purposiveness" (p.61). The assertion being, 
that the student's response to a given object on aesthetic lines perceives the 
object according to a mutual relationship between imagination and 
understanding. That is to say, that it is this experience which is in part 
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responsible for the actual object in aesthetic terms. The distinction is, that it 
makes no sense for the teacher or for that matter anybody else, to try to judge 
or experience such objects capable of being guided by concepts alone. 
However, it should be clear enough, that the character of the aesthetic 
reinforces the identity of the individual and with it his or her understanding of 
art and design experience. It is without doubt that what the individual is 
identifying is of the utmost importance to educational experience. 
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3.7 
It seems, in the main, that although the aesthetic in art and design is a 
visual or other sense-experience this does not necessarily imply that the sort of 
ability that one should expect students to develop is only one of a direct 
observational kind. For instance, I can imagine objects floating around this 
room that for one reason or another intrigue me to the extent that I want to 
capture this experience in a painting. The point being, that aesthetic 
expression is not dependent solely on observational work, and even if it were 
(see Rembrandt's gold helmets), one might suspect that there is more to this 
kind of experience than just a simple observation. In the case of aesthetic 
judgement, Kant sees the representation of the work as a valid one because it 
confonns to cognition in general (C/, §9, 217). Thus the concern is, from a 
teaching point of view, that this cognition in general (imagination and 
understanding) presupposes in part the aesthetic feeling response and its 
sensibility. Let us investigate this further. An art teacher may decide to use 
music to stimulate a different kind of painting, or blindfold their students so 
that they draw and paint from what they touch. Here, the concept of "seeing" 
is of a different kind than that of observation. It is without doubt that one of 
the crucial elements of drawing, painting and making is bodily/tactile contact 
with the work, the materials and tools. Working on a computer does not give 
you this kind of experience, but the sense of touch and the quality of the 
material can be important to any drawing, painting or making (see the work of 
Frank Auerbach, Ian McKeever, Joseph Beuys, William Turner, Brice Marden 
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and Antoni Gaudi Y Cornet). In viewing what might be called the textural 
qualities of such work, the tensions, softness, rhythm, roughness and dynamic 
form of these lines and structures, must not be regarded from the painter's or 
the maker's point of view, as indeterminate mark-making, blemishes or 
imperfections in the painting or making. For the painter's brushstrokes and 
the maker's handling of various kinds of cuts, are intentional and often serve 
an underlying purpose to transform ideas. The way the body can move, the 
way the painter or maker swings his or her arm in different rhythms and 
intensity suggest that the sense of "touch" IS not arbitrary matter. The 
assumption being, that the sense of "touch" m the work is not driven by 
concepts alone, but may also involve sensations and perceptions which in turn 
produce concepts. One reacts with one's body whether one is aware of it or 
not, and for the painter or the maker this tactile contact and its experience can 
affect one's imaginative sensibility. Pedagogically, the teacher needs to be 
aware of these factors in order to direct and improve the student IS 
understanding of art and design experience. 
The first issue that I wish to raise here, which I take from 
Armstrong, is that the sense of "touch" can not only be defined in many 
different ways, but denotes more often than not a wealth of possible 
experiences. Secondly, this idea of "touch" is somewhat misleading, for if 
Armstrong is to be believed (1988, pp.127-9) there is no sense-organ that 
encompasses "touch". As Armstrong writes: "Perhaps this difficulty can be 
met by saying that touch does not involve a special organ but rather a special 
procedure: objects coming into contact with the flesh" (p.129). The problem 
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IS, that there does not seem to be any kind of exact procedure which the 
student of art and design can follow, for the sense of touch that the student is 
concerned with has to do rather with the perception of touch, which 
Armstrong calls beliefs about tactile perceptions (p.129). To apprehend and 
direct one's sense of touch, must as Armstrong mentions, involve stimulation 
and use. But since, according to Armstrong (p.129), there is difficulty in 
locating the sense-organ for touch, how does one know that "this" touch is 
influencing the perception? For Armstrong, one possible answer to this 
problem could be that the perception was stimulated by the sensation of touch 
such that the perception acquired was due to or bound up with the intention 
and stimulation of the touch itself. Thus, as a teacher, if I ask the students to 
grip their paintbrushes or jack-planes very tightly the perception of this 
experience may well modify their actions or the result of the work. This 
happens because the sense-perception involved due to the tension in the grip of 
the paintbrush or jack-plane is able to stimulate images, actions or feelings of 
a particular kind. Accordingly, it may seem that the sense of touch alone can 
have an important effect in stimulating ideas useful for art an design practice. 
From this, one can identify that the operation and stimulation of 
sense-perception can cause and extend students understanding of visual 
experience and thus its educational value. Yet, it may be dubious to argue that 
there is difficulty in locating the sense-organ of touch, for the sense-organ here 
relates to the skin itself, to one's grip of the plane. 
In dealing with touch, it can be useful for the teacher to point out that 
our sen sol)' receptors in our fingertips hold a greater concentration of sensory 
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receptors than in any other part of the body. One can distinguish, for 
instance, the contact of two points being together closer in our fingertips than 
in any other part of the body. This is significant as it demonstrates the 
sensitivity of our touch. Of course, knowing this, does not tell us what is 
immediately "felt" by touch experience. Now, one might conclude from this, 
that the visual experience of touch must be vague, but this need not necessarily 
be the case. If one combines with touch the visual impression of the marks 
that one is making, then the description itself may not be as indeterminate as 
one might think. I concur with Armstrong that this kind of experience, 
through the surface area of the touch, its pressure, bodily displacement, 
motion, and change, informs us about what is going on in our bodies and 
what is being immediately perceived by the sense of touch. On these lines, the 
teacher might deduce and exploit exercises that involve through touch, 
scratching the surface, painting with a twig, dragging the pencil, smudging, 
smearing, dry brush work, using various parts of the hand itself, chisel-edge 
paintbrushes, painting with a six foot paintbrush and comparing it with a one 
inch paintbrush, and using rags and rollers in the work. It would seem that at 
one level, one cannot talk about stimulation and use as though they work 
independently. When the student drags the pencil he or she is being stimulated 
by this sense-perception experience which in turn is influenced by the use of 
the sense-perception experience; the stimulation and use feed off each other. 
There is considerable scope here for the art and design teacher to discuss and 
be aware of the various relations that tactile experiences, can manifest. 
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Our aesthetic response to touch, however, is further complicated by 
the fact that in painting with a twig or in holding a jack-plane, what one 
perceives by touch, as Armstrong asserts (1962, p.ll), is via the twig or 
jack-plane. It is the feel of the twig or the jack-plane that my touch perceives, 
as my hand pushes, turns, drags, slides or scratches the surface of the work. 
But how far can one insist on this? If I am drawing or making an object in the 
snow my hands may be so cold, that physiologically this experience may be 
the dominant factor which influences the quality of the work, and not the 
instrument itself. No doubt possible concepts would interconnect with our 
touch perception, but this is exactly what the teacher would want his or her 
students to explore and recognise. Alternatively,. as Armstrong writes: "A 
hole in my tooth, can feel larger than it really is, when explored by the 
tongue" (p.12). In the same way, by keeping my eyes closed and feeling my 
face (eyes, nose, ears mouth, cheeks and so on in relation to the smoothness, 
roughness, coldness, hardness, convex and concave shapes and spatial forms) 
with one of my hands and recording this tactile experience on paper can 
change one I s understanding about touch and visual experience, in away, that 
is not possible by any other means. In touching one' s own body, there is the 
fact that two sense-organ areas are touching one another, which is not the same 
as touching an inanimate object. Furthermore, students could also consider the 
kind of pressure or resistance of pressure they are applying to the skin surface, 
for all of this can affect the visual impression. These kinds of exercises are 
important since they can encourage the student to consider further the notion 
as to what constitutes aesthetic experience and understanding. For in "seeing" 
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this shape, or in making a leg for a table the visual impression of this shape or 
the making of this table leg undergoes a variety of phenomenological 
judgements that can affect and determine one's procedure, imagination and 
method of experience. It follows, that there are a vast array of pedagogical 
turns that the art and design teacher can manipulate in order to demonstrate 
both the significance and accountability involved in art and design learning. 
Student's ability and learning may be further enhanced when one 
asks them to do a drawing in two minutes, then over a period of five minutes, 
and then over a period of twelve hours and so on. In each case, the time 
conditions are important aspects of aesthetic learning. As Kant identified, there 
are immediate and reflective experiences which are being evoked and revealed 
by how one perceives such experience through time and this detennines 
(along with space) in part, the kind of marks that one lays down in the work 
(CPR, A.33-B.54). Only when one draws a line, Kant argues (CPR,B.154) in 
the physical sense does the perception of what one may be thinking get 
determined, but that this determination is intuited by ourselves (CPR, B.156). 
One's awareness of the time factor as a length or magnitude of experience in 
the work, while being something that is given, is nevertheless constructed and 
determined by the student In the student's work itself, the intuition of time 
coexists with the spatial qualities of the object. Consequently, a student's 
understanding of the spatial qualities are held together by the factor of time, in 
that the shape, size, colour, proportions and their relationships "necessarily 
stand in time-relations" (CPR, B.51). There is then, nothing "unreal" about 
space and time in that all objects appear to be constructed by these conditions 
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of experience. But in order to identify in one loose sense what is "real" about 
a particular experience, A.J. Ayer argues (1976, pp. 76-9) , that the student 
must be able to discriminate and correlate under different conditions, the 
. properties through which an object presents itself in perception or as a 
concept. In which case, what is "real", as Ayer goes on to say, can be seen in 
many different ways. Now while I do not wish to explore any further what 
establishes realism, as this would lead me back into theoretical arguments, the 
issues that concern us here are that aesthetic experience presupposes what is 
real by the kind of perception, imagination and conceptual understanding that 
is being determined by the student. The art and design teacher is aware that 
this is not something that one can know in advance of the aesthetic work, for 
what is real about art and design work has to be perceived, and one can only 
identify what one is perceiving by constructing and analysing the experience. 
Thus one may safely say, as Kant does, that time and space are "two sources 
of knowledge" (CPR, B.55-A.39) upon which the aesthetic work is derived. 
One objection might be that our awareness of an object could be spontaneous 
which therefore may not give us any outward signs about our space-time 
construction. What is more, if our response is intuitive one may have to 
consider that this intuitive feeling is responsible for the experience and the 
space-time construction. The student may be learning the meaning of art and 
design experience from his or her intuitive feelings rather than from how he or 
she discriminated by space-time construction. The structure of experience, 
however, is affected by the properties which arrange our experiences for us. 
Intuitive or not, one depends to some extent on the connections that one is able 
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to build and this can only be realised by how the student puts together his or 
her spatial and temporal relations. A student is unlikely to argue his or her 
case properly without some reference that satisfy these conditions. Even so, 
there are difficulties about this. In art and design experience, not only may 
our spatial and temporal relations face in different directions, but to what 
degree is such experience "ordered" or "constructed"? The flow of the spatial 
and temporal construction may seep out or be saturated not in any linear sense 
but as an outburst of feeling. 
A crucial role here for the art and design teacher is that the student's 
work must be publicly perceptible in some manner, but one could argue that 
simply drawing a line on a piece of paper is a mark which can be identified 
publicly. The teacher wishes, of course, to infuse a better understanding of 
m.ark-making than this. Let us, therefore, explain further how the teacher 
might explore the connections of what is publicly perceptible in art and design 
learning and understanding. By getting students to rapidly produce a drawing 
of an object in three minutes will produce a different kind of experience than a 
drawing produced over three days. In each drawing, the experience is 
markedly different and moreover, so is the visual quality of the drawing. This 
happens because different tensions and perceptions are being extended over the 
work that lapse, relate and transcend over the different experiences that the 
student is encountering in the progression of the work. This can be shown by 
how a student dwells on an object, the different thoughts, feelings and 
perceptions that these situations entail. Equally, such experience also relates 
to the different meeting points of a drawing where the lines cross, the breaks 
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that one makes in a drawing between a curved shape and a straight line, by the 
geometry and rhythms, the changing thickness of the line, how a light touch 
meets a dark touch, the length of the line, the line direction, the compositional 
structure, the roughness of the line, the building up of different layers of line, 
the tonal changes in the line and the line's movement. One surmises from 
this, that the object details change as a consequence of what is being 
constituted in part by the time and spatial conditions that one constructs in the 
work. 
A further criticism that one might throw at any idea of spatial and 
temporal construction is when one is faced with an object or painting that 
involves several different issues in the work itself. If on the one side of a 
painting there is an image of a dog and on the other side of this painting there 
ÙŸĚan image of an apple, does one see the apple and the dog separately? If one 
can see the apple and the dog at the same time what kind of spatial and 
temporal view of the apple and dog determines the place or image of these 
objects? It may seem that one does not construe such an experience as just an 
optical one, for a thing of beauty is dependent on how it feels not on how it 
looks. Similarly, what happens when an object involves multiple imagery, 
for how does one then envisage the spatial and temporal locations? Many 
objects and paintings have a variety of features to them and one may not be 
able to neatly separate out the images, colours, forms or spaces that seem to 
occupy and inform these works. It is common practice in making or painting 
that the teaching approach attempts to encourage the student to interchange and 
build different areas, reworking and reconstructing reciprocally as an ongoing 
238 
concern in the work itself. This manner of working is complex, as many 
elements of this experience are determined by a variety of sense-conceptual 
conditions that are being realised and developed in different ways. The 
teacher knows that one's understanding of such work and its subsequent 
development is not dependent on identifying and experiencing these different 
aspects separately, that the strength of the work lies in being able to imagine 
these aspects together. There are various times in the work when the student 
must refuse to judge the work as though certain features such as line, space, 
colour, scale, proportion and so on, exist independently of other compositional 
factors. Educationally, this is an experience where the correctness changes in 
part against the object. Of course, one may be able to analyse particular 
features in the work separately and the teacher may feel that this is necessary 
in order to appreciate and develop an understanding of the object or painting 
sense. But, one must reject any attempt that one can purely understand the art 
and design work through this kind of approach. The verdict is, that it may be 
counter-intuitive to claim that one's spatial and temporal understanding must 
be understood in this way. It does not follow that by analysing particular 
areas of the work that the "place" or "location" of these features are identified 
in this way. Certainly, the teacher can say to a student, that the back of the 
chair that he or she is making needs further development or that this house, or 
tree in the landscape that the student is painting needs more reworking. But 
the teaching practice involves much more than this, as the teacher is aware 
that there may be any number of impressions maintaining the image of the 
chair, the house or the tree. To deal with these kinds of problems it is 
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standard practice in education for the teacher to be on the look out for 
personal commitment shown by the students, and a sign of this experience is 
when the students show that they are making transformations in the work. 
What is askew in the current argument is that one's imagination and 
intuition is often needed in order to feel the "presence" and the effect of these 
sense-impressions, ruling out any clear reference to spatial and temporal 
relations. The work being handled by the student often requires that what is 
observed connects various features of the work together. In the painting work 
of Signar Polke and Jasper Johns, references are made that point to past and 
present experiences, so much so, that the past and the present seem to overlap, 
coexist. In William Hogarth's A Rake's Progress, the portrayal is one of 
satire, of social commentary. The art and design teacher is aware that this 
ŴŸÛĚhas a rich vein of humour and pathos which penetrates into almost every 
scene of A Rake's Progress. What I am attempting to say is that these qualities 
are not factors that can be simply isolated, placed and examined as though one 
is analysing the stresses in a piece of timber, for to do so would be to miss the 
point of the experience. The imaginative expression of such work may only 
happen because there are other connections involved which at times may have 
to be experienced simultaneously in order to feel the full force and relevance 
of the work. The pathos and humour in A Rake's Progress, can often be felt 
as one experience and this is how in one respect, it should be. The portrayal 
of satire works in A RaJa:'s Progress because of the way that one is able to 
imagine and feel in one experience both the pathos and humour connecting and 
merging together. Here, because of the particular way that the pathos and 
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humour is handled in the painting, both of these qualities penetrate and overlap 
each other. Not surprisingly, the perception that one gets from this kind of 
experience poses problems in the way spatial and temporal notions appear to 
be operating, because such occasions depend on the play of a number of 
cognitive-feeling powers working and interacting simultaneously and 
cooperatively. To feel the "life" of the work means engaging in this process. 
The implications of the time and spatial conditions, presuppose a network of 
perceptions which interconnect and manifest themselves in different ways. Just 
how exactly time and space affect particular pieces of work is difficult to 
answer and deserves a more extended discussion than I am able to give. It 
seems unlikely, however, that one can claim that this kind of dynamical 
combined experience as heightened sensuous awareness, amounts to 
non-learning, for the acquisition of learning, as I have attempted to show, 
springs from many sources not all of which are disclosed in 
sensation-language. Learning cannot be seen as exclusive to either the 
Kantian or Wittgensteinian doctrines. A heightened sensuous experience 
presupposes learning of a certain kind that is crucial to the development of the 
art and design work. But it is true to say, that aesthetic judgements require 
that the students use their imagination in a responsible way, and this the 
students learn by developing arguments and correcting mistakes in the work by 
sharing, responding and testing their ideas with others. 
In any art and design learning process, one must not assume that a 
three-minute drawing must by definition be inferior to the three-day drawing, 
for all is dependent on what is experienced, seen, intended, reacted to, and 
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reflected upon; the intensity of the experience. Yet, even here there is an 
important time sequence that affects the intuition of the experience and thus 
our reaction to the work. Indeed, in general, a three-minute drawing will 
often have a quality to it that a three-day drawing cannot match and vice versa. 
Once again, the whole point of such experiences is to demonstrate how the 
picture quality of a drawing can change depending on whether a drawing is 
produced rapidly or slowly. Similarly, according to Wittgenstein, a student's 
approach to these kinds of exercises can vary from one student to the next 
because of his or her working method. In this instance one student may decide 
to concentrate on the outline of the fonns, working from the middle to the 
outside, another student may decide to work in this fashion, but produce a 
quality of line that is markedly different from the other student simply because 
the drawing fired his or her imagination and a third student, who feels the 
tension and pressure more than most, will also produce a different kind of 
drawing. In each case, this individuality seems crucially important to the 
development of the drawing and its creative effect and this is what the teacher 
should exploit. The teacher can do this, in one respect, by pointing out to 
students the kinds of "moves" that can colour one t s experience and the 
subsequent interpretation, but much of this would relate to particular 
circumstances. This is not to say, that the teacher would not discuss the 
general learning notions and ideas that students might have to consider in a 
project. So much so, that what the teacher raises in such discussions will 
often prove invaluable for the student in a number of ways. One obstacle here 
is, that one should recognise the fact that in art and design education, the 
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particularity of the experience, as I have often pointed out, is not from the 
cognitive to the sensuous or vice versa, but rather dynamically reflects an 
interrelated and total experience. In each drawing that students produce, 
whether it is a three-minute drawing, a three-hour drawing, or a three-day 
drawing, a different kind of control with their marks, contact with the 
surface, consciousness, mood and perception varies in connection with how 
they respond, feel and interpret these experiences imaginatively. The same 
thing happens if students are asked to do a diagrammatic drawing, a tonal 
drawing in black and white, a tonal drawing in colour, positive or negative 
spaces, a collage, a relief and so forth. 
As a counter-argument, one might suggest that the sense of touch, 
the consciousness that one could possess and one's mood and spontaneity in 
such drawings are indeterminate, but what does this mean in aesthetic terms? 
Whether touch, consciousness, mood or spontaneity are relevant or not is 
dependent not on whether such factors are indeterminate in logical-truth 
terms, but on the creative act-perception of these factors for artistic or 
design purposes. For Armstrong and Wittgenstein, one can treat 
act-perception as evidence or grounds upon which certain conclusions can be 
reached. If I say for example, that the marks in this drawing are bold and 
dynamic I can as a teacher point to such effects in the particular work and 
describe what I "see". In so doing, as Armstrong states: "I have provided my 
questioner with a reason" (1988, p.l44) for believing that such marks are bold 
and dynamic. Thus, while the student's perception of what is "seen" may be 
questionable, he or she has provided a means by which such experience can 
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be argued. In other words, what I take the object as, from the point of view 
of "seeing" the object, says something about what I know about this object. 
The argument is, that certain qualities which I have apprehended, as a 
consequence of "seeing" the object, provide me with a reason for stating what 
I "see". Armstrong's and Wittgenstein' s argument is that my perceptions 
represent part of how I apprehend reality. Of course, as I have shown, 
"seeing" may not quite be this straightforward. One case, against this kind of 
interpretation in art and design practice, is that aesthetically one can be 
aroused by a variety of stimuli which may very well modify the student's 
understanding through different encounters with the work. To amplify this, it 
is possible to claim that the object is bold and dynamic in various ways 
depending on how one is "seeing" the object. It may not be clear, therefore, 
that the description that I give, corresponds to how others might see the same 
features in the same object. They may well see the bold and dynamic features 
that I am describing, but see these bold and dynamic features differently, or 
see the same features but attach other meanings to them. It could also be that 
what I see as bold and dynamic is being attributed to other factors in the work 
that I have not noticed. It is not unusual for a teacher to suggest to students 
that the manner in which they have painted the objects in their paintings comes 
across as bold and dynamic because of the way they are drawn. Certainly, 
such comments must raise our concern for if the teacher is claiming that the 
objects in the drawing appear bold and dynamic, he or she must point out the 
contingent factors which make the objects bold and dynamic in this painting. 
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He or she might also point out some of the alternative ways in which such 
effects can be further achieved or extended. 
One of the arguments that further connects a student's object 
understanding, is that he or she must consider the meaning of the object as not 
being something conferred on the object as he or she encounters it; what the 
students create connects to other previous encounters with the object. The 
case being, that the teacher must encourage the student to reflect and bring to 
bear on the work previous experiences that they have acquired. The student 
can show perhaps what they have learnt from previous exercises by applying 
what they have learnt from these occasions. Here, the sophistication of the 
student's understanding about an object must mean that the student has 
examined his or her object in a variety of ways, distinguishing the fact that 
learning requires the modification of meaning, as new perceptions of thought 
and experience are identified. It is worth bearing in mind, however, as 
McAdoo argues (pp. 116-4), that a student may begin a project from an 
unlearnt starting point, despite the fact that he or she may be tapping into 
previous experiences. Each new experience that a student may tackle, poses 
some problems that he or she has not encountered before and it is these new 
aspects that may need particular attention. It does not follow, of course, that 
because a student has tackled the same project repeatedly that he or she have 
not learnt something new each time. The diversity of art and design 
experience allows the opportunity for a student to examine a particular issue 
repeatedly, but in different ways. Furthermore, a teacher of art and design 
may wish to go over certain experiences because of issues stemming from the 
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project's aesthetic complexity. For example, there would be many issues 
arising out of how the students would demonstrate that they understood 
still-life painting, for as any art and design teacher knows, what is involved in 
still-life painting has a long history and a practice that cannot be appreciated in 
one lesson. 
For the teacher, he or she will be looking for visual signs of 
alterations in students work, which mayor may not be derived purely from 
observation experience. What the teacher needs to recognise is the manner in 
which visual alterations in the work are an essential process in themselves, 
for such experience further enhances the student's understanding of art and 
design practice. Alterations transform the work. It represents a mark of 
significance, a feature of how the work is developing and an act of 
consideration and thought. There is often no way in which the student will be 
able to observe the affect of a certain quality in his or her work and its 
potential, unless he or she is able make corrections and changes. Moreover, it 
could be argued, that since meaning in art and design cannot be a 
preconceived experience, that the only sufficient and justifiable way that a 
student can assert and extend his or her visual understanding is by 
demonstrating a willingness to explore and discover. By altering the work, the 
student is provoking new experiences and perceptions of the work itself, as he 
or she is remodelling its arrangement, whereby the images, experiences and 
ideas that the student is working with are being reinterpreted and analysed. 
The premise being, that the process of alteration or reworking an object is a 
significant element of the learning experience because it demonstrates not only 
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that it takes time to make and to form ideas, but unless alterations are being 
made to the work (which again may be over a period of time), it becomes 
difficult to determine the extent to which such-and-such a person has or can 
show development in his or her understanding. Without modifying one's 
learning how can the student locate and place new aspects, or reveal different 
layers of experience and extended relationships? One of the difficulties that I 
have noticed students having in relation to this experience within an art and 
design context, is the way that students can allow the initial marks that they 
make determine the development of the drawing, painting or designed object. 
This is a recurring problem in the development of the work and particular 
attention should be paid to this issue. There are times when student will lack 
the confidence and critical ability in making aesthetic judgements in their t 
work and cling to what they know because it is "safe". Indeed, it is not 
unusual to be taken in by the sensuous nature of one's own experience, 
without determining how these sense-conditons are affecting the work. I ĦŸĚ. 
It might seem that Wittgenstein' s notion of "organisation" , 
sensation-language, perceptual knowledge and concept of meaning, are 
perhaps reasons that can prevent the student from reworking the object in 
certain alternative ways. The conflict here, is that these elements are often 
needed to develop one's creative understanding, even when such factors seem 
to point to another kind of thinking about art and design education. However, 
to see the potential in one's work, one may have to abandon any 
preconceptions that one may have, remove the problems that Wittgenstein 
poses about meaning, and work simply with one's spontaneity, its mood, and 
• 
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mner-sense experience. This experience can contribute to the student's 
understanding because it can open up new experiences that enlarge his or her 
awareness of certain aspects of visual expression and meaning. There may 
not be any logical sense to this approach that can be properly explained in 
definite conceptual terms, for to do so would be to give an artificial picture 
in which to judge this kind of experience. None the less, it could be argued 
that part of the teacher's responsibility is to set up situations whereby students 
have to consider, differentiate and compare objects through different 
approaches, so that perceptual and imaginative understanding can be acquired 
and developed in different ways involving different perceptions, behaviour 
and techniques. The temptation for the teacher and the student in learning 
terms, is to suppress one's feelings, momentary impulses or emotions, but 
from an art and design analysis these factors can strike at the very heart of 
creativity. As C.l.B. Macmillan writes: "Human beings may see, but we 
should remember that commenting on it in just this way may prevent more 
significant learning" (1995, p.45). 
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3.8 
The point has already been made, that while perception may be 
objective, as Kant thought (CJ, §2), such perceptions are not solely 
responsible for aesthetic representation, for aesthetic discrimination, as he 
argues, is apprehended by imaginative means. In other words, the form of the 
object aesthetically; is in free-play, an experience in character which is not 
necessarily contingent on knowing the object in purely conceptual terms. 
One's creative understanding is not attached to any clear system of thought 
because imaginatively I can judge the object's logical sense, as an aesthetic 
experience, by feeling alone. That as an experience, our imagination is 
attached in various ways involving sensory and conceptual understanding 
presupposing different relations that are sensed and thought. This requires one 
to see that learning in art and design involves imaginative experience not as 
forming a logical train of thought in a systematic fashion, but one that 
involves, as Kant claims, the conscious feeling of the mind and its state (Cl, 
§l). Kant's argument is, that the imagination allows us to experience objects 
that would otherwise not be possible to experience if one had to employ 
deterministic means of understanding. As remarked previously, it is tempting 
to think that it is purely our observations which determine and provoke 
aesthetic judgements, but if this were the case, all that the student or teacher 
need refer to and explain is the formal properties of the work. However, as I 
have indicated, there are cognitive-feeling states as well as 
sensation-language that can affect the play of our creative and conceptual 
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operations. Given that this may be the case, what are the practical 
implications of these concerns for education? Now, Kant's concept of the 
aesthetic in an interconnected sense, embraces perception, thought and 
imagination. Seen in this way, the teacher needs to be concerned with the 
fact that art and design experience, to various degrees, always involves a 
combination of these factors, but not in any definite order. 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant makes the case that imagination 
is responsible for perception (CPR, A.120-1). The contention is, that the 
possibility of experience, as Kant argues, necessarily rests on the individual 
being able to imaginatively produce a synthesis of knowledge or experience. 
Understanding, Kant argues, must have a synthesis through imagination 
(CPR, A.119). The premise seems to be, that all objects of sense to contain i 
ŸTŤŲVWŠŪTÙŪŦHĚare conditioned firstly by intuitive and imaginative means. As 
Kant writes in his footnotes: "Psychologists have hitherto failed to realise that 
imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself' (CPR, A.120). For 
Henrich (p. 36) the significance of this, is that imagination is always present in 
understanding, which as Henrich goes on to say "necessitated the move from 
an ultimately empirical aesthetic to an aesthetic founded upon transcendental 
principles" (p.37). The point of this remark, from a teaching side, is to 
suggest that aesthetic understanding cannot be purely understood or explained 
in terms of only the student's experience. The argument is, that by simply 
making references to one's "inner" self experience does not distinguish the 
particular way that all art and design objects are manifested. One can 
envisage, for instance, using the imagination to predict some future event as 
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one finds in the work of Hieronymus Bosch, or alternatively, one could hardly 
describe Marc Chagall' s paintings as connected to what is based on 
experience. For such work cannot be substantiated purely from this point of 
view. The argument being, that one can have intuitions, thoughts and ideas 
independent of an actual observed physical experience. It remains, however, 
that more often than not, there is a mutual dependence in aesthetic experience 
which in the Kantian sense, combines intuitive and conceptual sense 
imaginatively. Thus, the imaginative experience corresponds to intuitive 
experience, but to present the possibility of this experience in a tangible form, 
it is necessary for this experience, by imaginative means to be conditioned by 
concepts in general. 
The thesis that perception also combines imagination in Kant's 
thinking, needs further debate for as Strawson cites, Kant's understanding of 
imagination in the Critique of Pure Reason operates (1) to connect perceptions 
of different objects of the same kind in another dimension and (2) the 
imagination also connects different perceptions of the same object of a given 
kind (1970, p.33). One would also have to admit that it is possible to 
construct other arrangements of how such a perception and its imaginative 
connections could be further explored. For example, would it not be possible 
for a student to connect different perceptions of an object with different 
perceptions of several different objects. It is also possible that the students 
perceptions of the object before them bears no resemblance to this object and 
that what they experience of this object is not the object at all, but rather the 
effect of what surrounds the object itself, or alternatively, that the perception 
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of the object is an accumulation of different aspects of the same object. It 
should be obvious from this that one could keep adding different arrangements 
and combinations to our perceptions. What Strawson further explains about 
this is: " (1) that this sort of combination is dependent on the possession and 
application of this sort of concept, that is, that if we did not conceptualise our 
sensory intake in this sort of way, then our sensory impressions would not be 
combined in this sort of way; (2) that distinguishable perceptions combined in 
this way, whether they are temporally continuous (as when we see an object 
move or change colour) or temporally separate (as when we see an object 
again after an interval), really are distinguishable, that is different, 
perceptions" (p.39). 
In agreeing with Strawson on these Kantian points, one would also 
have to concede that our perceptions may be spontaneous and that such 
perceptions may be caused by the optical effect of the work and by what it 
means to "see" and to notice, in Wittgensteinian terms, an aspect of what is 
being noticed. For example, one argument here would be that I may see the 
cup in front of me, but I do not see this object as a cup at all, but as a storage 
jar for my pens and pencils. The fact then that I "see" the cup, does not mean 
necessarily that I see it as a cup, for as I have suggested, this object to me is 
not a cup, but a storage jar. To find out whether I was confusing the cup with 
a storage jar, may, of course, depend in part on my concepts of these objects. 
However, what this poses for art and design, is that the artist or the designer 
may have special reasons for sensing and constructing particular objects that 
have nothing necessarily to do with the sensing and constructing of physical 
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objects. That the student of art and design may not be interested in the fact 
that this object in front of him or her is simply a cup as if what confirms this 
object has to do with its actual physical existence. In this instance, he or she 
may justifiably argue that what confirms the actual physical existence of this 
object, at one level, has nothing at all to do with what logically confirms the 
existence of this object as purely a perception of epistemic, phenomenological 
and conceptual analysis, but rather, how one experiences such an object 
imaginatively. In learning terms, what one wants to handle in art and design 
tends to be those factors that will enable the student to construct a presence, 
ambience, character or mood in relation to the object, in such a way that the 
object's experience sustains aesthetically, feelings of life. Actual or not, the 
teacher knows that it is what is imagined that turns what one sees into 
something worth exploring. Perhaps, the pedagogical lesson to be learnt is 
that in taking the object as a cup, the student who is interested in giving this 
experience meaning, might investigate the object's history. This might entail 
exploring the object's family history, where it was brought, whether it was a 
present that was given to the student, its physical structure, its distinguishing 
features, how it is used, the student's particular interest in the object, the place 
'that this object has on the table, how one touches and feels the object, its 
weight, how it reflects colour and so on. 
Teaching-wise, one needs a practical perspective about imaginative 
experience that one can actually observe and apply to learning situations. To 
some extent this has been covered by Wittgenstein' s remarks, but 
questionably, one might construe that since the imagination in the Kantian 
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sense, is in free-play, the aesthetic must then lack some conceptual coherence. 
Indeed, one might think that because the student must be "free" to judge his 
or her own response to an object, Kant's analysis on the one hand vindicates 
the claim that the aesthetic is a personal response, but this might misconstrue 
Kant's other claim, as stated, that the aesthetic could be considered universal. 
Let us, therefore, discuss these two issues. Firstly, it could be argued, as one 
has seen throughout this work, that art and design experience is as 
conceptually coherent as it needs to be. That is to say, that the argument that 
the aesthetic makes is not purely conceptual (what is?) because what 
determines its value is subject to creative concerns. If one takes for granted 
that this is the case, one still might think that this kind of experience, because 
it is creative, is simply subjective. On the other hand, the difficulty that one 
has with this, is that it is misleading, at least in aesthetic terms. For what 
matters is not purely the conceptual coherence, but rather as Wittgenstein 
seems to argue in the general sense, whether the imagination relates to the 
situation of life in which it takes place. 
By suggesting that the aesthetic judgement can be objective, I am 
claiming that art and design understanding, in Wittgensteinian terms, must be 
in part descriptive of its expression, but also, that the work is related to the 
kind of experience that one is attempting to portray. The principle that there 
is a lack of conceptual coherence in aesthetic experience might seem confusing 
or incompatible with art and design understanding. For example, in relation to 
Frank Kafka's novel Meta11lOrphosis, Hertzberg writes: "Does the story show 
that one can, after all, remain the person that one is, even after ceasing to be 
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human (in the story, the insect clearly remains Gregor Samsa), or should it be 
discounted on the grounds of conceptual incoherence?" (1991, p.146). 
likewise, there is indeed nonsense in a great deal of painting, but as Hacker 
implies (p.185, Vol.In, part 1), there is nonsense and nonsense. One can find 
this nonsense in Marc Chagall' s paintings, in Paul Klee' s work and in much of 
"Primitive Art", but there is a serious side to this aesthetic nonsense that 
cannot be dismissed out of hand. The case being, that such work is not 
constructed arbitrarily. This factor alone should make us question what 
constitutes learning and understanding. Aesthetic education argues that Marc 
Chagall's or Paul Klee' s work brings to life experiences that reveal aspects of 
of some importance about our world. One can further question whether 
Kafka's story or Paul Klee's paintings are meaningful, by one's ability to 
imagine whether the characterisation of such work reflects something 
particular about life that seems worth expressing. The teaching in art and 
design, therefore, must be emphasising this kind of experience. 
Kant's analysis argues that: "humanity signifies, on the one hand, the 
universal feeling of sympathy, and, on the other, the faculty of being able to 
communicate universally one's inmost self-properties constituting in 
conjunction the befitting social spirit of mankind" (CJ, §60, 355). Of course, 
one could insist that Picasso's Cubist work is hardly representative, in one 
respect, of "real" physical objects, but there is nothing "false" nor naive about 
Picasso's perceptions. What seems to matter here, is whether one can justify 
and account for the perception's correspondence and its reality. Yet, one 
cannot account for the perception correspondence by claiming that one is able 
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to locate it "here" in one's visual field, which in any case would be 
impossible, as this would require that I can pinpoint with accuracy, at every 
step of the way, how the "this" of this particular perception can be found. To 
grasp Picasso's understanding of art, however, is first of all to recognise that 
there is an imaginative content involved in establishing the meaning of the 
experience. In the Kantian sense, as Makkreel argues: "Here interpretation is 
subject to revision introduced by the imagination's efforts to link sense and 
intellect and becomes as much a function of judgement as of reason" (p.112). 
Furthermore, one has no need to "locate" the perception in order to justify the 
experience, because I know what Cubism and what Picasso's particular 
perceptions represent without having, as Jackson argues (pp.120-1), to locate 
in the visual sense the meaning of the work. The crucial argument being that 
the visual sense, which is what the teacher is concerned with in art and design 
teaching, may not be dependent on any particular aspect of the work, because 
the way the work is constructed and developed connects and corresponds to a 
variety of reflective and immediate judgements. As mentioned, one may not 
be able to specifically place an aesthetic experience, but this has to be seen 
against the fact that art and design experience transcends boundaries. Thus 
the key argument for the teacher has nothing to do with the precise location of 
an experience, but rather, with how the pictorial sense is being portrayed 
through the argument that the student is constructing in his or her work. 
Similarly, the argument that Jackson makes, is that: "I can during a 
concerto, listen happily to the strings and unhappily to the piano. And that 
when I have a red and non-red after-image together, I am sensing red-Iy with 
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respect to one thing and non-red-Iy with respect to another. But what are these 
things with respect to which I am sensing, for there need, of course, be no 
appropriate physical thing in the offing? It is hard to see what they could be 
other than the mental objects of the act-object theory" (p.124). To establish 
then, the common argument that is often put forward about aesthetic 
experience, that, "I know what I like", may seem somewhat problematic. As 
the objection here, of course, is how do I "know" what I like, for clearly in art 
and design experience, much depends on what constitutes and determines one t s 
response and analysis of this perception and what is being observed and noted. 
Following this line of reasoning one can see why Wittgenstein was not 
generally in favour of ostensive definitions, for to point to an object, in this 
instance, as an explanation of "this is what I like", would not explain what is 
being distinguished aesthetically. In Wittgensteinian terms, "this is what I 
like" would not explain anything, for when he mentions that "Red is 
complex", his response is: "We are not familiar with any technique, to which 
that sentence might be alluding" (Z §338). I have also shown that perception 
differs depending on the kind of object and intention that one has in mind, but 
that this aesthetic perception can be shown to be accountable by the kind of 
work that the student produces. One has already seen that if the student 
wishes to establish certain perceptual and conceptual qualities in his or her 
work then he or she must do so by showing an understanding in the visual 
sense of what constitutes size, shape, distance, smoothness, texture, colour 
and other spatial qualities. However, one cannot treat aesthetic experience as 
though it is simply an examination of physical objects and their relations. In 
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that, one is confronted by the fact, that in aesthetic terms, qualities such as 
shape, composition and size are not elements purely determined in themselves. 
Not only does the artist or designer compare such forms, but they select and 
construct these elements on the basis of the kind of relationships which these 
forms seem to manifest in perception. What needs affirming here, as 
Wittgenstein maintains, is that colour, shape, texture and so on, are also 
determined by the kind of light, spatial sense, tonal values, opaqueness, 
transparency, thickness, rhythm and direction of line, smoothness and other 
such qualities. Consequently, colours, shape and texture, which the student 
manipulates can be considered from different points of view. 
Bearing the implications of what has been said, it seems in learning 
terms inadequate to say, "that I know what I like", because at the very least, 
this remark obscures the complex conditions that affect the understanding of 
art and design educational experience. This is not to deny, that because I 
cannot describe it, that it necessarily follows that I do not know what I like. 
For it may be argued, that the presence of certain objects themselves may be 
enough to say, "this is what I like". Moreover, the fact that I may not be able 
to explain why I feel I enjoy this particular object, may not in any particular 
way diminish my feelings for this object. A further ground for refusing to 
accept that "I know what I like" is meaningless, is to say that at times it may 
be appropriate to say just this. In learning terms, a searching issue for 
someone who might claim that they "know what they like", without explaining 
it, may itself prove to be invaluable in the determination of other experiences. 
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"I know what I like" may not be inconsequential because it can be used in a 
variety of ways, some of which may call for such a remark to be made. 
The issue for the teacher of art and design, as I have indicated, is 
what brings the experience into prominence. What then does this require? 
For the teacher as well as the student, this experience requires noticing how 
the experience was perceived and what distinguishes the particular expression 
that constitutes the work. In toning a piece of work, rearranging the 
composition, painting over areas which appear not to be working, varying 
one's painting technique so that the painting has more rhythm, using different 
media on the paint, using different sense-organs, changing the perspective and 
scale of the object to create more of a dynamic feeling as opposed to a static 
composition and so forth, stimulates ideas. But to give an account of these 
judgements requires a sophisticated understanding of the way in which one 
can use concepts, imagination, perception and behaviour in visual experience. 
One might say, that the task for the teacher in such a situation, is knowing 
how to create an environment that will encourage students to arrive at 
solutions that capture their creative understanding. 
A reason why one might consider what is captured in an aesthetic 
experience as a disputable explanation, has to do perhaps with the kind of 
interpretation that one is making. It is without question, as Ayer cites (p.73), 
that mistakes are often made because further observations do not seem to 
support one's perceptions. In which case, I think, it must be admitted, that the 
student has to demonstrate through a body of work, how different observations 
seem to support their perceptions. In learning, the student needs to produce an 
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argument supported by a body of ideas which he or she have researched and 
created. I have touched on the fact that a student's sketchbooks, models, 
diaries and so on are a vital source of information upon which to show that a 
student's perceptions are not randomly constructed. In sympathy with this, as 
Wittgenstein thought, it is the coming into existence that is part of what 
constitutes objectivity and learning. Here, the argument is, that when 
something is written, scribbled, painted or made, this experience gives us 
something concrete to compare, to deduce and to perceive. However, Ayer 
writes in the Wittgensteinian sense (pp.79-81), that one needs to formulate on 
what basis students can claim that their perceptions manifest or preserve the 
real identity of their objects? Certainly, as Wittgenstein argued, one can 
corroborate whether such perceptions seem to reflect the reality of the 
situation, but as Ayer goes on to say: "Our perceptual judgements are seldom 
indefinite, in the sense that we claim only to perceive a physical object of 
some sort or other. In the same way, we identify it as a thing of some specific 
kind, and this brings in further assumptions, as, for example, that the object is 
solid, or flexible, or that it is not hollow" (pp.80-1). Equally, in such cases, 
one may refer to one t s intentions, conceptual understanding and other sensory 
modes collaborating to determine the experience that one feels is correct in 
some way. Of course, the object before us possesses different problems about 
its recognition and identity, than say, an object which does not exist at all in 
physical terms. Yet, in art and design whether the object exists at all as a 
physical object or not, our acceptance of such objects, would be scrutinised 
with as much rigour as one would determine physical objects, albeit from a 
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different perspective. In other words, how one visually experiences the 
colour, shape, spatial content, function, purpose and meaning determines the 
representation of the object for us. Still, it is not just a matter of what is being 
perceived and how to account for this, for art and design learning must also 
relate to whether one is satisfied with the results of this work, and what kind 
of "special" perceptual identification one is making. 
In arguing that identity is important, when one comes to the issue of 
identity in a Mark Rothko painting, it would be false to say that one is 
"seeing" anything. If one is not meant to "see", what is the experience 
actually capturing? One is not expected when confronted by a Mark Rothko 
painting to "see this", for Rothko's intention is not to deal with form or 
content in the sense of what is being perceived as physical qualities in the 
work. In one respect, the visible does not exist in Rothko' s paintings, as the 
intention of the work is an attempt to describe, through experience, his 
emotions. One is expected to construct our experiences along emotional lines. 
An object of this kind is not simply a matter of observed perception, in that 
there is a distinct lack of spatial and time quality mark-making that one can 
refer to in the work itself. The artist has deliberately reduced these factors in 
his painting. It is conceivable that one cannot look at a painting of this kind 
and ostensively point to the painting and its colour changes or mark-making 
for specific guidance as to what the work expresses in precise terms. The sort 
of experience that one is having is not to be perceived as properties of a 
physical object, for quite clearly there are no object elements in his work. 
What one would have to pursue is perhaps an emotional response and not a 
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purely reasoned response to the work, to the extent that, how well the painting 
expresses this fact, is dependent on how well one can experience the emotional 
content that one relates to the work. If this is correct, however vague this 
feeling may be on a personal level, the experience itself may be an exact one, 
in respect that what is being suggested is a reference to and heightened 
awareness of emotional feelings as an affective response. 
As claimed, for the teacher or the student the description in a work 
of art, is not purely accountable in linguistic terms, as much of the experience 
may rely on sense-impressions. In relation to this discussion, it would be a 
mistake to attempt to justify Rothko's work as a reference to the physicality of 
any object, because it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find similarities 
and resemblance of specific feelings and their expressions reduced to this kind 
of analysis. Evidence of identity here is in part determined and justified by 
whether one is able, when perceiving the work, to be consciously aroused by 
one's particular emotions-ideas. These emotions-ideas, must be felt as 
feelings and not, as stated, to provoke simply a definite physical image of an 
object. Such feelings must be stimulated purely by the work itself. 
Familiarity or access to what the work is communicating, in part, means to 
abandon any recognition to things in the work for Rothko is not concerned 
here with its visible form, even though the visual sense of the work is reliant, 
in part, on how the work was constructed. How the work is constructed, may 
provoke one's awareness of what is pertinent to the painting, which in this 
case, because of the way the painterly qualities are layered and arranged on 
the canvas, the experience of this effect, arouses perhaps different 
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emotions-ideas taken from the work. The poignancy of the experience is 
characterised by the imagining and its activity. To understand and justify what 
is being imagined, requires both acquaintance and considerable engagement 
with the work over a period of time. Without knowing the artist's intentions 
in such an "abstract" piece of work, the construction of meaning may be 
difficult to establish, to those unfamiliar with this process. How far one would 
need to be precise about these intentions is perhaps an open question, but it 
seems clear enough that one can begin to unlock such an experience by simply 
asking whether the artist is interested in exploring colour to evoke 
emotions-ideas. This kind of response, for the teacher, would give rise 
further to specific questions about how the artist is examining and using 
colour. 
It might seem that in examining how the artist is using colour to 
evoke certain emotions, one can get a clear insight into understanding 
Rothko's paintings. The trouble is, that Rothko appears to be dealing in part 
with experiences that makes it difficult alone to understand his work on a 
conceptual-intellectual framework. One misses his point, if one hangs one's 
understanding in this fashion. It has also to be asserted, that one should not 
assume that what the artist describes is ipsa meta the case. In any teaching 
situation, the teacher must question the student's accuracy of understanding, 
by examining how such an experience is being applied, what this experience 
designates and its relevance. In order for students to demonstrate that they 
are making discriminating references, they have to be able to show how they 
are constructing their thoughts. Students work will probably go disastrously 
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wrong if they are incapable of producing the kind of evidence that explains 
their interpretations. The artist, like anyone else, is not infallible and because 
the act of making may not explain itself one must guard against arguments that 
appear solely to defend this position. It may seem that those who appeal 
merely to this kind of argument, and think that their work speaks for itself, 
may be showing arrogance of the most exalted kind. 
The question remains, that the way that colours are employed in a 
painting are anything but transparent, but it is through the application of 
colour and other materials, that issues and problems to do with conflict, 
contradiction and confirmation can arise. This step must be seen against the 
fact that an object may have, in a determinate manner, all these qualities 
expressed in different ways (see Vincent van Gogh's The Mght Cafe). These 
differences are further explored by Wittgenstein when he argues that the 
student may use the same shade of green to paint an object transparent and 
opaque. For the shade of green that the student is using may not be the 
important element in the transparency or opaqueness of the object. What the 
student is doing is setting up new relationships of experience, whereby the 
shade of green and its use is being determined in another way. I have 
previously given other examples of how this can be achieved, but it is 
immediately apparent, that in the painting work of Joseph Beuys, Georg 
Baselitz, Franceso Clemente, William Blake and designers such as I.e 
Corbusier, Daniel Lieberskind, Lebbeus Woods, Bernard Tschumi and 
Gaetano Pesce, drawing and making represent experiences which open up new 
relations, realities of experience and the possibility of seeing new fanns. This 
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gives us the view that creativity is an activity that is determined by having an 
understanding of the judgements that one is making in the work. In the 
Kantian sense, however, these aesthetic judgements are seen to be actively 
involving free-play. The argument that I have in mind in educational terms, 
is that art and design learning is essentially explorative and experimental in a 
creative sense. Hence, it follows, as Kant thought, that the art and design 
teacher needs to realise that such aesthetic experience cannot be planned in 
advance of what is being perceived in an experience. There can be no 
standard of what the perception may be and that what is ultimately produced 
may owe less to pure conceptualisation than one might be led to believe. 
From a different teaching angle, it may be absurd to insist that a 
certain criteria is necessary to determine an art or design object. Such a 
remark would appear to have repercussions for assessment and testing. 
Paradoxically, while it may seem as though one needs criteria in order to 
assess the work, the argument against this position, as Wollheim puts it: 
"assumes (by talking of representation) that there is an independent means of 
identifying what we see, independent that is of how we represent it, and then 
goes on to deny that this is so" (1972, pp.124-5). The issue being, that one 
cannot have independent means of assessing art and design work, since art and 
design is a visual experience whereby our actual perception of the art and 
design work is essential. One needs to take account of what is being perceived 
and its stimulation. If the drawing or object needs changing or adjusting then 
this is done by engaging the work itself; the work itself tells us what changes 
need to be made. If one assumes that one changes the object because it does 
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not meet the criterion involved, then this assumes that one has decided what 
the visual experience should be, prior to seeing the work. My account of the 
work, as Wollheim goes on to insist, must be in relation to the object itself, 
for without this perception, one's understanding may appear worthless. One 
can only talk about the work having experienced it, but this is not to say that 
my understanding is simply a matter of observation, far from it. The 
argument from a teaching side is, that if the perception is not a perception of 
the work itself, then one's understanding must be independent of the actual 
object concerned. This throws into question any possible deductions or 
inferences that one could make in support or against this work. Furthermore, 
the problem with criteria, is that they do not give an accurate guide about how 
the work was constructed, since art and design work cannot be predetermined 
in advance of what is being perceived in the work itself. In support of 
Wollheim's argument (p.128), that while the student may have intentions, it is 
what the student encounters with the work itself and what one observes as a 
consequence of one's actions conditioning this experience that prevents us 
from knowing in advance what the experience will be. Wollheim' s argument 
seems to be, at the very least, that criteria should be based on the visual 
experience of the work, but since it is the work itself that indicates whether 
something needs to be changed, does one really need criteria? It may also be 
true, as Wollheim goes on to state, that while one needs to observe one's 
actions as they are being formed, it does not follow that what is being 
represented in the work ties to what is being observed. What I am really 
looking at, then, may not be categorised by what is observed, but by some 
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other token of experience. For example its history, its tactile qualities or 
other sense-imaginative involvement. Yet, significantly, the more that the 
student draws from different aesthetic experiences the more likely he or she 
will be capable of seeing and comprehending new patterns and expressions of 
meaning and the sense of what is being observed. The acquisition of learning 
requires that steps are taken that show the handling of problems or issues in 
different ways. 
In order to bring the above argument down to earth, several things 
need to be taken into consideration. The educational value that I feel one has 
to demonstrate in art and design education, is that the student's art and design 
learning must be convincing. To achieve this effect, the student's degree of 
understanding that he or she has acquired must be accessible to others, but the 
means by which one achieves this goal cannot be realised unless one evokes 
imaginative experience. The main problem that stands in our way in 
educational terms, is how can one guarantee correctness in art and design 
practice, when such experience is multifarious in kind. There is nothing 
unusual in this in itself, for most people in their daily lives operate their 
experiences in this manner. However, the source of doubt that one may have 
about art and design experience seems to rest squarely upon creative 
imagination. 
The standard argument that education in general seems to insist upon, 
is that learning must be conceptual. Now, not wishing to devalue this 
experience, as it is indeed a crucial factor in learning, one might nevertheless 
ask to what extent is the conceptual argument in aesthetic terms revealing? 
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How instructive, in other words, is conceptual experience? Wittgenstein, in 
much of his later work undoubtedly gives us a number of examples of this 
approach and its importance in relation to acquiring and determining a 
successful performance of skill and understanding. A colour, as Wittgenstein 
remarks can be described as luminous, dull, cloudy and so on. To understand 
colour one may have to appeal to this kind of understanding to demonstrate 
the type of use of this colour and its sense in the work. An argument 
stemming from this that Wittgenstein is answering, is: "A colour which is 
"dirty" if it were a colour of a wall, needn I t be so in a painting" (RC, p.28, 
§89). However, if one wants to profit by art and design experience, one 
cannot understand this activity in conceptual terms alone. For in using colour 
the artist or the designer response involves a feeling state, a felt intensity that 
triggers and accompanies our experience of the colour. In the Kantian sense, 
such feelings are intuitive and involve cognition in general, but maybe there is 
also a case to argue that our feelings involve one I s whole being. It is this 
phenomenon, the feeling as an imaginative experience, rather than purely a 
conceptual experience that beats the drum in art and design experience. For 
without doubt the connection between ideas and feelings are essential to art 
and design. As Kant writes: "aesthetic judgements decide, not by any 
harmony with concepts, but by feeling" (CI, intro. VIII, 194). The 
indispensable argument is this, that in art and design experience one learns the 
meaning of a colour, not by simply having a concept of it, nor by simply its 
use, but how. one imaginatively experiences the colour, for decisions are made 
in the work based on this encounter. There is certainly a "closeness" of 
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experience about feelings in the aesthetic, but it is clear that one cannot relate 
to these states of being simply as intellectual constructs. One should not 
assume, however, that this means that one cannot apprehend the experience. 
Of course, one is not talking here about feeling sick, or feeling tired, but 
rather how the artist and the designer learns to zero into his or her feelings as 
references to creative understanding. 
In chapter one, I claimed that one may refer to these feelings, as Kant 
in one of his arguments seems to suggest, as intuitions which induce a feeling 
of our own selves in relation to purposiveness. It may seem that what gives 
further support to this argument in education, is that an art and design 
teacher, would encourage the students to reflect on their perceptions and 
feelings in different ways, as this would have the knock-on effect of 
developing and analysing further what they think and feel about their work. 
There would be various stages, interconnections and levels of thinking about 
these feelings that would further condition one's understanding. At times one 
might consider concentrating more on the sensation, mood or play of feeling 
rather than the object itself. In the aesthetic sense, such feelings are 
nevertheless relational, in that having a certain feeling about an object relates 
to aspects in the work which cause us to consider, what these feelings are 
dependent on. It would be nonsense for any student to argue that they could 
develop an understanding of an object without references to this object. 
Moreover, it is without doubt, that while the students, sensory and perceptual 
experiences may be keenly felt, what the students may be lacking is a way of 
communicating this experience. The teacher's role would be in this instance, 
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to show to students how they could possibly interpret and decode their 
experiences. What students need to learn is how to pick out and register both 
the simple and complex parts of their experiences and to understand the way 
such experiences are communicated in art and design terms. 
The difficulty with this, is that one may not be able to say what 
exactly this feeling consists of because there may be too many overlapping 
tones of this feeling that make it impossible to account precisely for its colour 
effect. Visual input alone is immensely complex, for one is not just talking 
about the here and now, as our visual understanding is integrated and 
immersed with other sensory factors embraced over a period of time. Apart 
from the fact that our feelings change, these experiences may be attributed to 
and arise from a layering of sensations, images and thoughts. In the aesthetic 
it bas to be recognised that there are a large number of factors that make the 
work intuitive. The making itself is an activity where its construction and 
assemblage involves through the sense of touch, images, ideas, mark-making 
and general materiality, the exploitation and characterisation of various 
differences in sensory and perceptual information. In education, the art and 
design teacher may have to repeatedly expose his or her students to certain 
aesthetic practices in order to bring about perceptual learning and 
understanding. It takes time, for instance, to learn how to paint flesh colours, 
how to plane a surface flat and how to understand one's feelings. There is a 
difference, one might argue between knowing one's feelings and when to act 
upon them. What the teacher needs to reflect on, is that the students' feelings 
which are embedded in certain sensory and cognitive perceptions, may be the 
270 
result or overlaying of both their personal responses to the work and the 
teacher's discussion and comments about such work. The argument being, 
that what the teacher discusses with the students about their work may be a 
significant factor that connects and determines for the students the kinds of 
limits or deductions that they can make about their own feelings. The 
intervention of the teacher can help the students to explore their feelings in 
different ways. On the other hand, one may have to abandon any attempt to 
precisely locate or determine what these feelings are other than the fact that 
they are cognitive-imaginative experiences involving perceptions of an 
object. 
From a practical position, the teacher would start the process of 
exploring these issues about feelings by devising in different ways, tactile, 
ŠŸWŬŲXHĚwritten and perceptual exercises, for students to experiment with 
and examine. The concern would be, how does one know when to reject one's 
feelings, how does one know when to modify them and how does one know 
when our feelings are "right"? For the teacher to deal with these concerns, 
and for the student to learn from such experience, requires that one tackles 
these issues by setting up project work or exercises that are designed to test 
the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the feelings that one has acquired 
or developed in the process. This might suggest for the teacher and the 
student the need to explore, in relation to feelings, the physicality, materiality, 
locality and presence of particular art and design work. Other issues might 
suggest that the student considers the optical appearance of objects contrasted 
with the functions or status of objects, the manipulation of forms, patterns, 
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details, spatial factors, the history of the object, its symbolic content, and so 
on. In this way, the student can learn to contrast, argue and bring to light their 
thoughts-feelings on such matters. Like most other subjects, it might seem 
that the student needs to be led "systematically", but with the proviso that the 
teacher must allow the student to reflect upon his or her own experiences. 
However, it would be more accurate to claim that a developmental and open 
free approach, that allows the student to question, analyse and search for 
meaning represents the best chance of the student understanding art and design 
experience. This obviously means, apart from other factors, that the teacher 
has to design exercises which draw on students past experiences. Of course, 
the teacher would further have to devise strategies whereby the content, for 
example, of dealing with spatial considerations, is made accessible for students 
to examine. This might mean setting up a still life, a slide lecture and or a 
visit to a gallery or a museum. If, as I have asserted, a student's feelings 
must relate to the perception of the object, the teacher and the student can 
devise ways to assess and explore what these restrictions and/ or possibilities 
will allow us to argue and experience. 
What one has to see is that there is no standard type by which he or 
she will use a dull, luminous or cloudy colour. Moreover, these colours have 
to feel right, if the object is to work at all. This argument knocks on the head 
any attempt to understand this experience in intellectual terms. It does of 
course, in educational terms, remain a fact that such art and design work must 
be checked to determine its credibility. I have pointed out in this thesis 
various ways in which this can be achieved. However, two final points are 
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worth mentioning further. The first concerns the fact that the teacher must 
possess certain feelings if he or she is to practice this understanding with 
anyone. If the teacher says to a student go and see Paul Cezanne's The 
Basket of Apples, 1895, and look at the way he paints his apples, the appeal 
that the teacher is making, is that he too possesses certain feelings about this 
work. He or she must know something of what can be learnt from this 
experience otherwise what was the point of mentioning Paul Cezanne's work? 
In this respect, the teacher's understanding should not be aimless, as this 
would confuse the student about his or her intentions. Secondly, I concur 
with Wittgenstein, that if art and design practice is to have its lines of reality 
tied, the sense experience of such work cannot be unrelated to an object and as 
Pears points out (p.341), unconnected to our physical world. Our sensations, 
ŠŸĚWittgenstein seems to argue in his later work, must connect to objects of 
experience in such a way that the sense of these feelings are perceptible by 
others. In this way, one begins to make one's understanding accountable. 
However, one hastens to add, that sensation-language situations alone do not 
explain the deeper perceptual experiences that one has to feel and thus create 
in order to understand properly art and design work. The creative mind, as 
any art and design teacher will acknowledge, sets its own impulses and tuning 
more often than not from what is imaginatively perceived and played with, in 
a dynamical sense, in thought, feeling and intuition. 
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Conclusion 
Quite clearly, this work has explained that there are many diverse 
ways in which the teacher can teach art and design and the student can learn 
about art and design. The special problems that face teaching in education 
must relate to the "intrinsic" diversity posed by the art and design experience. 
Creatively, one's imagination can be turned and viewed in many ways, the 
feeling of which may be expressive of a number of things. It is not an 
experience that can be described as deterministic in purely conceptual terms, 
because creatively, as I have mentioned, it is neither limited nor under the rule 
of any particular concept. To make matters worse, this implies that art and 
design experience cannot be formulated or tested. Equally, if no precise 
conception of art and design work can be found, it is reasonable to argue that 
this practice must compound further the problem of teaching in art and design. 
As I have argued, however, this should not mislead us into thinking that art 
and design education' is inferior or inadequate in any way. To show how 
sophisticated and accountable this experience can be, the two main arguments 
that I have been concerned with expressing in relation to creative learning, 
stem from Wittgenstein's notion of sensation-language and Kant's notion of 
cognitive-feeling. What I have attempted to demonstrate in this thesis, is 
how accountable and how effective art and design experience can be, given 
these different philosophical viewpoints. Certainly, education-wise, there are 
drawbacks if one attempts to see one of these arguments and not the other. 
Given the debate that I have constructed in this work, how one employs these 
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arguments must be a matter of considerable aesthetic judgement. It has been 
in part my argument that in considering aesthetic judgement, there is a wealth 
and subtlety to this experience that is indispensable to the learning situation in 
. art and design education. 
Obviously, it becomes important in teaching terms, for the teacher to 
show how this understanding is acquired. Of course, it needs to be stated, that 
art and design understanding cannot be reduced to the mere formal qualities 
of its representation, for however "good" this representation may be, art and 
design experience extends itself beyond the formal qualities of the 
picture-plane. A student, then, needs to investigate more than just the 
perceptual features of his or her art and design work. For no matter how 
rational one's methods may be, the aesthetic experience intensifies the 
cognitive and sensuous side of the student's experience beyond merely 
practical considerations. Indeed, one might further suppose that as an 
imaginative experience art and design confounds convention and with it the 
belief that its sense conforms with the expectations of a regular system of 
making and doing. 
While few in education would deny that creative experience is 
important, the nature of what constitutes precisely such experience is often a 
missing feature in art and design education. My position has been to show on 
the one hand the diversity and complexity of this experience, and on the 
other, to show how one can handle in a pedagogical fashion the sense of 
learning that can take place in art and design education. At the heart of this 
art and design learning, is the interplay that takes place between imagination 
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and understanding. The relationship between imagination and understanding 
is a dynamic one, a response conditioned by the activity of experience. 
Without doubt, this art and design activity is not a form of escapism, for the 
experience must be determined by the perception of the object and its 
meaning. Since art and design practice is essentially an imaginative 
experience, the difficult task for the teacher is being able to suggest ways that 
will enable the student to correct and enlarge his or her understanding of this 
experience in an insightful manner. Any attempt the teacher makes to improve 
art and design understanding, as I have indicated, must guard against any 
textbook or worksheet activity that is prescriptive in kind. 
One normally thinks of this imaginative process in art and design as 
mutually embracing the compositional arrangement of the work and the 
et:eative play of thoughts and feelings that interact with this experience 
reciprocally. An experience that can in part spring from the form and content 
of the art and design work. In which case, how students show their 
understanding is very much dependent on their own resources, their ability to 
respond and express colours, shapes, ideas and so on. A student will not be 
able to express properly colours, shapes and ideas unless he or she is able to 
demonstrate reasonable connections between these kinds of factors. As a 
result, one cannot claim that what a student creates in his or her art and design 
work, is "blind". But what is enlightening about how a student expresses his 
or her work is indeed problematic for there are many delicate tonal changes 
that can have a profound affect on the employment of understanding, and what 
is acceptable in these circumstances. 
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From a Kantian and Wittgensteinian position, I have explored some 
of the sophisticated difficulties and possible solutions that an art and design 
teacher should consider and learn to acquire. It follows perhaps that the art 
and design teacher should concentrate on activities which are "productive" 
rather than simply "reproductive", as such experience would be attempting to 
demonstrate that art and design practice is empowering. For it seems that one 
consequence of this approach, would be to encourage the capacity to extend 
rather than constrain one's understanding. Yet because there are many 
perceptual differences that can affect the "productive" sense of the art and 
design work, the teacher needs to approach such work with caution. 
Educationally, I have argued that aesthetic understanding must be embraced. 
My argument has been that in art and design students leam about themselves 
and what they are expressing, as Oakeshott states (1959, pp.18-20) through 
creative involvement. What emerges, is that art and design education 
represents a special kind of perception based on the notion of creativity. Art 
and design education does indeed represent a personal way of expressing one's 
understanding, but one that is stimulated and guided by argument. The 
making of this argument can be quite exhaustive and extraordinary. Here, the 
art and design teacher at all levels of education must recognise that the 
aesthetic experience is a self in the making, a coexistence between past and 
present ideas. It should be noted that what the student encounters in the work 
affects the way past and present ideas are perceived and handled. 
Consequently, what a student meets in a work, together with the project 
requirements, often determines the manner in which past and present ideas 
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connect. Any dialogue that the teacher has with a student can affect this 
balance. Similarly, it is important to realise that any coexistence between past 
and present experiences may be absorbed and mingled by the student in 
different ways. In this case, the character of what is produced through the 
various connections between past and present experiences is determined by 
how the student employs his or her creative sensibilities. Thus, to repeat, the 
quality of the student's work in art and design is enriched by how past and 
present thoughts are conditioned by imaginative perceptions. It follows, as 
suggested, that ŸŤĚbest art and design practice is where there is freedom to 
form in a purposive manner. 
My attempt has been to demonstrate and justify art and design 
education and what one can expect to express and learn from this concern and 
its history. Art and design practice attempts to reveal the connections 
between our own inner centre of consciousness and the external world, by 
responding to the impulses and analysis of personal experience. In art and 
design students cannot distance themselves from the work, for there is nothing 
neutral about this experience. In other words, the student has to make a 
personal case, state a position and make an argument. There are, as I have 
claimed no immutable facts that make art and design dependent on anything, 
other than aesthetic sense. While there is no absolute definition of what 
constitutes aesthetic experience, everything, nevertheless, is dependent on the 
particular situation and what this embodies individually. At the same time, 
the learning derives its intelligence from what is created articulately in these 
particular art and design situations that one devises. In designing projects 
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whereby students can learn to experience and express the aesthetic in a 
creative fashion, through the difficult elements of form and content, the 
teacher adopts a position that shows where he or she stands on such matters. 
Against this, the teacher needs to combat any suggestion that art and design is 
merely a relative matter. What the teacher teaches, often has applications in a 
wider range of matters beyond any immediate setting or reference. 
Pertinently, a teacher would want to see that his or her particular comments 
about a piece of work were being used by students in other situations and in 
various ways. The stand being taken, is that while the teacher is concerned 
with the student's current work, his or her thoughts on these developments 
have implications beyond perhaps, the immediate work. In this sense, one 
might also reply that what is often discussed aesthetically has repercussions for 
other work of a similar nature. Lessons are learnt that can and should be 
transferred to other situations. In the course of the teacher-student dialogue, 
the student learns to pick up the language of art and design practice. On this 
view, the student is learning in part the kind of discourse that is involved in 
making aesthetic judgements. 
It is conceivable, that the lesson that a student may learn from a given 
situation may seem appropriate to other learning environments throughout this 
person I s life. Yet, as proposed, it is quite clear that students will not grasp 
and create in an imaginative fashion unless they can experience in a specific 
kind of way, revealing the connections they are making in a plausible manner. 
Educationally, the teacher would want to see some of the student's previous 
learning being brought to bear on current curriculum assignment work in order 
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to substantiate certain connections in his or her object. The student has to 
show at times that he or she is able to take advantage of the teacher's 
professional judgement. Even so, what is relevant or plausible in aesthetic 
terms is, however, far from straightforward, since such notions require that 
the student can substantiate his or her understanding by the kind of arguments 
that he or she is making by visual means. It is because a student's response to 
an object may vary that it is necessary for the teacher to know something about 
how the student is responding. As I have remarked, the difficulty for the 
student, is that there is no standard of success that he or she can tum to for 
guidance in determining the work, because each piece of work must be judged 
on its own merits, an experience that cannot be predetermined. To try to 
predetermine art and design practice would be to disregard the very essence of 
ŸĚexperience in relation to imaginative free-play. I have argued in this 
thesis, that imaginative free-play in the Kantian sense, refers to aesthetic 
autonomy. According to this account, students must be allowed to experience 
the work in their own way. At one level, the significant point here, is that the 
free-play of the imagination allows the students to strive towards an honest 
showing of their own thoughts and feelings. That such experience may be 
subsequently without ulterior aim, is evidence that an object may be variously 
tackled by a student. The position is, that imaginative free-play is creative 
energy that provokes and involves the perception of thought. An experience, 
as I have claimed, that may be as much conceptual as it is intuitive. It is no 
easy matter to provoke the power to make, yet all children possess this ability. 
The power to make, as suggested, is essential to understanding and hence to 
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education, as it involves the ability to know. One comprehends oneself, in the 
making process as one learns to construct one's thoughts and what they 
express. However, in studio practice, the teacher must wait and see what the 
student develops in his or her work.. The teacher must not in this sense impose 
preconceptions, but let the student's work reveal itself. How instructive a 
teacher's comments may be is partly dependent on what the student is 
constructing. But the teacher's remarks to his or her students are not destined 
to serve only those considerations to do with the student's visual work itself. 
The case being, that the teacher may also have to consider the student's 
intentions, attitude, constraints, background knowledge, level of ability and 
approach work.. 
Unlike science education, what imbues the sense of art and design is 
sympathetically connected with feeling. Feelings are part of the aesthetic 
qualities that accompany any understanding of art and design work. The 
formative process that seems to influence the student's art and design learning 
is couched in the freedom to experience; an experience that is not limited by 
concepts or rules, but strives for ideas of reason (Cl, § 17, 232) that manifest 
themselves in imaginative thought. A central argument of mine has been that 
any imaginative play that one adopts in art and design relates to understanding 
and is thus "serious business" (C J, §53, 329 ), because it "penetrates much 
further into the region of ideas" (Cl, §53, 333) provoking and exciting visual 
sense as it develops and plays. To appreciate the sense of this the student's 
work must ultimately be self-confirming if the art and design learning is to 
have any value at all. Appreciation is that which is self -confirming. 
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Nevertheless, the components which allow the student to appreciate art and 
design work rest to a large extent on how the teacher communicates his or her 
awareness of what constitutes proper experience and judgements in these 
matters. 
In an imaginative way, feelings involve certain relations between 
emotions, thoughts and sensations. Such experience, as explained in an art 
and design sense, has an intellectual and non-intellectual character to it. Thus 
in art and design education the relationship that a student builds up in his or 
her work, involves the imaginative free-play of one's felt response to the 
work. The student learns by what is being perceived, to comprehend and 
guide his or her feelings. It follows that the character of such feelings would 
seem to be intentional. Crucially, what the student investigates and the 
ŸŤŲĚin which the teacher directs the student to consider particular kinds of 
perceptions to do with his or her object, must condition the student's feeling 
response. The students explore their feelings through rational and sensory 
observations involving the perception of visual, auditory and tactile 
experience. The students' experiences, therefore, relate to tangible sensible 
qualities that have educational importance. Conversely, it might also be 
implied from this, that art and design experience cannot be regarded at one 
level as free-play experience at all. Our feelings get their description from 
the conditions of their production, which stem from how the student notes his 
or her impressions and develops an attitude towards this experience. It 
follows, that the student's awareness of his or her feelings are dependent on 
how one sees and uses certain qualities of his or her experiences. 
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An aesthetic experience, as I have pointed out, must in some sense be 
descriptive of the story or thoughts it is telling if it is to be successful. To 
understand this properly the teacher must know how the student is addressing 
issues in his or her work and the kind of approach he or she is taking. From 
an educational point of view this means, for example, that the student, would 
have to use a certain kind of mark-making to represent a particular kind of 
feeling, image and thought. The student learns that mark-making can entail 
specific feelings, images and thoughts as perceptions of a possible experience. 
This infers that the student argues his or her case in part by making 
connections that gather the pictorial sense that accompanies the work. In 
many ways, meaning is built up when the character of the work involves 
those fertile and difficult moments that seem to touch the nerve of one IS 
ŸŪŠWÙŬŪHĚreflecting on what one has experienced and composed. In art and 
design, then, a teacher must stimulate not· only a student I s thoughts but their 
sensations as well. 
It is important to remember that firstly the aesthetic experience is 
stimulated by events, images, feelings and thoughts, secondly it is a response 
to these events, images, feelings and thoughts, and thirdly it involves ideas 
and technique. The character of such experience in an interdependent manner, 
is spontaneous and reflective. The sense here, one must conclude, is that the 
aesthetic in art and design can be employed sensibly. For this reason, one of 
the lines that I have attempted to draw has been to show that a student who 
may opt to do art and design classes must realise that he or she will be dealing 
with experiences that can go well beyond the communication of language. 
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I have repeatedly attempted to explain that aesthetic experience is not 
a self-indulgent experience, a display of feeling alone, as some might suppose. 
Art and design education begins to take definite shape when students engage, 
structure and differentiate experiences in relation to a point of view, an 
intuition or a conceptual experience that relates to human understanding. 
Whatever form this takes, this perspective represents a position of reference 
which has to be accounted for. How a student becomes acquainted with his or 
her experiences are issues that must concern education. One deduces, that 
how ideas are derived enables the student to learn something about aesthetic 
content. This point of view, however, along with the work itself may be a 
constant developing experience. While the students must learn to objectify 
particular life experiences, the capacity to touch the centre of one IS 
ŸVȘÙŬẀVŪŤVVĚcreatively involves the powers of perception. For students to 
demonstrate that they are extending their understanding, requires not only that 
their experiences be visibly recognisable in aesthetic terms, but that their 
work should show new relationships of experience that validate their 
perceptions. The teacher wants to see that the student is able to capture his or 
her imagination and one's public sense of this experience by the way that he or 
she is able to handle a certain subject. As explained, the student learns about 
art and design, by the teacher setting various assignments that allow the 
student to explore and develop relationships of different kinds. As a 
consequence of this, it may be argued that it is of fundamental importance that 
a student learns both about different relations that objects can have and that 
there are different ways to "seeing" objects, because without the development 
-
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of this sense, the student's conceptual framework will be limited. This seems 
to suggest that a student's creative understanding is dependent significantly on 
how he or she is able to view an object in different ways. Thus, students need 
to develop different perceptions of object experience if they wish to enhance 
their conceptual-creative understanding. What takes shape, then, in art and 
design, in the words of Ernst Cassirer, is: "not simply a momentary outburst 
of passionate feeling" (1945, p.146). For art and design work represents a 
way of viewing the world and of making sense of it. A further point about 
this, is that the art and design teacher must be concerned with developing and 
varying student's seeing and interpretation, so that as Ernst Cassirer implies, 
it alters and extends his or her view of reality and sense of experience 
(p. 110). Art and design can be, then, a daunting task for any student. 
To understand art and design one has to enter into the life of 
aesthetic experience. It is an experience that Oakeshott describes as sensuous, 
perceiving, feeling, desiring, thinking, approving, imagining, listening, 
reflecting, touching, discussing, demonstrating, intuiting, crying, laughing, 
desiring, loving, symbolising and so on (1959, pp.11-8). One wonders how 
many other subjects in our educational system can draw upon experience in 
such a positive way. What emerges from this, is that art and design practice 
attempts to foster and bring to light those things which are aspects of our life, 
aspects which individuals share and experience. Not I hasten to add, in some 
inconsiderate fashion, but in a genuine attempt to understand one's experience 
by imaginatively making that which seems important to oneself; an experience 
that is part of one's personal development. But, it remains true to say, that 
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such experience while often seen as a release, an "intrinsic" need to strive for 
personal expression, can also be a difficult "mental" experience to realise in 
visual terms. If the student is genuinely attempting to make sense of his or her 
thoughts and feelings, then, this experience justifies claims to learning. In 
respect of this work, one could say that the kind of learning that the aesthetic 
manifests, is the kind of learning that attempts to take stock of what the 
student is imagining, feeling, perceiving and thinking. Art and design is an 
embodiment of not only a coherent experience, but one that reaches out to the 
very essence of self-expression, knowledge and understanding. I have shown 
that art and design experience and its judgement is not a vacuous, passive or 
"organic sensation" (CI, §44, 306), but rather, as Kant thought, a determined 
reflection of self-recognition by imaginative means. For Wittgenstein, art and I 
., 
design understanding is embedded in one's "practice". His view was that 
form and content in aesthetic terms is given meaning through one's actions, 
application and description. As one has seen, this aesthetic experience in art 
and design education is not merely a physiological or "organic response", but 
involves in a determinate fashion intelligible expressions of human 
understanding. Not surprisingly, Kant further insists in relation to this 
experience: "that this form is not, as it were, a matter of inspiration, or of a 
free swing of the mental powers, but rather a slow and even painful process of 
improvement, directed to making the form adequate to his thought without 
prejudice to the freedom in the play of those powers" (CI, §48, 312-3). It is 
this complexity, as I have outlined, that the teacher and the student of art and 
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design must embrace, if one 1S to employ the relevance of aesthetic 
understanding in education. 
In summary, the teacher in art and design must deliver a curriculum 
that constitutes aesthetic experience and its realisation. It is, therefore, a 
characteristic of art and design experience that it transcends boundaries. 
Seeing, interpreting, comparing, differentiating, adjusting, usmg, 
experimenting and examining are all elements which make up this experience 
and, as shown, are ingrained in art and design education. Through various 
realities of experience that involve different perceptions of objects, the student 
can learn to understand how art and design communicates its sense. Different 
perceptions of objects require from the teacher that he or she encourages the 
student to notice how different ways of seeing can affect one's interpretation of 
VŸUĚobjects. This happens because the teacher shows the students how they 
can interact with their environment to perceive their world, and to demonstrate 
this fact by comparing the effects of different mark-making, ideas and so on. 
One ought not to forget, though, that prolonged, spontaneous and intermittent 
thoughts are constant hallmarks of art and design practice. The student 
acquires a growing familiarity with art and design practice when the teacher 
can observe a student engaging in this process. Through one's actions a 
student will demonstrate his or her attitude towards art and design. The 
teacher assesses and looks to see how students are progressing by how they 
respond, analyse and express colours, shapes, lines, textures, rhythms and so 
on. In this way, art and design education is a visible creation, that to a large 
extent can be monitored and appraised. Here, educationally, it is important to 
287 
recognise as I have mentioned, that these rhythms, colours, textures, 
constructions, spatial projections and so forth, are not just part of a rational 
process, they are also necessary elements for the development of creativity. 
For it is the representation of what is perceived in such experiences through 
the sense-organs and the perceptual properties that one might attribute to such 
encounters, that can stimulate imaginative ideas. In a different vein, for a 
student to "see" an object and to work through his or her ideas of this object 
requires an intensity of thought and feeling. So much so, that an intuitive and 
reflective grasp of the ideas being extended in the work, evokes the selectivity 
of materials and techniques. From this last consideration, it might also be 
said, that art and design learning is not simply a matter of seeing and 
interpreting. In other words, one realises that art and design is a making 
experience, and not just a response to seeing and interpreting objects in a 
gallery or a museum. The making itself further involves aspects of seeing and 
interpreting not found purely in viewing the visual object, but rather, in 
creating it. One's response and analysis of objects depends, as explained, on 
all sorts of distinctions and connections that have to be made, but only a token 
of these features are present in the final object. Whatever the merits of the 
final work in art and design a whole range of perceptions and idea 
developments will have been phenomenologically encountered and explored, in 
order to make the visual sense distinguishable and to represent the 
importance of these features. 
It is worth distinguishing, that because learning presupposes 
self-realisation, it is crucial that the art and design teacher shows by means of 
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models, drawings, sketchbook, paintings and so on, how this process to some 
degree operates. The teacher's role, in one respect, is to explore and debate 
with students what one can do with certain ideas and how this experience can 
. express and confirm the degree and direction of student learning. I have given 
numerous examples of this approach in this work. Similarly, I have claimed 
that art and design experience is educationally sound. To support this, I have 
argued to begin with that what the student encounters in art and design 
education involves disinterested and unconditioned experience (see chapter 
one). Furthermore, I have argued that art and design education also involves a 
physical understanding of the experience of objects by conceptual and 
sensation means. The line that I have taken, is that students should be 
encouraged to self-express their own interest, not in any shallow sense, but by 
obliging the individual through autonomy to search and scrutinise particular 
experiences that reflect without reservation, understanding. The synopsis 
being, that art and design experience does not reduce the concept of 
understanding, but positively attempts to extend it in a comprehensive 
manner. This experience criss-crosses and structures successively various 
plays of thought, so that what is eventually established by the student may be 
the way a line cuts across the canvas aggressively or the way a leg of a chair 
can look sharp and decisive. It is clear that what holds the image of this line 
or leg of a chair intact, is the way the form communicates itself. In a crucial 
way the student must show how a line or leg of a chair holds together and 
enclose for the student certain thoughts, inviting us to perceive the perception 
of these features in a certain fashion. If Kant is correct, the rule of this 
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perception is dependent on the individualisation of an experience (CI, §46). 
In short, students in art and design must define for themselves what their work 
is communicating, but they can only do this by arguing their case. What is 
produced by students, is dependent on the state of affairs that they are able to 
bring to bear on their work, and how they are able to attach meaning to these 
expressions. 
One might agree with Wollheim that: "A non-arbitrary relationship 
does not have to be one-one relationship: it can be many-one, or even 
many-many" (1994, p.187). What is implied, here, is that there is more than 
one way in which a student can represent an image of a tree, can make a chair 
on the theme of Cubism or deal with the notion of homelessness. In 
exploring such issues, the art and design teacher knows that this experience is 
ŸŤŲĚcomplicated by the fact that what is constructed by the student involves 
visual experiences that have non-linguistic characteristics. I have explained 
that for the student to form an idea out of their experiences, requires 
considerable understanding of visual perception and pictorial meaning. It is 
important to see, however, that the intricacy and intimacy which constitutes art 
and design, complicates still further the teaching situation. The essential point 
is, that art and design education is not just an appeal to reason alone, for 
aesthetic understanding is an experience evoked by creative activity. The 
situation being, that students must to some extent carve out their own object 
sense, making accessible their own understanding in aesthetic terms. As 
argued, the pictorial demands which the student has to grapple with can reach 
a depth beyond intellectual interest or language use. 
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To reiterate, the distinction seems to be that art and design "expands 
the mind by giving freedom to the imagination" (CI, §53, 326), thus ruling 
out any claim that one can conceive of such experience purely by reason or 
language. None the less, there is no common standard or exact reference 
criteria that the teacher can apply to all of the students he or she teaches, since 
each piece of art and design work is individually created. The teacher like the 
student must be persuaded by the argument. It therefore requires an 
experienced and knowledgeable art and design teacher to deal with these 
issues and to demonstrate the kinds of arguments that a student needs to 
produce to substantiate his or her thinking. If the student is to realise certain 
ideas then he or she must understand what is being evoked by the work and 
how to account for the perceptions that belong to this experience. 
I have shown in various places how art and design practice m 
education can transcend, by its sensuous and imaginative nature, certain 
obstacles which prevent us from thinking and experiencing objects in new or in 
different relations. One might suppose, then, that art and design activity 
challenges the orthodoxy of what constitutes experience and understanding. 
Thus, one of the lessons here for education, is that a teacher who is able to 
stimulate a student's imagination more energetically will find that such a 
student will not be confined by reference only to the objective existence of 
things as one might fix it through scientific concepts and laws. In art and 
design education students cannot just sit there in a classroom waiting for 
something passively to happen, but rather they must create and intensify their 
experience. Such activity "induces much thought" (CI, §49, 314) which 
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one might construe in the process as an attempt to remodel experience ( CJ, 
§49, 314). One's attempt therefore to induce thought and to remodel it, must 
be necessary to education. 
As part of the learning activity, a teacher would want to see that 
students were both changing and developing their ideas in a manner that 
attempts to show that they are opening up and deepening their understanding. 
In this regard, the art and design teacher's role is to provide the kind of 
stimulus that will arouse and stimulate the students to realise their creative 
potential. To nurture a student's appreciation of art and design is to provide 
an environment that challenges and develops visual understanding through 
physical and "mental" experience. Apart from the importance of "play" here, 
what is creatively expressed by the student tends to be a conscious effort to 
capture a particular experience. Such work gives feedback to the students and 
represents a perception of themselves and what they have achieved. Here, one 
must not overlook the fact that art and design education extends beyond 
"technical skill", which may be argued is merely a means to an end. 
Moreover, art and design embraces not just the product itself, but the 
purposive sense that the student encounters in evoking his or her feelings and 
ideas. Educationally, learning about one's thoughts and feelings aesthetically 
is characterised by how the student is absorbed by his or her impulse to 
create. To achieve any kind of success in art and design education involves 
the free-play of the imagination, in order for the student to be stimulated by 
the potentialities of what is being evoked. For the art and design teacher, he 
or she must find through the curriculum, ways that properly animate and 
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strengthen this involvement. Aesthetic appreciation, then, captures a more 
sensitive understanding of our ideas than language because such experience 
allows students to tap into their feelings and emotions in a way that one cannot 
grasp simply by linguistic means. If one is to allow the student the space to 
create in art and design education, the teacher must aim to clarify and 
strengthen the student's independent research and personal vision within a 
creative approach. To achieve this, the student's work must involve the 
capacity to be realised as intended, and the conditions which make this 
possible stem from the work itself and one's ability to imagine. But this, as 
argued, is not an experience where a basic standard of measurement can be 
applied. 
Students often wish to share their experiences, but for students to 
VŸĚtheir experiences, requires as Wittgenstein thought, that their visual 
sense must presuppose a description of its understanding. The danger for us in 
education, is not to subordinate necessarily that which sensation-language is 
unable to effectively explain. Of course, in the Kantian sense, such 
description must have an imaginative-feeling dimension if one is to profit by 
this understanding in aesthetic terms. Tempered by this understanding, art and 
design education can be justified in so far as it attempts to capture the reality 
of certain experiences by how one imagines and is "moved" by ideas. 
However, unlike Kant, one may have to be cautious and distance oneself from 
Wittgenstein's position concerning understanding in general, for his arguments 
do not seem to penetrate deep enough into the significance of imagination. I 
have attempted to show, in various ways, that art and design education 
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embraces Kant's and Wittgenstein' s philosophy in a genuine and profound 
sense and the heightened awareness of what is explored, is infused with the joy 
of learning and understanding, transcending and comprehending one's own 
perceptions of the world. This discussion ends with the belief that art and 
design education must reassert and familiarise itself with the complexity, 
richness and sophistication of the learning experience in art and design. My 
critique has been to show to the teacher these very points that transform art 
and design experience. 
In general, it seems that there has been a tacit suppression in art and 
design education to limit its thought to what can simply and directly be 
applied to teaching situations under the model which Smeyers and Marshall 
emphasise as: "measurable learning outcomes" (1995, p.28). Such an insular 
view of learning can be detrimental to the quality of teaching in this area and 
paralyses in the process the vibrant and enlightening sensibility of art and 
design understanding. If education wishes to benefit and confront art and 
design work, it must acknowledge that this activity has a overwhelmingly rich 
seam of personally created detail crucial to its life. 
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